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THE

HISTORY

OF THE REIGN OF

PHILIP THE SECOND,

KING OF SPAIN.

VOL. III.

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HISTORY

OF THE REIGN OF

PHILIP THE SECOND,

KING OF SPAIN.

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THE

HISTORY

OF THE REIGN OF

PHILIP THE SECOND,

KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK XIX.

BOOK XIX.

1584.

Temper and diſpoſition of the States.

THE prince of Parma did not neglect the opportunity which the diſtreſs occaſioned by the death of the prince of Orange afforded him, to perſuade the confederated provinces to accept of peace. But their diſtruſt of Philip, their attachment to the Proteſtant faith, and the other cauſes mentioned above, ſtill retained their influence, and rendered them averſe to any reconcilement with a prince, againſt whom their indignation was more inflamed than ever, by the cruel injury which they had lately ſuffered. They could attend to nothing now but how to proſecute the war with vigour, or to teſtify their reſpect for the memory of the prince of Orange.

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1584. Prince Maurice.

WILLIAM's eldeſt ſon, the count of Buren, was ſtill a priſoner in Spain; and his ſecond, prince Maurice[a], was engaged in the ſtudy of literature and ſcience at the univerſity of Leyden. On this young man, who, at the time of his father's death, was only eighteen years old, of great hopes, and whoſe actions afterwards exceeded the moſt ſanguine expectations of his countrymen, the States beſtowed the greateſt part of the dignities which his father had enjoyed. Beſides creating him high-admiral of the Union, they conferred upon him the government of Holland, Zealand, and Utrecht. And, in order to ſupply his want of experience, and ſecure his being early inſtructed in the military art, they appointed count Hohenloe, the moſt accompliſhed officer in their ſervice, to be his lieutenant or deputy, till he ſhould attain to greater maturity of years and underſtanding.

Reduction of Bruſſels, Ghent, &c.

FROM this conduct of the States, which proved that William's aſcendant over them had not terminated with his life, Farneſe perceived that it would be impoſſible to bring the war to a concluſion in any other way than by force of arms. Diſmiſſing therefore all thoughts

[a] Grandſon, by the mother's ſide, of the celebrated elector of Saxony of the ſame name.

of

of peace, he proceeded with great activity in the military operations which he had begun in Brabant and Flanders; and his ſucceſs was in proportion to the prudence and vigilance which he exerted. Beſides the towns above mentioned, he had lately acquired Vilvorden and Dendremonde, but he had not yet reduced Ghent, Bruſſels, or Antwerp. To have proceeded ſeparately againſt each of thoſe places, in the ordinary way of ſieges, would have protracted the war to an exceſſive length. Inſtead of that method, he bethought himſelf of another, which was ſuggeſted by the ſituation of the ſeveral towns, and the nature of their reſources. This was to make himſelf maſter of the banks of the rivers and canals on which they ſtood, while he ſent out flying parties of horſe to ſcour the adjacent country. And thus he not only put a ſtop to their trade, without which they could not ſubſiſt, but cut off all of them but Antwerp from every ſort of communication with other places. For ſeveral months, however, the inhabitants declined entering into any terms of accommodation. But when they conſidered that, unleſs he were obliged to draw off his troops by the approach of a ſuperior army, they muſt ſoon be reduced to the laſt extremity, their reſolution failed, they began to liſten more patiently to the exhortations which the ſecret partiſans of Spain were daily ſound-

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ing in their ears; and, at length, ſuch of them as were ſituated in the more interior parts, firſt Ghent, and afterwards Bruſſels and ſome other inland towns, reſolved to return under the Spaniſh government, upon conditions to which Farneſe had, on different occaſions, ſhewn himſelf willing to agree.

Of theſe conditions, the moſt important were the following: "That the people ſhould engage to acknowledge no other ſovereign but the king of Spain: That no religion but the Roman Catholic ſhould be permitted, but that the Proteſtants ſhould be allowed to remain in the Netherlands for two years, in order to diſpoſe of their effects: That a ſum of money ſhould be paid for defraying the expences of the war: That all paſt offences ſhould be forgiven, and all the ancient rights and privileges of the inhabitants reſtored and maintained inviolate."

In fulfilling his part of theſe conditions, Farneſe not only acted with ſtrict fidelity, but diſplayed a degree of lenity and moderation that was admirably calculated to promote his views. Of the fine of three hundred thouſand crowns, to which the people of Ghent conſented in their treaty of ſurrender, he demanded only two hundred thouſand. And although in his

his act of indemnity six persons, more obnoxious than the rest, had been excepted, he required from them only a pecuniary fine. He was likewise at all times willing to listen to the complaints of the Protestants, and to redress their grievances [b]. 1584.

Siege of Antwerp.

All the considerable towns in Brabant were now subdued, except Antwerp. The prince had early formed the resolution of laying siege to that important city; and some time before his acquisition of Ghent and Brussels, he had taken measures for beginning it. But in order to secure success, it was necessary that his utmost skill and strength should be exerted; and he now applied himself to the prosecution of his design, with all the anxiety, zeal, and industry, which an object of the highest consequence deserved.

Antwerp was at this time not only the richest and most splendid, but likewise the strongest city in the Netherlands. As it lies extended along the banks of the Scheld, and the confederates still maintained their superiority at sea, it was thought to be sufficiently secured on one side by a strong wall which ran parallel to the river; and on the other sides it was fortified by

[b] Meteren, p. 368.

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ramparts of extraordinary height, and a ditch filled with water, of ſuch depth and breadth, as in the opinion of thoſe times rendered it almoſt impregnable.

SUCH was the judgment formed of it by the prince of Parma, and on this account he did not intend to attempt reducing it by ſtorm, but to have recourſe to the ſlower method of blockade, which he knew muſt ſooner or later prove ſucceſsful.

ON the ſide towards the land, he found it extremely eaſy to render the blockade complete, as the ſtates had no army able to contend with him in the field, and all the neighbouring towns were in his poſſeſſion. But theſe circumſtances he perceived would be of little advantage, while the beſieged remained maſters of the Scheld; and therefore to deprive them of this reſource was the great object to which all his operations, during this celebrated ſiege, were directed.

THE people of Antwerp had penetrated into his deſign, and had omitted nothing in their power to prevent him from carrying it into execution. With this view they had conſtructed two forts, one on each ſide of the river, about three miles below the town; to one of which they

they gave the name of Lieffkenſoech, and to the other that of Lillo. Farneſe judged it neceſſary to begin his operations with reducing theſe forts. He ſent the marquis de Roubais againſt Lieffkenſoech, which ſtood on the Flanders ſide of the Scheld, while Mondragon laid ſiege to Lillo. Roubais found no great difficulty in fulfilling the general's intention with regard to Lieffkenſoech. But Mondragon's attempt on the fort of Lillo was not attended with the ſame ſucceſs. This fort was valiantly defended by colonel Balfour, a Scotch officer of diſtinguiſhed merit, and Teligny, the worthy ſon of the brave La Noue. After battering the ramparts for ſeveral days, Mondragon attempted to take the fort by ſtorm, but was repulſed; and in his repulſe, and a ſally which the garriſon had made ſome days before, he ſuſtained the loſs of no leſs than two thouſand men.

Upon receiving intelligence of this diſaſter, the prince of Parma, after ſettling the government of the towns which he had lately conquered, came himſelf to view the ſcene of action. He found that all the time and pains and blood which had been ſpent in the ſiege of this fort had been miſapplied; and perceived that as it ſtood at ſome diſtance from the banks,

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it did not materially interfere with his plan for putting a ſtop to the navigation of the river.

For this reaſon, inſtead of puſhing the immediate reduction of it, he was ſatisfied with blockading it on the land ſide, ſo as to prevent the excurſions of the garriſon.

The prince of Parma's plan for blocking up the Scheld.

Having given inſtructions for this purpoſe, he called a council of his general officers, and laid before them his project for blocking up the Scheld, by building a bridge over it, to intercept the communication between the beſieged city and the maritime provinces: an enterpriſe which, had it failed, would have expoſed him to deriſion, but which ſhewed the boldneſs of his genius, and has contributed, more than almoſt any other of his military atchievements, to raiſe his character to that exalted rank which it holds in the annals of hiſtory.

By moſt of the officers his propoſal was regarded as chimerical. For where, ſaid they, can materials be found for ſo great an undertaking? And even if they ſhould be found, yet how is it poſſible to tranſport them hither? By land-carriage, it is utterly impracticable; nor would it ſeem to be much eaſier by water, while the enemy poſſeſſes ſo great a ſuperiority in

in naval force. Beſides that, no beams, they obſerved, were of ſufficient length to reach the bottom of the river.

To build a bridge of ſhips, they thought, would be equally impracticable, becauſe he did not poſſeſs ſo great a number as was neceſſary, and it would be impoſſible to collect them from different places, in the face of a vigilant enemy, of a ſuperior naval ſtrength. And even allowing it were poſſible, either with beams or ſhips to conſtruct ſuch a bridge as was projected, yet it would be quickly deſtroyed by the ice, or by the tides and ſtorms, or by the enemy.

But Farneſe, conſcious of reſources in the fertility of his genius, of which his officers could form no idea, was not diſcouraged by theſe objections. He conſidered that the meaſure on which he had reſolved was the only one by which Antwerp could be reduced, and that till he ſhould reduce that city, and thereby get poſſeſſion of a naval force, the towns lately acquired (which uſually carried on their trade by the way of Antwerp) muſt ſuffer the greateſt inconveniences, and it would be in vain for him to attempt the conqueſt of the maritime provinces.

Determined

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DETERMINED by theſe conſiderations, he proceeded inſtantly to make the preparations neceſſary for executing his deſign. Having firſt ſounded the river, and meaſured its breadth in different places, he found, that between the village of Ordham in Brabant, and Caloo in Flanders, it was neither ſo deep nor ſo broad, as above or below. At this place therefore he reſolved to build a bridge. And he began with raiſing two ſtrong forts oppoſite to each other on the different ſides of the river, beſides ſeveral redoubts, on which, as well as on the forts, he planted a great number of cannon, to defend the bridge when finiſhed, and to protect the workmen while engaged in building it.

IN the mean time he ranſacked all the country round for materials, and had the good fortune to find at Dendremonde and Ghent, great quantities of every thing requiſite for the intended work. If he could have conveyed his materials to Caloo down the Scheld, a great expence of labour and time would have been ſaved. This he repeatedly attempted; but he ſoon found that it was impoſſible to eſcape the vigilance of the citizens, who being directed in all their operations by St. Aldegonde, lay in wait for his boats near Antwerp, and either took or deſtroyed them.

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In order to avoid the repetition of this disaster, Farneſe made, on the Flanders ſide near Borcht, which ſtands higher than Antwerp, a large cut in the dyke of the Scheld, by which he laid all the neck of land between Borcht and Caloo under water; opening an egreſs for the water by another cut near Caloo, and tranſporting his apparatus for the bridge acroſs the inundation. This expedient rendered it unneceſſary for his boats to paſs by Antwerp, and they likewiſe arrived ſooner at their deſtined port.

But St. Aldegonde having built a redoubt ou the Brabant ſide, oppoſite to the cut at Borcht, and ſtationed ſome armed veſſels to cruiſe there, ſoon rendered the paſſage as difficult as before. Farneſe was therefore obliged to adopt another experiment, much more laborious than the former, but which he knew would certainly be attended with ſucceſs. This was to dig a canal fifteen Italian miles in length, to join the inundation juſt now mentioned, with a little river which falls into the Scheld at Ghent. That he might finiſh this arduous undertaking the more ſpeedily, he fixed his head-quarters at Beveren, in the neighbourhood of the canal, and was perpetually preſent himſelf, exhorting and encouraging the workmen; and ſometimes taking the ſpade and pick-axe into his own hand.

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hand. The work was finiſhed with wonderful expedition, and fully anſwered his expectation. As the enemy could have no acceſs either to the canal, or the river with which it communicated, he conveyed all neceſſary materials and engines from Ghent without oppoſition, and immediately afterwards began the conſtruction of the bridge.

Deſcription of the bridge.

THE two extremities of this edifice were formed of huge beams, driven into the bottom of the river by the force of engines, and ſtrongly bound together by other tranſverſe or croſs beams. This part of the work, called the ſtacados or eſtacados, ran from each ſide of the river towards the middle of it, as far as the depth of the water would allow; which on the Flanders ſide was two hundred feet, and on the other, nine hundred. Theſe ſtacados were only twelve feet broad, except towards the two extremities, next the centre of the river, where their breadth being increaſed to forty feet, two forts were erected upon them, and furniſhed with artillery. The whole was covered at top with ſtrong planks, and a parapet five feet high, of the thickeſt planks, was raiſed upon it for the ſecurity of the ſoldiers. A row of piles was then driven deep into the bottom of the river, parallel to each of the ſtacados, at the diſtance of a few feet from them, and ſtrongly

ſtrongly faſtened to the beams of which *they* were compoſed. Beſides which, another row of long beams pointed with iron, was placed horizontally a little above the ſurface of the water; ſtretching out to a conſiderable length from the bridge on both ſides, ſo as to make it dangerous for ſhips to approach.

By this part of the work, the navigation of the river was conſiderably ſtraitened; but as there was an open ſpace in the middle, between the heads of the eſtacados, of more than one thouſand two hundred and fifty feet, the enemy's ſhips, taking advantage ſometimes of the night, and ſometimes of the wind and tide, continued, though not without loſs, to paſs and repaſs as formerly; and the city was ſtill abundantly ſupplied with proviſions. Farneſe having from the beginning intended to fill up the intermediate ſpace with ſhips, had with great difficulty collected two and thirty, which he judged to be a ſufficient number. Theſe veſſels, after the maſts had been taken out, were placed with their ſides parallel to each other, at the diſtance of about twenty feet. They were ſtrongly faſtened together by chains, and were fixed in their places by anchors at both ends, in ſuch a manner that the ſailors could ſhorten or lengthen their cables, as the tide either roſe or fell. Over the intermediate ſpaces, ſtrong beams

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beams went from one ſhip to another. Above theſe were laid planks; and the ſame ſort of parapet was erected, as that which was raiſed on the ſtacados. Thirty ſoldiers and four ſailors were put on board each ſhip, and all the ſhips were planted with artillery.

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For the greater ſecurity of this part of the work, a flota one thouſand two hundred feet long was conſtructed of barks, bound together in the ſame manner as the ſhips of which the bridge was formed, with the ſame ſort of beams pointed with iron, reſembling a file of pikes, ſtretching from that end of the barks which lay next to the enemy. Theſe barks were filled with empty caſks, to prevent them from being ſunk, and were fixed in their place by anchors. Of this kind of flota, two were conſtructed, conſiſting each of two and thirty barks, one above, and the other below the bridge, at the diſtance of two hundred yards.

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This ſtupendous work[c] furniſhed employment to the prince of Parma's fleet and army for more than half a year. Without a fleet of conſiderable ſtrength it could not have been executed, and the procuring of this fleet in ſuch diſadvantageous circumſtances, was one of the

[c] It was finiſhed February 1585.

many

many ſtriking proofs which Farneſe exhibited on this occaſion, of that extraordinary activity and enterpriſe by which his character is ſo eminently diſtinguiſhed. With infinite labour and difficulty he had equipped, at Ghent and Dunkirk, forty armed veſſels, and put them under the command of the marquis de Roubais; who being well ſupported by the forts and redoubts on the banks of the river, protected the workmen, in ſpite of the moſt vigorous efforts which the beſieged could make to interrupt them.

FARNESE however would not probably have ſucceeded in his enterpriſe, if the United States had exerted themſelves with vigour, proportioned either to that of the enemy, or to the importance of the prize conteſted. It now appeared how great was the loſs which the confederacy had ſuſtained in the death of the prince of Orange. By William's ſuperior rank, wiſdom, and experience, ſome turbulent leaders had been reſtrained, who, after his death, indulged their factious, intereſted ſpirit, without regard to the pernicious conſequences which might enſue. Among theſe was Treſlong, whom the States had appointed commander of the fleet deſtined for the relief of Antwerp. This man, whether from treachery or from private reſentment, paid no regard to his inſtructions;

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ſtructions; but on different pretences, at firſt delayed putting the orders of the States in execution; and at laſt told them that he would not fail, unleſs ſome perſons with whom he had quarrelled were removed from the magiſtracy. On this occaſion, prince Maurice called an aſſembly of the States of the province, diſmiſſed Treſlong from his employment, and put him under arreſt. The command of the fleet was then given to count Hohenloe; but the time in which its operations might have proved effectual, was paſt; and the bridge, with all its fortifications, as above deſcribed, was almoſt finiſhed.

Conſternation of the beſieged.

No words can expreſs the aſtoniſhment which it excited in the minds of the beſieged. At the commencement of the work, they had regarded it rather as an object of deriſion, than as fitted to excite any ſerious apprehenſion or alarm. Their anxiety and terror now were in proportion to their former confidence and ſecurity. They ſaw an entire ſtop put to their trade in every quarter. They already felt many of the inconveniences of a ſiege. Their imaginations repreſented, in the moſt dreadful light, the calamities which they were about to ſuffer; and perſons of all ranks began to talk of the neceſſity of preventing them in time, by making their peace with the enemy. But they were

were divided from forming any fixed reſolution by St. Aldegonde, who employed all his eloquence and addreſs to rouſe their abhorrence of the Spaniſh yoke, and to inſpire them with the hopes of being able to raiſe the ſiege. BOOK XIX. 1585.

Speech of St. Aldegonde.

"IT is not ſurpriſing, ſaid he, in an aſſembly of thoſe who held public offices in the town, that many of our fellow-citizens ſhould tremble at the proſpect of thoſe hardſhips which uſually attend a long continued ſiege. But while we caſt our eyes forward to theſe, let us reflect on the calamities which we have reaſon to dread from a ſurrender. We have ſeen, within theſe few years, two memorable ſieges, the ſiege of Haerlem, and that of Leyden. The people of Haerlem, rather than ſubmit to the laſt extremities, choſe to throw themſelves on the mercy of the Spaniards. But how bitterly did they repent of their having done ſo? And how much better had it been to have fallen in the field of battle, than to ſuffer, as ſo great a number of the braveſt did, that ignominious death, to which they were doomed by the cruel Spaniard? The inhabitants of Leyden, on the other hand, reſolved rather to die, than to deliver themſelves up to ſuch a perfidious enemy; and the conſequence of their adhering to this reſolution was, that the ſiege was raiſed, and a period put to all their miſeries. Can we heſitate in de-

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ciding which of theſe examples we ought to follow? Is not death more eligible than ſubmiſſion to the dominion of an enemy, from whom we have endured ſuch intolerable outrage?

If this city ſhall fall again under the yoke of theſe oppreſſors, can we doubt that the citadel will be reſtored, and with it all the tyranny which they were wont to exerciſe? Will not our religion be proſcribed, and the inquiſition eſtabliſhed? This illuſtrious city will then become a colony of Spaniards. Her commerce will be ruined, and her inhabitants obliged to wander in ſearch of places of abode, forlorn and indigent. But why ſhould I thus deſcribe the diſaſters of a ſurrender? There is ſtill no reaſon for deſpair. It is impoſſible that this bridge can ſtand long againſt the efforts which we ſhall make for its deſtruction. Let us not therefore be wanting to ourſelves; but with a fixed unalterable purpoſe, let us embrace the glorious alternative of liberty or death."

By theſe exhortations, joined to the reſpect in which his character was held, St. Aldegonde gained over the citizens to a perfect conformity with his ſentiments; and perſuaded them to renew the oath, which they had formerly taken, never to return under the dominion of the king

of

of Spain. An edict was then publiſhed, prohibiting all perſons, under the ſevereſt penalties, from liſtening to any terms of accommodation that might be offered; after which they proceeded with redoubled ardour, to put in practice ſuch expedients as had been deviſed for the demolition of the bridge.

Preparations of the beſieged for demoliſhing the bridge.

In order to effectuate this, they had been for ſome time paſt employed in preparing fireſhips, under the direction of Giambelli, a celebrated Italian engineer, who appears to have been the author of this invention. They were formed of the thickeſt planks, and had each of them a mine or chamber in the middle. This mine was built in the ſtrongeſt manner, and filled with gun-powder, and with rugged ſtones, bullets, and ſuch other weighty materials, rammed hard and cloſe, on purpoſe to increaſe the reſiſtance and augment the force of the exploſion.

The citizens laboured at the ſame time in conſtructing a flat-bottomed veſſel of extraordinary ſtrength and ſize, with which they intended to attack the forts and redoubts on the banks of the river. This enormous machine was more properly a floating caſtle than a ſhip, and the town's people had, on account of the ſanguine expectations which they conceived

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from it, given it the name of the "end of the war."

While the people of Antwerp were thus employed, the confederates who lay at Lillo, under count Hohenloe, made a vigorous attack on the fort of Lieffkenfoech, and compelled the garrifon to furrender. From Lieffkenfoech, they proceeded againft another fort of the name of St. Antony, which they likewife reduced with the fame facility. When intelligence was brought to the prince of Parma of their defcent, he fet out with a detachment of his army to oppofe their progrefs; but both the forts had furrendered before he could arrive. Being enraged againft the commanders of thefe forts, on account of their having made too feeble a refiftance, he ordered them both to be beheaded on the dyke of the Scheld, in fight of the enemy. He was the more concerned for the lofs of Lieffkenfoech, as it gave the enemy free poffeffion of the navigation of the river below the bridge, and thereby tended to facilitate the execution of any defign which they might form for its deftruction.

At firft he imagined that the folicitude which the confederates had fhewn for the recovery of Lieffkenfoech, had proceeded from their intending to make an attempt upon the lower fide

ſide of the bridge. But it ſoon appeared, that their only view was to ſecond the operations of the beſieged, and to complete that ruin which they expected the exploſion of the fire-ſhips would certainly produce.

These veſſels were ſent down the river, with a favourable wind and tide, on the fourth of April. The Spaniards, who had got ſome imperfect intelligence of their nature, were filled with the moſt anxious expectations. They knew them to be the fire-ſhips from their unuſual appearance, and were variouſly affected, according to the various conjectures which they formed of the effects that were about to be produced. But they were all alike prompted by curioſity, to behold a ſpectacle which had never been exhibited in any ſiege before. And the banks of the river, the forts and redoubts, and even the bridge itſelf, were crowded with ſpectators.

Of ſeveral veſſels which Giambelli had prepared, only two were conſtructed in the manner above mentioned, the one of which contained in its mine ſix thouſand pounds of gun-powder, and the other, ſeven thouſand five hundred pounds. One of them ran aſhore before it reached the bridge. But the other being more fortunate in its direction, was

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driven towards that part of the bridge, where the ſtacado on the Flanders ſide was united to the ſhips. A great number of the Spaniſh officers and ſoldiers had the courage to jump on board, in order to extinguiſh the train, which Giambelli had contrived in ſuch a manner, as to require an hour before it could reach the mine. The prince of Parma had advanced a little way on the ſtacado, to wait for the event; but was prevailed upon by his officers to retire. He had ſcarcely entered the neighbouring fort when the exploſion happened, with a noiſe more dreadful than the loudeſt thunder. A ſudden darkneſs overſpread the region round. The ground ſhook as in an earthquake. The river, diſturbed in its courſe, was thrown over its dykes, and poured into the fort of Caloo with inconceivable violence. Not only ſuch of the Spaniards periſhed as had ventured to go on board the fire-ſhip, but all thoſe too who were upon the bridge, and many of thoſe who ſtood upon the banks of the river. No language can deſcribe the horror of the ſcene which preſented itſelf after the ſmoke was diſpelled. The bridge, and both the ſurface and the banks of the river, were covered with the dead and wounded; whoſe bodies were disfigured in a thouſand hideous ways by the ſmoke and flames, and the various inſtruments of deſtruction

ſtruction with which the ſhip was ſtored. Eight hundred men were killed, and a great number maimed and dangerouſly wounded. Among the killed were many officers of diſtinction; but no perſon periſhed, ſo deeply lamented by the prince of Parma, as the Marquis de Roubais, the general of the horſe; a nobleman diſtinguiſhed by many ſhining accompliſhments, brave, active, and expert both in the arts of peace and war; once an enemy of Spain; but who, prompted by jealouſy of the prince of Orange, had abandoned the cauſe of liberty, and ſhewn for ſome years paſt no leſs zeal in reducing his countrymen under the Spaniſh yoke, than he had diſcovered formerly in aſſerting their independence. It was not only loſſes of this kind which the prince of Parma ſuſtained on this occaſion. The bridge likewiſe ſuffered conſiderable damage. Six of the ſhips which compoſed the middle part of it, were burnt; ſome were forced from their ſtations, and others turned with their keels uppermoſt, and daſhed to pieces.

If the confederates had improved the opportunity which this havoc afforded them, the whole work might have been demoliſhed; and in that caſe, a prediction of the prince of Orange would have been fulfilled, that if Farneſe with ſo ſmall an army ſhould undertake

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the ſiege of Antwerp, it would prove his ruin. But, as was obſerved by the old experienced Mondragone, it appeared from many circumſtances in the conduct of the confederates in this ſiege, that the prince of Orange was dead.

By ſome ſtrange fatality, or ſome unaccountable inadvertence, or, as one hiſtorian inſinuates, by a miſunderſtanding between the magiſtrates of Antwerp and the admiral of the Antwerp fleet, thoſe fire-ſhips which had coſt ſo great an expence of money, ingenuity, time and pains, were ſent down the Scheld before any concert had been formed with the confederates at Lillo; who were therefore unprepared to ſecond that mighty effort which had been made for opening the navigation of the river.—Giambelli, though extremely ſolicitous to know the ſucceſs of his invention, remained entirely ignorant of it for two days. A large reward was offered to thoſe who ſhould venture to go down the river for intelligence. But none had courage to advance far enough to make any certain diſcovery, nor did the citizens know any thing of what had happened till the third night after, when they received information of it by a meſſenger from count Hohenloe.

THE prince of Parma was in the mean time employed in repairing the bridge, and he exerted himſelf with ſo much activity and vigour, that it was made as ſtrong as ever before the beſieged were acquainted with the damage which it had ſuſtained. His late experience ſuggeſted to him an alteration in the work, which was found afterwards of great importance: this was to remove the flotas, and to form that part of the bridge which was compoſed of the ſhips, in ſuch a manner that, in caſe the enemy ſhould repeat their experiment, it might be opened at different places to let the fire-ſhips paſs through and continue their courſe down the river.

Other attempts of the beſieged.

THE ſpirits of the beſieged were ſtill ſupported by the ſanguine hopes which they had conceived from that enormous veſſel, which they called "the end of the war." This huge machine was entirely the work of the citizens, and was not approved of either by Giambelli or St. Aldegonde. It was found, on trial, too unwieldy to anſwer the purpoſe for which it was intended. After planting the lower part of it with cannon, and filling the higher part with muſketeers, they made an attack upon one of the Spaniſh redoubts; but they failed in their attempt, and the machine itſelf was ſo much

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much ſhattered, as to be rendered almoſt unfit for future uſe.

At Giambelli's deſire, the ſenate of Antwerp had again recourſe to their firſt expedient of fire-ſhips; but the enemy having learnt the nature of theſe machines, employed different means to render them ineffectual. They laid hold of them as ſoon as they appeared, and ſometimes extinguiſhed the trains, and ſometimes dragged the veſſels to the banks of the river, or through the openings in the bridge.

Giambelli then bethought himſelf of another device, from which he believed that ſome more certain effect might be expected. Having bound together in one compacted body fifteen ſhips armed with pointed beams, and with ſcythes or falchions, for cutting the chains and cordage of the bridge, he ſent them accompanied with fire-ſhips down the river when the wind and tide were combined and favourable. The ſhock which this contrivance produced was very great; but through the wiſe precaution which Farneſe had taken, by making the openings juſt now mentioned, together with the unexampled boldneſs of his ſoldiers in laying hold of the fire-ſhips, the bridge received no greater damage than could be quickly repaired,

paired. Some other expedients were propoſed by Giambelli, but the ſenate was deterred from adopting them, partly by the expence and time requiſite to prepare his machines, and partly by the difficulty of finding mariners and ſoldiers willing to expoſe themſelves to the danger with which the putting his inventions in practice would have been attended.

The Counterdyke of Couveſtein.

THERE remained now for the beſieged only one reſource, to which, if they had given proper attention in the beginning, all the anxiety, expence, and labour, which they beſtowed in attempting to demoliſh the bridge, might have been ſaved. In order to form a clear conception of what will be ſaid on this intereſting part of the preſent ſubject, it is neceſſary to remember that the ground on the north ſide of the Scheld, between Antwerp and Lillo, is much lower than the reſt of the country; and were it not for the dyke of the river would every tide be overflowed. This ground is generally covered with water in many places, but in other parts it furniſhes paſture for a great number of cattle with which the Antwerp market is ſupplied. Through the middle of this plain there runs from the village of Couveſtein, where the country begins to riſe, to the great dyke of the Scheld, a ſmaller dyke, called the Counterdyke of Couveſtein, which had been formed to ſerve

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for a road or cauſeway. The confederates at Lillo could, by opening the dyke of the Scheld, lay all the ground under water between Lillo and the counterdyke, while the beſieged could, with the ſame facility, introduce the river into that part of the plain which lies between the counterdyke and Antwerp; and thus, by breaking down the counterdyke, the inundations on each ſide of it could be united, and a free navigation opened between Antwerp and Lillo.

THE reader will eaſily perceive, that while the bridge ſtood, the fate of Antwerp depended entirely on the counterdyke; and that, in caſe the confederates could make themſelves maſters of it, they might bid defiance to the prince of Parma, and without anxiety ſuffer him to retain poſſeſſion of the bridge. If, in the beginning, they had believed it practicable for him to execute his deſign of blocking up the river, they could have fortified themſelves on the counterdyke in ſuch a manner, that, with the aſſiſtance of the inundation, they would have baffled his moſt vigorous efforts to expel them. But they were deceived by the contempt which they entertained of his intended enterpriſe, and did not perceive their error in neglecting to occupy this important ſtation till it was too late. The prince of Parma had already ſeized upon

upon it, and taken every neceſſary precaution againſt the attempts which he doubted not they would, ſooner or later, make to wreſt it from him. He committed the charge of defending it to two of his moſt vigilant officers, Mondragone and Manſvelt. He ordered it to be made broader and higher than it was before. He ſtrengthened it with piles of wood driven into it tranſverſely, and he erected ſeveral forts upon it, beſides planting redoubts on the dyke of the Scheld, with which he intended to take the enemy in flank, in caſe they ſhould venture to approach. 1585.

THE confederates, however, deſpairing of being able to demoliſh the bridge, reſolved, if poſſible, to diſlodge him from the counterdyke. And their firſt attempt, after laying the ground on each ſide of it under water, was made in the beginning of May by count Hohenloe. That general had formed the plan of this attack in concert with St. Aldegonde, who was to have co-operated with him, and had agreed to ſet ſail with the Antwerp fleet immediately after lighting up, on a tower in the city, three fires, as a ſignal of his departure. By a miſtake of the perſon to whom the charge of this ſignal was committed, it was exhibited before the time, and through this untoward accident count Hohenloe was left alone in the execution

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The confederates at Lillo, and the people of Antwerp, were in the mean time indefatigable in making preparations for another attack. St. Aldegonde stood almost single in his opinion on this occasion, and endeavoured to convince his countrymen, that it would be easier for them to destroy the bridge itself, than to make themselves masters of the counterdyke, in opposition to an enemy so much upon their guard, and so strongly fortified. But having, since their disappointment with regard to the effect

effect of the fire-ſhips, been accuſtomed to conſider the bridge as impregnable, they were deaf to whatever he could advance upon the ſubject, and he was obliged to concur (which he did with all his wonted activity) in the execution of that deſign of which the majority approved.

Battle of the counterdyke.

TOWARDS the end of May every thing was prepared, both at Antwerp and Lillo, that was thought neceſſary to ſecure ſucceſs; and, on the 26th of that month, count Hohenloe, according to concert with St. Aldegonde, ſailed from Lillo early in the morning, with a ſquadron of more than a hundred ſhips, having on board a numerous body of troops, under the command of the moſt experienced officers in the United Provinces[d]. He reſolved to make his attack at the broadeſt part of the counterdyke, between the two middle forts, called the Fort of the Palliſades and Fort St. George, where there was room to intrench his troops. In order to facilitate his landing, he ſent before him four veſſels reſembling fire-ſhips, with ſome trains of gun-powder, to which the ſoldiers, who were concealed within, ſet fire. This device produced the deſigned effect. The Spaniards taking the ſmoke and flame for

[d] Juſtin de Naſſau, Iſelſtein, Fremin, Morgan, and Balfour.

the

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1585. the forerunners of an explosion, retired hastily from that part of the dyke to which they saw the vessels approaching. The confederates in the mean time advanced, and landed between seven and eight hundred men, who were quickly followed by all the rest of the forces. The Spaniards then discovered the artifice by which they had been deceived, and immediately returning, attempted to recover the station which they had left. An obstinate and bloody action ensued, while the contending parties were supported on the one side by the cannon of the fleet, and on the other by those of the forts on the counterdyke.

In the midst of this contest St. Aldegonde arrived with the fleet from Antwerp, which was nearly as numerous as that from Lillo. The confederates being thus powerfully reinforced, kept possession of the ground which they had gained, and while some of them fought, others were employed in cutting the counterdyke, and in raising temporary defences of piles of wood, and sacks of earth and wool, against the fire of the enemy. The combatants being cooped up in a narrow space, every stroke and shot did execution. But they received continual supplies of fresh men from the ships and forts, and their courage was superior to every danger. Both St. Aldegonde and Hohenloe mingled with

with the combatants, and by their example and exhortations nouriſhed the deſperate and intrepid ardour of the ſoldiers. "This is the laſt difficulty (cried St. Aldegonde) which remains to be ſurmounted. Perſiſt as you have begun, and Antwerp, that bulwark of our confederacy, will ſoon be delivered. Your liberty, your future ſafety, and every thing dear and ſacred, depend on the ſucceſs of your preſent enterpriſe. We have now no choice left but victory or death."

THE Spaniſh generals were at no leſs pains to animate *their* troops. Both Mondragone and Manſvelt, though worn out with age and the fatigues of a long continued warfare, diſplayed on this occaſion the higheſt degree of valour and intrepidity. But, notwithſtanding their moſt vigorous exertions, the confederates ſtill maintained their ground. They twice repulſed the Italians and Spaniards. Of the materials which they had brought along with them, they raiſed a conſiderable bulwark againſt the enemy's artillery. They made ſeveral openings in the counterdyke, and were ſo confident of victory, that St. Aldegonde and count Hohenloe, after aſſigning to the ſeveral officers their reſpective ſtations, ſet ſail for Antwerp in a ſhip which had paſſed through one of theſe openings, and entered the city in triumph.

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1585. Their deſign, it is ſaid, was to conſult with the magiſtrates concerning ſome future meaſures which they thought neceſſary to be purſued. But what the particular motives were, which determined the commanders in chief to leave their troops at this criſis, is not told by the cotemporary hiſtorians; and we are left to ſuſpect two men, of vanity and folly, whoſe general conduct furniſhes not the ſmalleſt ground for ſo unfavourable an imputation. They were received at Antwerp with the higheſt tranſports of gratitude and joy, and the people flocked to the harbour, impatiently expecting the arrival of the ſupplies of proviſions which they believed to be near at hand.

But this joy was of ſhort duration: the prince of Parma was for ſome time ignorant of what had paſſed. Having watched all the preceding night, he had gone in the morning to his head-quarters at Beveren, and retired to reſt; but being ſoon awaked by the noiſe of the guns, he ſelected a body of troops, and immediately marched to the place of action.

On his arrival, he viewed with indignation the enemy in poſſeſſion of the counterdyke. He ruſhed forward at the head of his battalion, and ſighing, exclaimed, "Where, my fellow-ſoldiers, is now your wonted intrepidity? Are you

you not aſhamed thus to yield to an enemy you have ſo often conquered, and in one hour to loſe the fruit of all your labours? Let who will follow me; I ſhall either die, or conquer." Having ſpoken theſe words, he advanced towards the enemy with a ſword in one hand, and a buckler in the other. The danger to which he was expoſed, inflamed his troops to a degree of madneſs. They returned to the charge with redoubled fury, and, in ſpite of the moſt intrepid reſiſtance, they drove the confederates along the counterdyke, till they came to the place where their companions were intrenched: there they ſtopped. The diſpute was deſperate, and the confederates, being reinforced with freſh troops from their ſhips, once more compelled the Spaniards to retire; but Farneſe, whoſe ardour was unabated, ſtill urging and impelling them, the attack was inſtantly renewed, and the Spaniards proved at laſt victorious.

It was now only within their intrenchment that the confederates retained poſſeſſion of the counterdyke. The prince of Parma and his troops were aware of the difficulty which they muſt encounter, in attacking an intrenchment defended by men who from the beginning had diſplayed the moſt determined bravery; yet they boldly advanced amidſt an inceſſant fire

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both from the ſhips and the intrenchment. Great numbers fell: ſtill, however, they continued to advance; and whilſt thoſe who were in the rear maintained a conſtant fire upon the enemy, the foremoſt ranks were employed in demoliſhing the fortification.

THIS fortification was at the ſame time attacked, on the other ſide, by two battalions ſent againſt it by count Manſvelt, the one conſiſting of Spaniards and the other of Italians, who vied with each other in giving the moſt conſpicuous proofs of their contempt of danger. The leaders of theſe battalions, Capiſucchi and Toralva, were the firſt who entered the intrenchments; and ſoon afterwards the troops under the prince of Parma entered it on the other ſide. The confederates, though thus deprived of all defence, ſtill continued to fight deſperately, till perceiving that the tide was going back, and that their ſhips were beginning to put off to a greater diſtance, while freſh Spaniards were pouring in upon them from both ends of the counterdyke, their courage failed, and they attempted to ſave themſelves by getting on board their boats and ſhips.

The confederates are defeated.

THE Spaniards, not ſatisfied with this victory, flung themſelves from the counterdyke, and

and purſued the fugitives as far as the depth of the water would allow. No quarter was given to thoſe whom they overtook. The counterdyke, and the water on both ſides of it, were covered with the ſlain, and many fell with diſhonourable wounds, who for ſeveral hours together had given inconteſtible evidence of the moſt heroic valour. The number of the killed on the ſide of the confederates amounted to two thouſand five hundred, and that on the other ſide, to one thouſand. The recovery of the counterdyke was not the only advantage which Farneſe derived from his preſent victory: he likewiſe got poſſeſſion of more than thirty of the enemy's ſhips, with all the artillery and engines that were on board. Immediately after which he proceeded to fill up the breaches in the counterdyke, and to repair the damage which his fortifications had ſuſtained. 1585.

THE beſieged, being thus cruelly diſappointed in their hopes of deliverance, were overwhelmed with conſternation and deſpair. By their late great exertions, their internal reſources were exhauſted, and they had little proſpect of any foreign aid that could arrive in time to prevent the neceſſity of ſurrendering. They had not indeed as yet experienced thoſe intolerable miſeries which attend on famine in a place beſieged; but they foreſaw that ere

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long theſe miſeries muſt certainly overtake them, and they conſidered, that to delay making peace with the enemy, could only ſerve to increaſe the difficulty of obtaining favourable terms. Such were the ſentiments of great numbers of every condition, notwithſtanding the ſolemn engagement under which they had lately come, of never ſubmitting to the Spaniſh government. St. Aldegonde, and the other magiſtrates, laboured to remove their apprehenſions, by aſſuring them, that not only their friends in the maritime provinces were preparing forces to relieve them, but that the queen of England intended to exert herſelf in their behalf. St. Aldegonde himſelf appears to have been animated with this hope, and for ſeveral weeks it had the effect which he deſired on the minds of the citizens; but their patience being at laſt worn out, they aſſembled in a tumultuous manner, and peremptorily required that ambaſſadors ſhould be appointed to treat of a ſurrender. The magiſtrates, though extremely reluctant, found it neceſſary to comply with their requeſt; and accordingly St. Aldegonde, and ſeveral others of the principal inhabitants, were ſent to the Spaniſh camp.

Capitulation of Antwerp.

THEY were received by the prince of Parma in the moſt gracious manner, and much more favourable terms of accommodation were offered,

fered, than they had reaſon to expect. Various motives concurred in determining this prudent general to act on the preſent occaſion with the utmoſt degree of moderation which the King's inſtructions would allow; for, beſides that the granting of equitable conditions to the citizens of Antwerp would contribute to facilitate his future conqueſts, he conſidered that his troops had ſuffered great diminution ſince the commencement of the ſiege; that, by accidents which he could not foreſee, the bridge might be demoliſhed; that he had with much difficulty reſiſted the efforts which the confederates had already made; that ſtill greater exertions were to be apprehended from deſpair; and that the beſieged, if compelled by ſeverity to imitate the example of Haerlem or Leyden, might reſiſt his moſt ſtrenuous endeavours to reduce them, till the queen of England, who was deliberating on the ſubject, ſhould reſolve to eſpouſe their cauſe.

Moved by theſe conſiderations, Farneſe ſhewed himſelf not only willing, but even deſirous, to bring the treaty of ſurrender ſpeedily to a concluſion; but the ambaſſadors of the beſieged, ſtill flattering themſelves with the hopes of aſſiſtance, ſtudied to put it off as long as poſſible; nor was the capitulation ſigned till within three days of the time when the whole

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ſtock of proviſions in the city would have been conſumed. This circumſtance had been carefully concealed from the citizens, as well as from the prince of Parma, and was known only to the magiſtrates and maſters of police. It had not therefore the ſmalleſt influence on the terms of peace, which were as favourable now as if the ſurrender had been made ſome months before.

In ſome reſpects they were more favourable than even thoſe which had been granted to Ghent and Bruges. Whereas the Proteſtants of theſe places had been permitted to continue only two years, in order to ſettle their affairs; in Antwerp they were allowed to remain four; and although Antwerp was much richer than any of the other cities, and the expence of the ſiege infinitely greater, yet he demanded a fine of only four hundred thouſand guilders for the payment of his troops. All the priſoners were ſet at liberty; all paſt offences were forgiven, and no exception whatever was made in the general act of indemnity; nor was any perſonal reſtrictions laid upon any of the citizens, except St. Aldegonde, who was required to engage, that he would not carry arms againſt the king of Spain for the ſpace of a year. This circumſtance had the appearance of a puniſhment inflicted on this diſtinguiſhed patriot; but

but it ought to be conſidered rather as a mark of reſpect and honour, ſince it implied an acknowledgment of his ſuperior merit, and diſcovered the dread which his enemies entertained of his abilities. 1585.

NOTWITHSTANDING this public teſtimony which St. Aldegonde received from the Spaniards, he was accuſed of having delivered up the town without neceſſity; and ſo raſh and ill-informed were the States of Holland and Zealand on this occaſion, that they forbade him to take up his reſidence within their territories. Being conſcious of having acted with perfect integrity, he paid no regard to their interdiction, but ſoon after the ſurrender ſet out for Zealand, where he required the States to produce his accuſers, and to try him openly [g]; and as no accuſer ever ventured to appear, he publiſhed a vindication of his conduct, calculated to put his enemies to ſilence, and to ſhew that, inſtead of cenſure, he had merited the higheſt praiſe [h].

THE ill-humour which the maritime provinces diſcovered on this occaſion, in their injurious

[g] The account here given is taken from Meteren, the beſt informed of all the hiſtorians in matters relative to Antwerp. It differs materially from that of Reidanus.

[h] Bentivoglio, part II. lib. iii. Meteren, lib. xii. Thuanus, lib. lxxxiii. Reidanus, lib. iv.

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rious treatment of a perſon ſo beloved and popular as St. Aldegonde, proves the error of thoſe who aſſert that theſe provinces were not diſpleaſed that the Spaniards had got poſſeſſion of Antwerp, and that their jealouſy of that commercial city was the cauſe why they did not exert themſelves with greater vigour to preſerve it. As the circumſtances above explained ſeem to afford a full account of their inactivity in the beginning of the ſiege, ſo, towards the cloſe of it, it ſhould ſeem they did every thing for the relief of the beſieged, which they could have done in their own defence. The only object of their dread at this time was the power of Spain. They could not but conſider Antwerp as a bulwark againſt that power, and they could not foreſee thoſe commercial advantages, which they derived afterwards from the reduction of that wealthy city under the Spaniſh yoke.

Brabant deſerted by many of its inhabitants.

THEY ſoon experienced theſe advantages, by the removal of ſo great a number of the inhabitants of Brabant and Flanders to Amſterdam and Middleburg, that it became neceſſary to extend the walls of thoſe cities in order to contain them. And thus the trade of the confederated States was greatly augmented, while that of the ſouthern provinces received a wound, of which it never afterwards recovered. The

prince

prince of Parma had provided carefully againſt this event, ſo fatal to the proſperity of his late acquiſitions, by the length of time which he allowed to the Proteſtants for diſpoſing of their effects, and by the mildneſs of his adminiſtration; but, beſides that their averſion to the Spaniſh government was become unconquerable, and that for ſome years paſt they had taſted the ſweets of liberty, they were too ſincerely attached to the reformed religion, to bear the thoughts of ever complying with the Catholic, or even to endure thoſe reſtraints to which it behoved them, during their ſtay at Antwerp, to ſubmit. Philip's bigotry had, in the time of the duke of Alva, tranſplanted great numbers of his ſubjects, together with their wealth and manufactures, into foreign ſtates, and it now increaſed the power of the revolted provinces, at the expence of thoſe which had returned to their allegiance. The Dutch began, not long after this period, to puſh their commerce to a greater extent than ever. They were more able than formerly to ſupport the burden of the war; and in a few years afterwards they found themſelves in a capacity, not only to defend their infant ſtate, but to attack their powerful adverſary, with ſplendor and ſucceſs, in the moſt diſtant regions of the globe.

THE

HISTORY

OF THE REIGN OF

PHILIP THE SECOND,

KING OF SPAIN.

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1585. State of the United Provinces.

ALTHOUGH the prosperity of the United Provinces was, in the issue, greatly augmented by that increase of inhabitants which they received from the conquered towns; yet, at the present period, their situation was more alarming and critical than it had ever been since the commencement of the war. The prince of Parma was an enemy more formidable in every respect than the duke of Alva; superior to him in military, and still more in political abilities; and the more to be dreaded by the confederacy, on account of the moderation and equity which he displayed in his treatment of the people who had submitted to his arms. Almost the whole of Brabant and Flanders,

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ders, except Sluys and Oſtend, was already conquered; and by his reduction of Antwerp, he had acquired a numerous fleet, which he knew well how to make ſubſervient to the operations of his land-forces, in the further proſecution of the war.

They offer the ſovereignty to the king of France.

THE States were more ſenſible than ever of their inability to defend themſelves, without the aſſiſtance of ſome foreign power. In their treaty with the duke of Anjou, they had diſcovered great ſolicitude in guarding againſt the annexation of the provinces to the crown of France; but ſoon after the death of the prince of Orange, they were perſuaded that with their moſt ſtrenuous efforts it would be impoſſible for them long to preſerve their independence, and that they muſt either ſubmit to Philip, or become the ſubjects of ſome other ſovereign, poſſeſſed of power ſufficient to defend them. Having towards the concluſion of the year one thouſand five hundred and eighty-four, deliberated maturely on the ſubject, they heſitated for ſome time between the king of France and the queen of England; but they came at laſt to fix their choice on the former, partly becauſe they believed it would be eaſier for Henry, than for Elizabeth, to afford them aſſiſtance and ſupport; and partly becauſe, at Henry's death, his crown would devolve on the king of

of Navarre, in whoſe hands they believed that both their religion and liberty would be ſecure.

THAT the offer which they reſolved to make to the French monarch would be readily accepted, they could not doubt, when they conſidered that the principal reaſon why he had formerly declined to eſpouſe their cauſe, was their refuſing to conſent to his ſucceſſion, in the event of his brother's death. They could not but ſuppoſe that his ambition would be highly flattered with the opportunity of making ſo great an addition to his hereditary dominions; and they were not ignorant of the reſentment which he bore towards the king of Spain, who, under the maſk of friendſhip, had long fomented the troubles of his kingdom.

HENRY was not inſenſible to the force of theſe incentives. He gave the ambaſſadors whom the States had ſent to him on this occaſion, the moſt gracious reception; aſſured them of his gratitude for the truſt and confidence which the States were pleaſed to repoſe in him; and bade them rely upon him for every mark of friendſhip in his power to beſtow. But as their propoſal was of too much importance to be haſtily embraced, he deſired they would deliver

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deliver it in writing, that it might be ſubmitted to the reviſal of his counſellors.

State of parties in France.

HENRY would not thus have delayed giving them a deciſive anſwer, if he had been at liberty either to purſue his own inclinations, or to conſult the intereſt of France. Peace indeed had been eſtabliſhed between the inveterate factions, into which his kingdom was divided; and the catholic league was apparently extinct. But the cauſes to which that pernicious confederacy owed its birth, ſtill ſubſiſted; and it required a much more dexterous and ſteady hand than that of Henry, to guide the reins of government, in ſuch a manner as to prevent the paſſions of the parties from breaking out again with as much violence as before. Henry duke of Guiſe, ſon of the celebrated Francis, was ſuperior to his father in exterior accompliſhments, and not inferior to him either in military or political abilities. Like his father too, he was actuated with the moſt inordinate ambition; and could not endure that inſignificance, to which the King's averſion to his bold aſpiring character had reduced him. Enraged at being excluded from the government of the ſtate, while all the power which he and his adherents had formerly enjoyed was engroſſed by the minions of the King, he reſolved either to com-

pel Henry to redreſs his grievances, or to deprive him of his crown. With the moſt indefatigable induſtry he applied himſelf to the proſecution of his deſign. His emiſſaries were ſpread every where; the kingdom ſwarmed with anonymous letters; and the pulpit reſounded with the imminent danger to which the church was expoſed. "For the King, it was ſaid, notwithſtanding his pretenſions to ſanctity, had either no religion at all, or was ſecretly attached to that of the Hugonots; for whom he had, in his late treaty with them, diſcovered the moſt unjuſtifiable partiality. This alone was ſufficient to rouſe the indignation of every faithful ſon of the church; but there was ground for the moſt alarming apprehenſions, when it was conſidered, that the duke of Anjou being now dead, and the King without any hopes of iſſue, the crown muſt (if the people did not exert themſelves with vigour to prevent it) be inherited by the King of Navarre, a relapſed heretic, and a determined enemy of their holy faith [a].

The Catholic league.

By theſe means the duke of Guiſe united more than one half of the kingdom in a fanatical, but firm confederacy, with which he hoped to controul, and in time to annihilate,

[a] Memoires de la ligue, tom. iii.

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1585. the authority of the King. In order to gain greater reſpect to this confederacy, he placed at the head of it Charles, cardinal [b] of Bourbon, a zealous catholic, far advanced in years, and noted for the weakneſs of his underſtanding. Guiſe intended this prelate for Henry's ſucceſſor in the event of the death or depoſition of that prince; and he expected under him to engroſs the whole adminiſtration, and to pave the way for his own acceſſion to the throne.

THE king of Spain was not an unconcerned ſpectator of theſe tranſactions, in a kingdom, to the affairs of which he had, for ſeveral years, given the moſt particular attention. For, beſides the deep concern, which, agreeably to his general ſyſtem of politics, he had ever taken in all the conteſts between the Catholics and Proteſtants in almoſt every European ſtate, he was greatly intereſted to prevent the king of Navarre (whoſe dominions he held unjuſtly) from aſcending the throne of France; and there was no other means he knew, by which he could deter the French monarch from lending aſſiſtance to the United Provinces, but to furniſh him with employment at home.

His views. MOVED by this laſt conſideration, he had given aſſiſtance to the league, when it was firſt

[b] Uncle to the king of Navarre.

formed

formed by the ſame factious leaders ſome years before. He was now more determined than ever to ſupport it; prompted partly by the motives that have been mentioned, and partly by this conſideration, that, by fomenting the diſturbances in France, he would exhauſt the ſtrength of that mighty monarchy, and thereby either acquire poſſeſſion of it himſelf, or be at leaſt delivered from all dread of that power, which he believed to be the only one in Europe able to counteract his deſigns.

His treaty with the duke of Guiſe.

HAVING ſome time before the preſent period revived his negotiations with the duke of Guiſe and the other heads of the league, he gave orders to his commiſſioners, Moreo, and Baptiſta Taſſi, to form an alliance with them, without delay. And it was accordingly concluded between the Spaniſh envoys on the one hand, and the dukes of Guiſe and Mayenne, and the Sieur de Menneville, agent for the cardinal of Bourbon, on the other, at Joinville, on the ſecond of February one thouſand five hundred and eighty-five, upon the following conditions:

"THAT in caſe the preſent king of France ſhould die without male iſſue, the cardinal of Bourbon ſhould, as firſt prince of the blood, be declared King; and all thoſe perſons excluded

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from the ſucceſſion, who were either heretics themſelves, or favourers of heretics.

"THAT the cardinal of Bourbon ſhould, in the event of his ſucceeding to the crown, ratify the peace of Chateau-Cambreſis, between the courts of France and Spain.

"THAT he ſhould prohibit the exerciſe of every religion but the Catholic, within his dominions.

"THAT he ſhould reſtore to Philip all the places which had been taken from him by the Hugonots, and aſſiſt him in ſubduing his rebellious ſubjects in the Netherlands.

"THAT, on the other hand, Philip ſhould contribute fifty thouſand crowns a month, for the ſupport of the confederacy, beſides aſſiſting it with a ſufficient number of troops, till hereſy ſhould be utterly extirpated. That he ſhould take the cardinal of Bourbon, the lords of the houſe of Guiſe, and all others who ſhould accede to the league, under his protection; and that neither of the contracting parties ſhould enter into any treaty with the king of France, without mutual conſent."

BESIDES theſe conditions, which were committed to writing, and ſubſcribed, Philip engaged

gaged to pay annually the sum of two hundred thousand crowns to the duke of Guise, to be disposed of by him as he should judge most conducive to the interest of the league. And it was agreed, that this whole transaction should be concealed, till a more convenient season for divulging it. 1585.

Henry, however, received intelligence of the congress; and from former experience it was easy for him to conjecture the purpose for which it had been held. Soon after this, the embassy from the States of Holland arrived, and was received in the manner above mentioned. Mendoza, the Spanish resident, could not be ignorant of what had passed at Joinville; yet he complained to Henry of his kind reception of the Dutch ambassadors, as being inconsistent with the friendship which he owed to the Catholic King. Henry replied to this complaint, with a degree of firmness and dignity, which it had been happy for himself, and for his subjects, if he could have maintained uniformly in his conduct: "I do not, said he, consider the people of the Netherlands as rebels, but as men, whose patience has been worn out by oppression. Humanity and justice incline me to take an interest in the distress of a neighbouring nation, once subject to the crown of France. I have not however as yet resolved

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to concern myſelf in their affairs. I am unwilling to violate that peace which ſubſiſts between your maſter and me; although I know, that, on his part, it has been violated. My reſolution will appear, when I think fit to diſcloſe it. In the mean time I deſire it may be remembered, that I ſhall not be intimidated by the threats of the king of Spain; and that I am maſter of my conduct, and at liberty, without being anſwerable to any other prince, to make either peace or war, as I incline."

Henry heſitates as to accepting the proffered ſovereignty.

AMONG Henry's counſellors were ſome who exhorted him to embrace ſo tempting an opportunity as the preſent, of advancing the glory of his crown. The perplexed ſituation of his affairs, they ſaid, ought rather to determine him to enter into foreign war, than to deter him from engaging in it. It would prove the moſt effectual remedy for thoſe noxious humours with which his kingdom was diſtempered, by giving a new direction to that reſtleſs ſpirit with which his ſubjects had long been actuated; and it will be found the ſureſt method of diſappointing the deſigns of the duke of Guiſe, by depriving him of the aſſiſtance of the Catholic King, to whom it would furniſh ſufficient employment in defence of his own dominions.

SUCH was the reaſoning of thoſe who adviſed Henry to accept of the ſovereignty of the United Provinces. It was plauſible, but not ſubſtantial or ſolid. "For where," ſaid others of his counſellors, ſeconded by the queen-mother, "can troops be found in France ſufficient to carry on a war againſt an enemy ſo powerful as the king of Spain? Upon ſuch of the Catholics as are in league with that monarch, the King can have no reliance. On the contrary, they would unite with Philip againſt their native ſovereign. To compoſe an army of ſuch Catholics as retain their fidelity, and to ſend that army to the Netherlands, would be to abandon the kingdom naked and defenceleſs to the duke of Guiſe. And were the King to apply to the Proteſtants for aſſiſtance, what purpoſe would that meaſure ſerve, but to excite an univerſal alarm, and to determine all the Catholics in the kingdom to accede to the league?"

He declines accepting it.

HENRY could not reſiſt the force of theſe arguments. Finding himſelf therefore thus fettered by his factious ſubjects, he reſolved, though with much reluctance, to decline the tempting offer which the States had made to him; and having called their ambaſſadors, he informed them, that the unhappy ſituation of his domeſtic affairs rendered it impoſſible for him at preſent to accept of their offer, or to undertake their

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protection; but that he would not fail to recommend their cauſe to the queen of England in the warmeſt manner [c].

Anxiety of the queen of England.

ELIZABETH had formerly approved of their election of the duke of Anjou, and had even contributed her endeavours to promote it. But ſhe dreaded the union of the provinces with France, as an event which would have raiſed the maritime power of that kingdom to a ſuperiority above her own, and therefore ſhe had regarded with a jealous eye, the making a tender to Henry of their ſovereignty. No ſooner was ſhe informed of that monarch's reſolution to decline accepting it, than her anxiety taking another direction, ſhe dreaded that their deſpair would induce them to throw themſelves on the mercy of their former ſovereign, whoſe ſevereſt vengeance, ſhe could not doubt, would be poured out upon her, as ſoon as his affairs in the Netherlands were compoſed.

The States make her an offer of the ſovereignty.

IN order to prevent this effect of Henry's refuſal, which was a more immediate object of her dread than any conſequence that could have ariſen from his acceptance, ſhe ſent an ambaſſador to rouſe their drooping ſpirits, and to give them hopes of her protection. The

[c] Reidan, lib. iv. Davila, lib. vii. Van Meteren, lib. xii. p. 76.

States

States were encouraged by this mark of her attention, to form the reſolution of making the ſame offer of their ſovereignty to her, which they had made to the king of France: and ambaſſadors were accordingly appointed, and ſent over to England in the month of July one thouſand five hundred and eighty-five.

THESE ambaſſadors employed every argument which they could deviſe, to prevail upon Elizabeth to yield to their deſire. After teſtifying in the ſtrongeſt terms that gratitude with which the States were penetrated on account of the favour which ſhe had already afforded them; they repreſented, "That they had now more occaſion than ever for her friendſhip, and muſt ſink under the power of Philip, who poſſeſſed ſuch inexhauſtible reſources, if ſhe did not ſpeedily interpoſe in their behalf. But although the power of the confederacy was ſmall, when compared with thoſe mighty efforts which were made by the king of Spain to enſlave it, it was not unworthy of the queen's attention and regard. Beſides poſſeſſing ſome important towns in Brabant, Flanders, and Guelderland, they were ſtill in poſſeſſion of Holland, Zealand, Utrecht, and Frieſland, in which there were many flouriſhing and well-fortified cities, capacious harbours, and navigable rivers, from which the Queen's ſubjects would derive infinite

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finite advantage in the way of commerce; not to mention that, by the acceſſion of ſo numerous a fleet as that of the United Provinces, her navy would be able to give law to all the maritime powers in Europe. They were far from ſuppoſing that intereſt alone would determine the Queen to regard their preſent application; they had already experienced her generoſity, and they now addreſſed her as the ſovereign of a powerful kingdom, who had ſhewn that ſhe was touched with their calamities. It was their earneſt deſire, at this time, that ſhe would accept of the ſovereignty of the provinces, upon the ſame conditions on which their native princes had enjoyed it, and that ſhe would henceforth conſider the people of the Netherlands as her faithful ſubjects, who would vie with thoſe of her native kingdom in demonſtrating their attachment to her perſon, and in advancing the glory of her reign."

ELIZABETH received this propoſal with much complacency, and aſſured the ambaſſadors, that they ſhould not return without carrying ſuch an anſwer along with them as would entirely ſatisfy the States; but before ſhe could be more particular in her reply, ſhe muſt conſider the affair with that attention which it deſerved, and hear the opinions of her counſellors.

THE

1585. She deliberates on the ſubject.

THE ſame thing happened on this occaſion in the court of England, as in that of France ſome months before. Elizabeth's miniſters were no leſs divided in their ſentiments than thoſe of Henry, and formed their judgments as courtiers are wont to do in matters of doubtful iſſue, conformably either to the natural temper of their mind, or to the inclination of the prince.

THERE were ſome among them who thought, that both juſtice and prudence required that Elizabeth ſhould reject the offer that had been made to her; "for it was the common intereſt of princes, they ſaid, that ſubjects ſhould be retained in their allegiance; and to encourage them in the violation of it, was in reality to undermine the foundations of their own authority. The Queen had hitherto favoured the inhabitants of the Low-Countries, not as a free and independent nation, but as a people who were cruelly oppreſſed; and her intention had not been to enable them to renounce their allegiance, but to induce their King to treat them with greater equity and moderation. In this purpoſe they thought ſhe might ſtill perſiſt. But to acknowledge the States for ſovereigns, and to accept from their hands that ſovereignty which belonged to another, would not only be a violation of that juſtice which princes

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princes owe to one another, but might be attended with the moſt dangerous conſequences to her own repoſe. The king of Spain would not reſt ſatisfied till he had retaliated ſo great an injury. The ſtate of Ireland, and even that of England, where there was ſo great a number of Catholics devoted to his ſervice, would furniſh him with means of executing his deſign. And from fomenting a ſpirit of diviſion among her ſubjects, he would ſoon paſs to an open invaſion of her kingdom. With *his* arms the ſpiritual thunders of the Roman pontiff would co-operate, and in that caſe ſuch a number of enemies might be excited againſt her as would endanger the ſtability of her throne."

But others of Elizabeth's counſellors were of opinion, that ſo inviting an opportunity as the preſent ought not to be neglected, and that the Queen could not, with reaſon, be accuſed of injuſtice for embracing it. The States, compelled by neceſſity, had, ſeveral years before the preſent period, aſſumed the ſovereignty into their own hands, and ſince that time they had conferred it upon the duke of Anjou, whom the Queen had virtually recognized for their lawful ſovereign. The king of Spain had clearly forfeited his right to their obedience, by his violation of all the conditions on which that right was founded. "Notwithſtanding

ſtanding this, he will no doubt be highly offended," continued they, "if the Queen ſhall think fit to liſten to the preſent application. But can he be more an enemy to the Queen, than he has already ſhewn himſelf? Has he not long endeavoured to ſtir up her diſſaffected ſubjects in Ireland? And in England does he not purſue the ſame hoſtile and inſidious deſigns? Has he not warmly eſpouſed the cauſe of the queen of Scots? Does he not on every occaſion ſhew himſelf an implacable enemy to the Engliſh name? And what is it that has ſo long prevented him from declaring open war, but that his revolted ſubjects in the Netherlands have hitherto afforded full employment to all the forces which he could ſpare from his ambitious enterpriſes? When he ſhall have diſengaged himſelf from his embarraſſments in the Low Countries, can we doubt that he will turn his arms againſt the Queen? It is the part of prudence to provide againſt a diſtant as well as againſt an immediate danger; and prudence and a regard to ſelf-preſervation require that the Queen ſhould, to the utmoſt of her power, ſupport the people of the United Provinces, becauſe in their preſervation the peace and ſecurity of her own dominions are involved. If ſhe reject the application of the States, and either give them no aſſiſtance or ſuch only as has hitherto been granted, they will ſoon be over-

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1585. overpowered, and Philip will then be not only at greater leiſure, but much more able than at preſent to execute his deſigns. But if the Queen accept of the advantageous offer that is made to her, and exert herſelf with vigour in defence of this people, who deſire to become her ſubjects, ſhe will encounter her enemy at a diſtance from home, ſhe will be powerfully aſſiſted by a brave and determined ally, and with her fleet acting in concert with that of the States, ſhe will be able to maintain the tranquillity of her kingdom."

Elizabeth undertakes the protection of the States.

ELIZABETH readily perceived the force of this reaſoning: ſhe believed that an open breach with Philip was unavoidable, and ſhe thought it more eligible to begin hoſtilities herſelf now, than to wait till her adverſary ſhould be in a condition to execute his deſigns againſt her. She reſolved however to decline accepting the ſovereignty which the States had offered her, either becauſe ſhe apprehended that it would prove a greater burden than ſhe was able to ſupport, or becauſe ſhe was afraid of exciting the jealouſy of the neighbouring powers. But while for theſe reaſons ſhe deſired that the ſupreme authority might ſtill remain in the hands of the States, ſhe reſolved to afford them her protection; and with this view, after having received particular information

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tion concerning their ſtrength, and the number of troops neceſſary for carrying on the war, ſhe concluded a treaty with them, of which the principal articles were thoſe which follow: "That the Queen ſhould furniſh the States with five thouſand foot and one thouſand horſe, to be commanded by a Proteſtant general of her appointment, and to be paid by her during the continuance of the war. That after the concluſion of the war the States ſhould repay her expences, and that the towns of Brille and Fluſhing, and the fort of Rammekins, ſhould be immediately delivered to her, and ſhould remain in her poſſeſſion till ſhe were fully reimburſed. That the commander of the forces, the governors of provinces and towns, and all the officers and ſoldiers, ſhould take an oath of fidelity to the Queen and the States. That in caſe it ſhould be found expedient to employ a fleet in the common cauſe, the States ſhould furniſh the ſame number of Ships as the Queen, to be commanded by an Engliſh admiral. That the commander in chief, and two Engliſh miniſters reſiding in the Netherlands, ſhould be admitted into the aſſembly of the States. That none of the rights or privileges of the confederated provinces ſhould be violated, and no change introduced in the eſtabliſhed religion or government. And laſtly, That neither of the two contracting parties ſhould, without mutual

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mutual consent, make peace, or enter into an alliance with the king of Spain[d]."

Leicester appointed commander in chief.

This treaty was no sooner ratified, than Elizabeth issued orders for carrying it into execution. The earl of Leicester (to whom this wise princess had been long attached in a degree which far exceeded his merit and services) was appointed general of the forces, and went over with them to Holland in the beginning of the year 1586, accompanied by more than five hundred gentlemen, who intended to serve under him as volunteers. Leicester had neither courage, capacity, moderation, nor integrity, to qualify him for the arduous task that was assigned him, but his defects were concealed under the glare of superficial accomplishments; with which, as he had long deceived the penetration of Elizabeth, he now imposed upon the people of the Netherlands, and excited in them the most flattering and delusive hopes. From his first arrival, they regarded him as the restorer of their fallen state, and profusely heaped upon him every mark of honour which their immoderate fondness could devise. Not satisfied with receiving him rather as a prince and a conqueror, who had already wrought their deliverance, than as the subject of an ally by

[d] Bentivoglio, part ii. lib. v. Camden, an. 1585.

whom

whom he had been ſent to their aſſiſtance, they conferred upon him the offices of governor general of the confederacy, and commander in chief of all their forces by ſea and land.

By this precipitate meaſure, of which they had afterwards the greateſt reaſon to repent, they intended to gratify the Queen, and if poſſible, to induce her to take a deeper intereſt in their affairs. But they were exceedingly diſappointed in their expectations; ſhe was offended at their artifice, and immediately diſpatched her vice-chancellor [e] to complain of their conduct, as being calculated to make the world believe her inſincere in the declaration which ſhe had publiſhed, of intending only to aſſiſt the provinces, and not to undertake the abſolute charge of their protection. She deſired that the States would recall that authority which they had conferred on Leiceſter, and commanded him to reſt contented with the portion of power which ſhe had given him. But it is extremely doubtful whether Elizabeth was in reality as much incenſed on this occaſion as ſhe appeared to be. She ſoon diſcovered an unwillingneſs to mortify her favourite's vanity and ambition; lent a favourable ear to the apology that was made to her by the States, and

[e] Sir Thomas Heneage.

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did not insist on a compliance with her request. Whatever was her motive for this conduct, Leicester was installed in the government, and invested with as ample powers as were consistent with the fundamental laws of the constitution; after which he proceeded to make preparations for putting a stop to the progress of the Spanish arms.

Operations of the prince of Parma.

THE prince of Parma, on the other hand, was no less active in preparing for the further prosecution of the war. After the acquisition of so many important towns, he had conceived the most sanguine expectations of being able soon to complete the reduction of the revolted provinces. But by the interposition of Elizabeth he perceived his victory snatched from him, when he thought himself upon the point of reaping it, and was exceedingly disappointed and chagrined. Finding himself however still superior to his enemy in the field, he resolved to improve this advantage, and as soon as the season would permit, to proceed with his wonted vigour.

The siege of Grave.

THE confederates had, notwithstanding their loss of Maestricht above related, been able to keep possession of two considerable towns on the Maese, Grave in Brabant, and Venlo in Guelderland. Farnese was desirous to make himself

himſelf maſter of theſe two places before he ſhould turn his arms againſt the northern provinces; and early in the ſpring he ſent count Charles of Manſveldt to form the blockade of Grave. Manſveldt executed his commiſſion with little oppoſition, by caſting a bridge over the Maeſe, and by building forts and redoubts not only on the dykes of the river, but on the land ſide of the town, where he pitched his camp, and cut off all communication between the beſieged and the country behind them. The town was defended by an Engliſh garriſon, under the command of a young nobleman, baron de Hemert, a native of Guelderland. Leiceſter, ſenſible that the place was of the greateſt importance for preventing the enemy from advancing into the provinces of Guelderland and Utrecht, went himſelf as far as the city of Utrecht, and from thence ſent count Hohenloe and colonel Norris with two thouſand five hundred foot, partly Dutch and partly Engliſh, to the relief of the beſieged. The Dutch arrived firſt, and having taken one of the Spaniſh forts on the banks of the Maeſe, oppoſite to Grave, they had begun to fortify themſelves upon the dyke, when Manſveldt, having received intelligence of their arrival, ſent three thouſand Spaniards over the bridge already mentioned. By theſe troops the confederates were compelled to abandon their fortifications,

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and to retire along the dyke; but Norris and the Engliſh forces coming up to their aſſiſtance, a bloody battle enſued. The Engliſh, though long inured to peace, gave proof on this occaſion of that ſtrong military genius by which they have ſo often diſtinguiſhed themſelves in their wars upon the continent. They drove the veteran Spaniards before them with irreſiſtible impetuoſity, killed ſeveral hundreds of them, beſides ſeven captains, and a great number of inferior officers, and compelled them to continue their retreat till they reached their fortifications on the bridge. There they were ſupported by freſh troops ſent by Manſveldt from the camp. The battle was renewed, and both parties fought for ſome time with the ſame fury as before, till they were ſeparated by a violent ſtorm of wind and rain, which rendered all their efforts ineffectual. Through this accident the Spaniards ſtill retained poſſeſſion of the bridge, but the rain which fell furniſhed count Hohenloe with the means of relieving the beſieged. The river being ſwelled to an uncommon height, he broke down the dyke near Raveſtein, which ſtands on the ſame ſide with Grave, and having laid all the country between Raveſtein and Grave under water, he conveyed to the beſieged, ammunition, proviſions, and a ſupply of troops, acroſs the inundation.

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THE prince of Parma, alarmed with this ſucceſs of the confederates, ſet out for Grave with his main army; and in a few days after his arrival before the place, two batteries were planted, and a part of the wall was demoliſhed. It might ſtill however have been defended for a conſiderable time; and De Hemert, the governor, gave the earl of Leiceſter the ſtrongeſt aſſurances that he would hold out to the laſt. But his courage failing, he began to talk of the neceſſity of ſurrendering; and although only two or three of his officers approved of his deſign, while all the reſt remonſtrated againſt it as cowardly and diſhonourable, he reſolved to put it in execution; and upon the ſeventh of June, before the breach was practicable, or the enemy had taken any meaſures for an aſſault, he ſent to the prince of Parma a propoſal to capitulate. The prince readily granted him the moſt favourable conditions, and ſuffered him and the garriſon to march out with their arms and baggage. But as De Hemert was undeſerving of this honour, he ſoon had reaſon to repent of the infamous part into which his cowardice had betrayed him. Both he and the officers who had concurred with him, were condemned by a court-martial to be beheaded. The ſentence was acknowledged to be juſt, yet De Hemert's fate excited great commiſeration in his countrymen. He was

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too young for the important truſt which had been committed to him; there was no reaſon to ſuſpect him of treachery or corruption, and he ſolicited in the moſt earneſt manner to have his life ſpared, and to be permitted to engage in ſome perilous enterpriſe in which he might retrieve his honour. But Leiceſter thinking it neceſſary at this time, for the eſtabliſhment of military diſcipline, which had been greatly relaxed, to give an example of ſeverity, rejected all the applications which were made in his behalf[f].

Siege of Venlo.

IMMEDIATELY after the ſurrender of Grave, Farneſe led his army, amounting to twenty thouſand foot and three thouſand horſe, to beſiege Venlo; and he made the greater haſte in his expedition againſt that place, the only one on the ſide of the Maeſe which remained in the hands of the confederates, as he underſtood that the garriſon was weak, and that the celebrated Martin Schench, who commonly reſided in it, had, by Leiceſter's orders, marched with the greateſt part of his troops to ſecure the town of Gueldres. This man, a native of Guelderland, and a ſoldier of fortune, is celebrated by all the cotemporary hiſtorians, on account of his extraordinary valour, activity, and enter-

[f] Meteren, p. 403. Bentivoglio, part ii. lib. ii. and Strada.

priſe,

priſe. Having firſt attached himſelf to the Spaniſh party in the Netherlands, he performed for that party ſeveral important ſervices, but thinking himſelf diſhonoured by a preference which the general beſtowed on a Spaniſh officer, he had deſerted to the States. Schench no ſooner heard that the Spaniſh army had begun the ſiege of Venlo, than he ſet out with a body of horſe in order to throw himſelf into the place. Finding it completely inveſted on every ſide, he attacked the beſiegers in the middle of the night, and having penetrated beyond the general's tent, he continued to advance till he had almoſt reached one of the gates of the town: but he could not enter, by reaſon of certain barricades which Farneſe had raiſed to prevent the ſallies of the garriſon. Before he had time to demoliſh theſe, the whole camp was up in arms, and obliged him to abandon his attempt. He fought his way back through the thickeſt of the enemy, and eſcaped with the loſs of between forty and fifty men. He made ſeveral other vigorous efforts for the relief of the beſieged, but they were all rendered abortive by the foreſight and vigilance of the prince of Parma, who repelled his attacks; and, in ſpite of the annoyance which he gave him from without, kept up an inceſſant fire upon the town till a great part of the wall was demoliſhed. The different nations of which

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the army conſiſted were diſputing with each other for the honour of beginning the aſſault, when the beſieged, dreading the fatal conſequences that might follow, ſurrendered the town on nearly the ſame conditions with thoſe which had been granted to the citizens of Grave. The prince of Parma found it neceſſary to employ all his authority to prevent the ſoldiers, whom the capitulation diſappointed of their prey, from offering violence to the inhabitants; and he gave a proof of his reſpect for Schench, by treating his wife and ſiſter in the moſt honourable manner, and furniſhing them with his own coach to carry them to whatever place they ſhould incline [s].

The ſiege and deſtruction of Nuys.

FROM Venlo, Farneſe went without delay and inveſted Nuys, which belongs to the biſhopric of Cologn, but was at that time in the poſſeſſion of the States.

GEBHERT de Truſches, the archbiſhop and elector of Cologn, having, about three years before the preſent period, abjured the Catholic religion, and married, attempted ſtill to retain his biſhopric and electorate; but his canons, ſupported by the Pope and Emperor, excommunicated him; and having made war againſt

[s] Meteren. Strada.

him,

him, in which they were assisted by the prince of Parma, they obliged him to take refuge in Holland, and elected in his room Ernest, son of the duke of Bavaria. The count de Meurs, one of his partisans, soon after recovered for him, by surprise, the town of Nuys, and obtained from the States a garrison, with which he had been able not only to defend that town against the force of Ernest, but to over-run the country, and do infinite mischief to the Catholic inhabitants. Ernest, unable to repress their irruptions, had gone himself in disguise to the prince of Parma to solicit his assistance, and it was in compliance with his request, that Farnese, postponing the prosecution of his designs against the northern provinces, engaged in his present enterprise. He knew that Philip regarded no undertaking as foreign to his interest, in which the security of the Catholic religion was concerned; and he dreaded that if the garrison of Nuys was not checked in time, they might gather strength, and persuade some of the neighbouring Protestant princes to espouse their cause. Some historians affirm, that he was likewise prompted by the prospect of that glory which he would acquire, should he conquer, in a few weeks, as he expected, a town which Charles the Bold duke of Burgundy had in vain attempted to reduce with an army of sixty thousand men in the space of a year.

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In this expectation he was not disappointed. Through a misfortune which befel the garrison in the person of Cloet the governor, who, being dangerously wounded, was disabled from attending to the operations of the defence, their resolution failed; and in less than three weeks after the prince's arrival before the town, they began to treat of a surrender. That he might save time, and deliver the town as entire as possible to the Elector, Farnese agreed without any difficulty to an armistice; and he had begun to treat with the deputies of the besieged, concerning the terms of capitulation, when the Italian and Spanish troops (who had been highly incensed on account of his having prevented them from plundering the inhabitants of Venlo), being transported with a sudden rage, ran forward in contempt of his authority, and assaulted the town on different sides, while the garrison, who trusted to the armistice, were off their guard. Meeting with little resistance, they quickly scaled the walls, spread themselves over the town, and butchered all who fell in their way, without distinction of age, sex, or condition. Nor was their barbarous cruelty satiated with the horrid carnage which they committed. Their fury being turned into madness, they spurned the thoughts of plunder, and set fire to the town; and as the wind was high, and most of the houses were built

built of wood, it was in a few hours consumed to ashes. Two churches only escaped, in which a number of women and children had taken refuge; and it was with difficulty that the marquis del Guasto prevailed upon the savage soldiers to spare the lives of those trembling, miserable remains of the inhabitants [g].

Siege of Rhineberg.

From this disastrous scene, Farnese, now duke of Parma, by his father's death, directed his march towards Rhineberg; another place in the electorate of Cologn, of which, on account of its important situation, the States were extremely solicitous to retain possession.

Operations of the earl of Leicester.

The earl of Leicester meanwhile had been employed in drawing together all the forces which could be spared from the garrisons of the towns and forts, and seemed determined not to suffer any more of the campaign to pass without striking some important stroke, which might satisfy the expectations of the confederates. But as his army, which consisted only of seven thousand foot and one thousand four hundred horse, was inferior in number to the enemy, he durst not hazard an engagement; but resolved to attack some place of importance in the possession of the Spaniards, in order to

[g] Bentivoglio, part ii. lib. iv.

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induce the duke of Parma to relinquish the siege of Rhineberg. He directed his march towards Zutphen, and in order to facilitate his design against that place, first attacked, and made himself master of the town of Doesberg; after which he sat down with his whole army before Zutphen, and began the siege in form.

He lays siege to Zutphen.

If he had followed the counsel that was given him, to secure certain passes which led to the town, it must unavoidably have fallen into his hands; as it was neither furnished with provisions, nor with military stores. Of this the duke of Parma had been particularly informed by Baptisto Tassi the governor; and for this reason, although he had made progress in his operations against Rhineberg, he immediately raised the siege of that place, and hastened with all his forces to the relief of Zutphen. As he was acquainted with the extremity to which the besieged were reduced, he sent the Italian cavalry, under the marquis del Guasto, before the rest of the army, with a temporary supply; and ordered a numerous body of Spanish infantry to advance with the utmost expedition. Through Leicester's neglect to fortify the passes, a part of this supply was introduced into the town without any difficulty, in the night; and on the day following, del Guasto attempted to introduce the rest. On this occasion a fierce rencounter

rencounter happened between the Italian and Engliſh cavalry. At the firſt onſet the Italians were compelled to retire; but they ſoon returned to the charge. The action then became hot and obſtinate, and the iſſue remained for ſome time doubtful. Del Guaſto, ſeconded by ſeveral officers of diſtinguiſhed reputation, made every effort that could have been expected from the moſt experienced commander. But the Engliſh, led on by colonel Norris and Sir Philip Sidney, proved a ſecond time victorious, and drove the Italians before them till they reached the Spaniſh infantry; when the Engliſh, being ignorant whether the whole Spaniſh army was at hand, thought it dangerous to advance. Of the Italians about one hundred and fifty were killed and wounded, and of the Engliſh thirty. But the latter paid dear for their victory, by their irreparable loſs of the brave and accompliſhed Sir Philip Sidney, who is celebrated by his cotemporaries, as a perſon of the moſt conſummate worth; and as he poſſeſſed the favour of Elizabeth, muſt, if it had been the will of heaven to prolong his life, have ſoon attained to the higheſt dignities in her power to beſtow. Soon after this rencounter, the duke of Parma arrived with his whole army in order of battle; and Leiceſter, conſcious of the inferiority of his forces, drew them off from the ſiege, and ſuffered him to enter

Death of Sir Philip Sidney.

Leiceſter obliged to raiſe the ſiege. Oct. 12th.

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enter Zutphen without oppoſition. Here the duke remained till he had viſited the fortifications, and laid in a ſufficient quantity of ammunition and proviſions; after which he repaſſed the Rhine, and having put garriſons into his new conqueſts, he ſet out for Bruſſels.

Leiceſter takes ſome forts near Zutphen.

His troops were no ſooner diſtributed into winter-quarters, than Leiceſter returned with his army towards Zutphen. He did not however intend to enter ſo late in the year upon the ſiege of the town itſelf, but only to make himſelf maſter of three forts on the oppoſite ſide of the river, which put it in the power of the Spaniards to make frequent incurſions into the territory of Veluwe. In this attempt he ſucceeded, and thereby deprived the Spaniards for a time of what had been the principal advantage which they derived from the poſſeſſion of Zutphen. After which, having ſtationed a part of his troops in theſe forts, he returned to the Hague, where the States had been appointed to convene.

Leiceſter's arbitrary and imprudent conduct.

This aſſembly had no great reaſon to be ſatisfied with their new governor's management of the war; and they were highly diſcontented with his civil adminiſtration. During the courſe of thoſe military operations which have been related, he had treated them

in many reſpects rather as a conquered province, than a free ſtate, to whoſe aſſiſtance he had been ſent by their friend and ally; and had ſhewn no leſs contempt of their fundamental laws, to which he knew they were unalterably attached, than to the conditions of their treaty with Elizabeth. Inſtead of regulating his conduct by the advice of the States or council, as gratitude and prudence required, he appears to have conceived an early prejudice againſt all thoſe who had diſtinguiſhed themſelves in the ſervice of their country, while he beſtowed his favour on a ſet of artful and deſigning men, of ſuſpected fidelity, who were obſequious to his caprice.

By their counſel, he laid reſtrictions upon trade, which, if the States had not interpoſed with vigour, would have proved fatal to it; and which obliged many of thoſe Flemiſh merchants, who had lately ſettled in Holland and Zealand, to remove into foreign parts. By the ſame advice, he tampered with the coin, and made ſuch alterations in it as enriched his minions or himſelf, whilſt they impoveriſhed the provinces.

Innovations were introduced without the conſent of the States, in the manner of collecting the public money, and after it was collected,

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lected, instead of putting it, as the constitution required, into the hands of the treasurer chosen by the States, Leicester ordered it to be delivered to a treasurer of his own appointment, who refused to satisfy the States as to the purposes to which it was applied. Taxes were levied from the people, for paying not only all the soldiers in the garrisons, and all the country troops, but sufficient likewise for the payment of between six and seven thousand Germans; yet the soldiers in the garrisons were so ill paid, that the officers found it difficult to prevent a mutiny; and two thousand Germans who had enlisted under the count de Meurs, in hopes of receiving a certain sum on their arrival in the Netherlands, being disappointed, through the governor's negligence, or the corruption of those in whom he confided, returned to Germany without drawing their swords, at a time when their assistance was absolutely necessary to the success of the campaign.

In the treaty between the States and Elizabeth, it had been agreed, that when any vacancy should happen in the government of a town, fort, or province, the commander in chief should fill it up with one of three persons presented to him by the States. To this agreement Leicester paid no regard, but appointed persons to governments of great importance, not

not only without their being named by the States, but even when the States remonſtrated againſt his appointing them. Roland York, a Londoner, who had ſome years before been detected in treaſonable practices, of which they gave Leiceſter timely information, was notwithſtanding this intruſted with the charge of the principal fort near Zutphen, which commanded the country of Veluwe; and William Stanley, an Engliſh Catholic, who had been in the ſervice of Spain, was made governor of Deventer, into which place Leiceſter, in contradiction to the treaty with Elizabeth, had put a garriſon of twelve hundred foot and two hundred horſe, conſiſting moſtly of Iriſh papiſts.

Besides theſe and other inſtances of imprudent and arbitrary conduct, he diſguſted the Dutch troops by appointing Engliſh officers to command them. He compelled the people to furniſh him with carriages, and to ſerve in his army as pioneers; and, in violation of what had ever been eſteemed a fundamental privilege of the inhabitants of the Netherlands, he obliged perſons, proſecuted by his tools, to leave the provinces in which they reſided, and to ſubmit to their trial in other provinces, where their proſecutors had greater influence to procure their condemnation [h].

[h] Van Meteren, lib. xiii. Grotius, lib. v.

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SUCH a complication of deſpotic meaſures in the government of a people jealous of their liberty, appears repugnant, whatever were the governor's motives, to the very loweſt degree of prudence which we can ſuppoſe him to have poſſeſſed. It is not ſurpriſing that he was ſuſpected of having formed a plan to ſuppreſs the aſſembly of the States, and to aſſume an abſolute authority; but if his preſumption could impoſe upon him ſo far as to make him believe, that ſo wiſe a princeſs as Elizabeth would, from her partiality to him, and in open violation of her engagements, ſupport his uſurpation, yet his conduct was extremely ill calculated to promote his perfidious deſign. It diſguſted all the better ſort of thoſe who had influence in the provinces, and ſerved to diffuſe an univerſal alarm, before he had taken meaſures proper for ſecuring ſucceſs in his attempt.

The States remonſtrate.

THE States, however, ſenſible of their preſent dependance upon Elizabeth, reſolved to avoid an open rupture with her favourite, and, notwithſtanding what had paſſed, they received him on his arrival at the Hague with every mark of reſpect. They delivered to him a modeſt but firm remonſtrance, and intreated him with much earneſtneſs to redreſs their grievances. Leiceſter could not juſtify his conduct in any of the particulars that have been mentioned.

mentioned. He attempted, however, to make ſome apology for it, and aſſured the deputies, though with little ſincerity, that for the future he ſhould be careful to avoid giving them any juſt ground of offence. He added, that at preſent he was under a neceſſity of paſſing over to England, on account of certain diſturbances in that kingdom, which required his preſence. The States were extremely ſurpriſed at this intimation, as they expected that he would have proceeded immediately to reform the abuſes of which they had complained; but they were in ſome meaſure reconciled to his departure, by his agreeing to a propoſal which they made to him, that, till his return to the Low-Countries, his authority as governor ſhould be lodged in the council of ſtate; and he accordingly executed a public deed to this effect on the twenty-fourth of November, although it ſoon afterwards appeared that he had done it only to avoid the trouble of any further ſolicitation upon the ſubject. He executed privately on the ſame day another deed, in which he reſerved to himſelf an excluſive authority over all the governors of provinces, towns, and forts, and even deprived the council of ſtate of their wonted authority. This conduct, at once ſo cowardly and inſincere, alienated from him more than ever the affections of the States, and deſtroyed entirely the confidence which they

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1587. Treachery of Roland York and William Stanley.

THE States had, as mentioned above, remonſtrated againſt the truſt committed to Roland York and William Stanley. Theſe men gave ſoon a fatal proof of the juſtneſs of the ſuſpicions which had been entertained of their fidelity. In a few weeks after Leiceſter's departure for England, they entered into a treacherous correſpondence with Baptiſto Taſſi, governor of Zutphen, and began to prepare their meaſures for delivering to him the important fortreſſes which had been intruſted to their care. The council of ſtate received intelligence of their perfidious deſign; but they had not power to hinder them from putting it in execution. In the beginning of February, both Deventer and the fort oppoſite to Zutphen were given up to the Spaniards. York did not live long to enjoy the wages of his iniquity, and died in miſery, neglected and forgotten by thoſe to whom he had ſacrificed his honour; but Stanley, having perſuaded moſt of his troops to enter into the ſervice of Spain, and having uniformly profeſſed the Catholic religion (which Philip conſidered as an atonement for the moſt odious crimes),

crimes), was permitted to retain the government of Deventer, together with the ſame rank in the Spaniſh, which he had enjoyed in the Engliſh army. This man, ſprung from a reſpectable family in England, had been concerned in Babington's conſpiracy in favour of the queen of Scots, and was probably betrayed, by the dread of a diſcovery, into this unworthy conduct, which has involved his name in perpetual infamy.

THE news of theſe diſaſters ſpread grief and conſternation over the confederated provinces. They recalled the memory of the duke of Anjou's attempt on Antwerp, and excited great anxiety and dread, leſt the examples of York and Stanley ſhould be imitated by the governors of other forts and towns.

Prudence and moderation of the States.

THE States participated of the diſtreſs which the people felt on the preſent occaſion. They ſtill however maintained their wonted fortitude, and without regard to Leiceſter's reſentment, reſolved to provide, as well as their circumſtances would allow, for the preſervation of the commonwealth. In an aſſembly held at the Hague on the ſixth of February, after aſſerting their own ſupreme authority, they enacted, that during the abſence of the earl of Leiceſter, prince Maurice ſhould exerciſe the authority

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of governor, and that all officers in their ſervice ſhould take an oath of obedience to *him*, and of fidelity to the States. To this reſolution, which was immediately publiſhed and enforced, two declarations were ſubjoined: the firſt, that the States did not thereby mean to abridge the authority which they had conferred on the earl of Leiceſter, but only to reſtore to the inferior governors their legal rights and powers; and the ſecond, that they highly diſapproved of thoſe general reflections which had been thrown out againſt the Engliſh troops, on account of the late treachery of a few individuals; for there were bad as well as good men in every nation, and nothing could be more illiberal and unjuſt than ſuch undiſtinguiſhing reflections.

They repreſent their grievances to Elizabeth.

But while their conduct at home contained this mixture of firmneſs and moderation, they gave vent to their reſentment, in letters, which they appointed ſome of their number to carry to Elizabeth and Leiceſter; in which, after making mention of the truſt and confidence which they had placed in him, they entered into a full detail of their grievances.

Leicester was highly offended with theſe letters, and endeavoured to perſuade Elizabeth, that they had been written by a party who were his enemies, while the generality were well affected both to his perſon and government. There

There was indeed a numerous faction in the Netherlands, under the direction of the clergy, whom Leiceſter had attached to him by a punctilious attendance on public worſhip, and an affectation of zeal for the reformed religion. Theſe men not only concurred with his partiſans in England, in attempting to diſcredit the repreſentation of his conduct which the States had tranſmitted to Elizabeth, but ſtudied to controul the authority of the States at home, and endeavoured to inſpire the queen with the moſt groundleſs prejudices againſt prince Maurice and other popular leaders, through whoſe influence, they ſaid, the States had conceived a diſguſt againſt the Engliſh alliance, and were now no leſs alienated from the queen than from the earl of Leiceſter. Elizabeth did not hearken implicitly either to the States or their accuſers, but ſent over to Holland lord Buckhurſt, a nobleman eſteemed for his prudence and moderation, to inquire into the ground of that contradictory information which ſhe had received, but chiefly with an intention to extinguiſh, as ſoon as poſſible, the ſpirit of animoſity and diviſion to which the governor's imprudence had given riſe. Buckhurſt ſoon diſcovered the falſehood of thoſe inſinuations which Leiceſter's partiſans had propagated with regard to the deſigns of prince Maurice, and the diſaffection of the States; and he found no reaſon to call in

Lord Buckhurſt ſent to the Netherlands.

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queſtion any part of that remonſtrance which had been ſent to Elizabeth. He wiſely declined entering into any diſcuſſion of the points of difference between the oppoſite parties, approved in general of the conduct of the States ſince Leiceſter's departure, exhorted them to bury in oblivion what had paſſed, and reminded them of the miſchievous conſequences with which the want of harmony muſt be attended in the preſent critical ſituation of their affairs.

Elizabeth's partiality for Leiceſter.

THESE exhortations ſeemed to produce, in ſome meaſure, the deſired effect; the States appeared ſatisfied that Leiceſter ſhould ſtill retain the office of governor; and lord Buckhurſt carried back to Elizabeth ſuch a report of their diſpoſition, as was calculated to preſerve that amity which had hitherto ſubſiſted between her and them; but he ſcrupled not to condemn the conduct of her favourite, and accuſed him of being the cauſe of all the diſturbances which had happened. If any other of Elizabeth's courtiers had been guilty of the ſame indiſcretions with the earl of Leiceſter, it is not to be doubted that he would have felt the weight of her reſentment. He had far exceeded the powers which ſhe had given him. By his miſconduct he had ſtrengthened the hands of her mortal enemy, the king of Spain. And by his miſconduct and arrogance together, he

he had almoſt involved her in diſſenſions with an ally whom ſhe had undertaken to defend, and with whom it was of the higheſt conſequence to her intereſt that ſhe ſhould maintain a perfect underſtanding. Yet ſuch was her partiality for this unworthy favourite, and ſo great the influence which he poſſeſſed, that he found means to turn her indignation from himſelf againſt his accuſer. Lord Buckhurſt incurred her diſpleaſure, and was even put under arreſt, as if *he*, and not Leiceſter, had been guilty [k].

Famine and peſtilence in the ſouthern provinces.

NOTHING could be more agreeable to the duke of Parma than theſe diſtractions in the confederated provinces; but he was prevented from availing himſelf of them by the miſerable condition to which the provinces under his command were reduced by famine and peſtilence. The country, as well as the towns, in the ſouthern provinces, had of late ſuffered a prodigious diminution of inhabitants. Great numbers had forſaken their habitations, partly on account of their religion, and partly of the ravages which had been committed by the troops; and only a few of thoſe who remained, had either ſeed to ſow, or horſes and cattle to

[k] Meteren, lib. xiv. Bentivoglio, p. ii. lib. iv. Reidanus, lib. vi. Camden, an. 1587.

cultivate

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cultivate their grounds. There had been almoſt no crop raiſed in the preceding year within the provinces, and the crops in the neighbouring countries had been worſe than uſual for ſeveral years. From Holland and Zealand the Flemings might have been abundantly ſupplied, but the confederated States, beſides prohibiting all communication with the ſouthern provinces, had placed guardſhips upon the coaſts, and in the mouths of the rivers, to prevent them from receiving ſupplies from foreign parts, in the hopes of weakening the Spaniſh army, or of compelling the frontier towns to return into the confederacy. This cruel policy was not attended with either of theſe effects. The duke of Parma brought proviſions for his army from France, Germany, and England, at an immenſe expence, and he gave particular attention to the ſupplying of thoſe towns which lay neareſt to the United Provinces.

Thoſe dreadful calamities which are the ordinary concomitants of famine, were felt chiefly in the interior parts, where great multitudes died of want, and of thoſe peſtilential diſeaſes which want and unwholeſome nouriſhment produced. In Antwerp, Bruſſels, and other places, many perſons of the better ranks in life, after ſelling their furniture and other effects to

purchaſe food, were reduced to beg openly in the ſtreets. In Brabant and Flanders ſeveral villages were entirely deſerted: and the cotemporary hiſtorians add, that from the ſolitude and deſolation of ſome parts of the country, wolves and other wild beaſts were ſo much multiplied, that beſides many perſons who periſhed in other places, upwards of a hundred were devoured by thoſe furious animals, within two miles of Ghent, in a country formerly one of the beſt cultivated and moſt populous in the Netherlands.

Prosperity of the United Provinces.

SUCH was the ſtate of the ſouthern provinces, which are by nature the richeſt, though governed by the duke of Parma with ſuperior abilities. On the other hand, the maritime provinces were torn by factions, and governed by one who poſſeſſed neither moderation, prudence, nor capacity; yet the inhabitants were not only entirely free from thoſe calamities with which their neighbours were oppreſſed, but were richly furniſhed with all the neceſſaries of life, and daily increaſed in numbers. Every houſe was occupied, new ſtreets and new towns were built, and individuals grew richer every day, notwithſtanding the perpetual burden of an expenſive war. For theſe advantages the Dutch were indebted chiefly to their commerce, which had long been conſiderable, but was of late greatly

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greatly augmented by the multitude of manufacturers and merchants who flocked into Holland and Zealand, when Brabant and Flanders were broken off from the confederacy. The calamities of the latter provinces contributed ſtill more to increaſe the migration of people into the former, till they became the ſeat of the greateſt part of that wealth and induſtry, which for ages paſt had diſtinguiſhed the Netherlands above the reſt of Europe[1].

In this condition of the United Provinces, it may appear ſurpriſing, that during the ſpace of eight months no attempt was made by the confederates to recover any of the towns which had been taken from them; but diviſion here, and the want of capacity and vigour in the perſon intruſted with the reins of government, were attended with ſome of the ſame effects as were produced by the famine and peſtilence in the other provinces. Neither prince Maurice nor the States had power at this time to enforce obedience to their commands, except in the provinces of Holland and Zealand. In the reſt, the partiſans of Leiceſter diſputed, and counteracted their authority; and thus, the duke of Parma, notwithſtanding thoſe unſpeakable calamities in which the provinces under his go-

[1] Van Meteren, lib. iv. p. 434. Thuanus, lib. lxxxviii. p. 9.

vernment

vernment were involved, was ſooner ready than the confederates to reſume the operations of the war. BOOK XX. 1587.

Ostend and Sluys were the only towns of importance in Flanders which had not ſubmitted to his arms. He now reſolved to attack the latter of theſe places; and, in order to conceal his deſign, he ſent Hautepeine and the marquis del Guaſto, with a body of troops, towards the Veluwe, as if he had intended to make his principal attack in that quarter. This artifice had the effect which he deſired. Prince Maurice and count Hohenloe were immediately ſent to the Veluwe with the army of the States; and in the mean time the duke turned ſuddenly towards Sluys. This place, which lies at a little diſtance from the coaſt, communicates with the ſea by a ſpacious canal, capable of receiving the largeſt ſhips. By this canal, which ſeparates Sluys from the iſle of Cadſand, the town is rendered inacceſſible by land on the weſt and north; and all the ground on the eaſt is ſo broken and interſected by an infinite number of ſmaller canals derived from the larger, that it is impracticable to approach the place except by a neck of land on the ſouth, leading towards Damme and Bruges. Sluys lies at the diſtance of nearly five miles from Oſtend on the ſouth, and from Fluſhing on the north; The ſiege of Sluys. Beginning of June.

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north; from the former of which it might receive assistance by land, and from the latter by sea. It was therefore the duke of Parma's first object to intercept the communication of the besieged with these two places, and for this purpose he began with attacking the fort of Blackenberg, which stands half-way between Sluys and Ostend. As the garrison were utterly unprepared for resistance against so vigorous an attack, he soon compelled them to surrender; immediately after which, he proceeded with a part of his forces to the isle of Cadsand. At that place, after erecting a fort on the banks of the great canal, nearer the sea than Sluys, he had recourse to the same expedient which he had employed so successfully at Antwerp, and blocked up the canal by a bridge of ships strongly bound together, and well furnished with troops and artillery.

Having thus cut off the only channels of communication by which the friends of the besieged could relieve them, he began to make his approaches to the place itself on that side which looks towards Bruges, on which alone it was accessible. Even there the ground was so wet, as to increase exceedingly the labour of working the trenches; and the besieged had, in order to keep the enemy at a distance, raised a strong redoubt beyond the ditch. The garrison

ſon conſiſted of about one thouſand ſix hundred men, partly Engliſh and partly Dutch, commanded by colonel Groenvelt, one of the braveſt officers in the ſervice of the States. In the beginning of the ſiege they made ſeveral vigorous ſallies, in which they gave the moſt ſhining proofs of intrepidity. But finding that although in theſe ſallies they did great execution among the enemy, their own numbers ſuffered conſiderable diminution, Groenvelt reſolved to reſtrain them for the future from advancing beyond the redoubt. This redoubt they defended for ſome time with great bravery, and frequently repulſed the aſſailants; but they were obliged at laſt to yield to ſuperior numbers, and to retire within the town.

In carrying forward the trenches, Farneſe encountered difficulties from the ſoftneſs of the ground, and the inceſſant fire of the beſieged, that were almoſt inſurmountable. Many of his troops were killed, and the marquis of Renti, La Motte, and ſeveral others of his principal officers were dangerouſly wounded.

Return of Leiceſter from England.

In the mean time prince Maurice and count Hohenloe had entered Brabant, and after deſtroying a great number of little towns and villages, had directed their march towards Bois-le-Duc, hoping that, in order to ſave that place,

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place, the duke of Parma would quit the ſiege of Sluys. But before they had taken the fort of Engelem, which lay in their way to Bois-le-Duc, they were informed that the earl of Leiceſter, who had long been impatiently expected, had at laſt arrived at Fluſhing with a reinforcement of troops. Maurice ſet out inſtantly, with ſome cohorts, to meet him, leaving Hohenloe with the reſt of the forces to proſecute the enterpriſe againſt Engelem and Bois-le-Duc. When Maurice had joined Leiceſter, the confederate army was nearly equal to that of the beſiegers. Leiceſter ſet ſail from Fluſhing on the twenty-ninth of June, and in a few hours reached the canal of Sluys. But after examining the bridge, redoubts, and forts, with which Farneſe had blocked up the paſſage, he judged it impracticable in that way to reach the town. Between the deſire of accompliſhing his deſign, and the difficulty which he muſt encounter in carrying it into execution, he balanced for ſome days, and at length he ſteered his courſe for Oſtend, with the reſolution to lead his troops from thence by land to the relief of the beſieged. In the proſecution of this latter deſign, he ſhewed no greater ſpirit than in that of the former. To open his way from Oſtend to Sluys, it was neceſſary he ſhould make himſelf maſter of the fort of Blackenberg. He accordingly laid ſiege to that fort,

His feeble attempts to raiſe the ſiege of Sluys.

fort, and had begun to batter it with his cannon; but he was no ſooner informed that the duke of Parma was upon his march to give him battle, than he drew off his troops from Blackenberg, retired haſtily in the night to Oſtend, and ſoon afterwards returned to Zealand.

THE duke of Parma reſumed with freſh ardour the operations of the ſiege, and having at laſt, though with incredible labour, puſhed his trenches near enough for erecting a battery, he ſoon laid a great part of the wall in ruins. He would then have attempted an aſſault, had he not perceived that the beſieged had raiſed within the wall a half moon, which they had fortified in the ſtrongeſt manner. Laying aſide therefore all thoughts of taking the town by ſtorm, he reſolved to employ the ſlower method of filling up the ditch, and working mines; and in theſe operations, againſt which the beſieged made the moſt vigorous oppoſition, near three weeks were ſpent after the wall had been demoliſhed. The beſieged had received certain intelligence that Leiceſter had given up all hopes of being able to relieve them, and they had now no more gunpowder left than was ſufficient to ſerve them for ten or twelve hours longer. Six days before this time Groenvelt, and the other ſurviving officers,

Generous reſolution of the beſieged.

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They capitulate.

August 4.

duke of Parma more than Nuys, Grave, and Venloe together [m].

Guelders betrayed to the Spaniards.

It afforded him great ſatisfaction under this calamity, that during the ſiege of Sluys, he had, without any bloodſhed, acquired the town of Guelders, which was betrayed to him by a Scots colonel of the name of Paton. To this man, Leiceſter had committed the government of Guelders; but having taken offence at ſome part of his conduct, he had openly threatened to put another, of the name of Stuart, in his room. In order to avoid this affront, Paton entered into a correſpondence with Hautpeine, whoſe troops were at that time in the neighbourhood of Guelders, and with his aſſiſtance he ſoon afterwards executed his perfidious deſign.

To compenſate to the States for ſo many important places, as they had loſt ſince their alliance with England, their forces had gained no advantage but the reduction of Axel, which prince Maurice took by a ſtratagem; and the fort of Engelem, which was compelled to ſurrender by count Hohenloe; who at the ſame

[m] Strada mentions the numbers killed on both ſides; but his whole relation of this ſiege is ſo exceedingly romantic that no credit can be given to it.

Meteren, lib. xiv. p. 439. Bentivoglio, part ii. lib. iv.

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time beat the Spaniſh troops under Hautpeine, in a rencounter, in which the latter loſt his life.

AFTER Leiceſter's unſucceſsful attempt to raiſe the ſiege of Sluys, he tranſported his troops to Brabant, and made another equally inglorious attempt to reduce the town and diſtrict of Hobgſtraten. This was the laſt military enterpriſe which he undertook in the Netherlands, immediately after which he ſet out for Dort, whither the States had ſent ſome of their number to wait his arrival.

Intrigues of Leiceſter.

THIS aſſembly was now more diſguſted than ever with his conduct. They long had reaſon to ſuſpect, and they had lately received certain intelligence, that he had formed a deſign to deprive them of their authority. A letter of his, writ from England to one of his ſecretaries, had been intercepted, in which, after mentioning his intended return to the Low-Countries, he expreſſed, in ſtrong terms, his diſcontent with the limited power which he had hitherto enjoyed as governor; ſent inſtructions to be communicated to thoſe who were privy to his deſigns; and inſinuated, that if he could not obtain a more extenſive authority, it was the Queen's reſolution, and his own, to abandon

don the provinces altogether, and to leave them to their fate.

The States alarmed.

THE States, alarmed with this intelligence, reſolved to ſtand upon their guard againſt his machinations. Being ſtill however unwilling, from their dread of Elizabeth's diſpleaſure, to come to an open rupture with him, they took no notice of this letter, but exhorted him to reject ſuch malignant counſels as might be offered by ill-deſigning men, who, in order to promote their own ſelfiſh views, wiſhed to ſow the ſeeds of animoſity and diſſenſion. From this exhortation, Leiceſter eaſily perceived that the States had come to the knowledge of his deſigns. With great diſingenuity he accuſed them of having violated their faith, by abridging that authority which they had intreated him to accept; and he threw the blame of all the misfortunes which had befallen the confederacy, partly on the States, and partly on prince Maurice and count Hohenloe. The States, he ſaid, had neglected to furniſh him with the neceſſary ſupplies; and Maurice and Hohenloe had, on different pretences, refuſed to co-operate with him in his military enterpriſes. Of a writing which contained theſe and ſome other groundleſs accuſations, copies were ſent by his partiſans into different parts of the provinces. The par-

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ties accuſed publiſhed a vindication of their conduct; and it is impoſſible, from what is preſerved of this altercation, to conſider what Leiceſter advanced, in any other light, but as the mean attempt of a perſon, equally weak and diſingenuous, to blacken the characters of others, in order to conceal the cowardice and imprudence of which he himſelf was conſcious. Such was the judgment formed of it by the impartial world, and by moſt of the inhabitants of the Netherlands. But there was ſtill a numerous party who eſpouſed Leiceſter's defence, and promoted the execution of his deſigns. The clergy were ſtill as much attached to him as ever, and ſpared no pains to bring the people to a compliance with his will. Having with this view called a ſynod or aſſembly, they appointed four of their number to preſent an addreſs to the States, in which, beſides exhorting them to attend to the true intereſt of the country, and the advancement of religion, they adviſed them to maintain concord with the queen of England, and the earl of Leiceſter.

The officiouſneſs of the clergy.

To this addreſs the States made ſuch a reply, as the officiouſneſs of thoſe in whoſe name it was preſented ſeems to have deſerved. "They had not been inattentive (they ſaid) to thoſe important objects which the ſynod had

had recommended to their attention; and they could not be more ſolicitous than they had always been, to preſerve inviolate thoſe engagements into which they had entered with the queen of England and the earl of Leiceſter; but, in their turn, they muſt exhort the miniſters to be on their guard againſt admitting among them perſons, who, under the cloak of religion, made it their buſineſs to calumniate the civil magiſtrates. By perſons ſuch as theſe, who affected great zeal for religion, the church had been ruined in the ſouthern provinces; and its ruin in the United Provinces would ſoon be accompliſhed, if an end were not ſpeedily put to the practices of ſuch deſigning men. They concluded with exhorting the miniſters to take warning from the fate of their brethren in Brabant and Flanders; and to remember, that the only way in which they ought to interfere in public affairs, was to favour thoſe to whom the adminiſtration was committed, with the aſſiſtance of their prayers."

Leiceſter's deſigns are fruſtrated.

NEITHER this wholeſome counſel, nor any other meaſure which the States employed to enlighten and alarm their countrymen, produced for ſome time the deſired effect. Leiceſter ſtill continued to carry on his intrigues in different places, and went from town to town, putting in practice every low art by

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which he might increaſe the number of his partiſans. In Frieſland, North Holland, and even in Dort and Leyden, there were many who eſpouſed his cauſe, and ſhewed themſelves deſirous to inveſt him with authority to controul the aſſembly of the States, notwithſtanding the many ſtriking proofs which he had given both of tyranny and folly. In Leyden a plot was laid for putting him in poſſeſſion of that important city; but the conſpirators were detected, condemned, and executed. And by the vigilance of the States, ſeconded by prince Maurice and William de Naſſau, governor of Frieſland, his deſigns in other places were rendered equally ineffectual. Having come at laſt to perceive that he was not equal to the attempt upon which he had entered, he grew tired of his ſituation, and in the month of December paſſed over to England, where, not long after his arrival, Elizabeth, either from a conviction of his incapacity, or from the deſire of keeping him for the future near her perſon, required him to reſign his government of the provinces; which he accordingly did, on the 27th of December, one thouſand five hundred and eighty-ſeven [n].

He reſigns the government.

THE flame which he had kindled was not ſo ſoon extinguiſhed. In ſome towns, the garri-

[n] Meteren, p. 455.

ſons,

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sons, instigated by him or his emissaries, openly despised the authority of the States. Against the garrison of Medemblinc, they were obliged to employ force; and in order to engage other garrisons to yield obedience to their commands, they had recourse to the interposition of Elizabeth, through whose good offices internal tranquillity was at length restored.

THE

HISTORY

OF THE REIGN OF

PHILIP THE SECOND,

KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK XXI.

PART I.

ELIZABETH was the more ſolicitous to heal the diviſions in the United Provinces, as ſhe apprehended that ſhe would ſoon have occaſion for all the aſſiſtance which her allies could afford her. All Europe had reſounded for ſome time with the noiſe of the preparations which Philip was making, with a view to ſome important enterpriſe. He had been employed for ſeveral months in building ſhips of an extraordinary ſize, and in collecting ſtores for their equipment; while the duke of Parma had made ſuch numerous levies in Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands, as ſhewed that

1587. Philip meditates the conqueſt of England.

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that he intended to take the field againſt the next campaign, with a much more powerful army than any which he had hitherto commanded.

His motives.

ALMOST ever ſince the beginning of Philip's reign, a great proportion of his troops had been occupied, either in war with the Corſairs and Turks, in the reduction of the Moreſcoes, or in the conqueſt of Portugal. He had never fully exerted his ſtrength againſt his revolted ſubjects in the Netherlands. Nor had he found leiſure to take vengeance upon Elizabeth, for the ſupport which ſhe had given them, and the inſults which he had received from her in America, where ſeveral of his colonies had been plundered by her fleet[a]. To theſe objects he now thought that his honour as well as his intereſt required that he ſhould apply his principal attention. As he did not doubt that, with a much ſmaller force than he intended to employ, he ſhould be able to compel the people in the Netherlands to return to their allegiance, he had begun his preparations chiefly with an intention to invade England, and he aſpired to the entire ſubjection of that kingdom. But he heſitated for ſome time as to the manner in which he ſhould proceed; and held frequent

[a] By Sir Francis Drake, anno 1585.

meetings

meetings of his council to assist him in deciding, whether it was most expedient to begin with the invasion of England, or with the conquest of the United Provinces. Idiaquez, one of his principal officers of state, advised him to abandon altogether the former of these designs.

Speech of Idiaquez.

"The situation of England (said that prudent statesman), which is surrounded on every side with a tempestuous ocean, and has few harbours upon its coasts; the numerous forces which defend it; the genius of the people, and the nature of their government, concur in making me believe that it will be found almost impossible to succeed in an attempt to conquer it.

"The English navy is alone equal to that of any other nation; and when joined with the ships belonging to the revolted provinces, must prove an overmatch for any fleet that can be sent from Spain. And even allowing that the King's forces should effectuate a descent, yet what ground is there to hope that they will be able either to subdue so great a nation, or to maintain, for any considerable time, such conquests as may be made? In order to accomplish the most ordinary conquests, some favourable disposition in the people towards the conquerors is necessary; and in order to preserve them, there

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there is need for a continual ſupply of troops. From no part of the Engliſh nation has the King any reaſon to hope for aſſiſtance in the intended enterpriſe. In the beginning of his reign, he had experience of the ſtrong abhorrence which theſe iſlanders entertain of a foreign yoke. And he knows how difficult it muſt be to keep up a numerous army in England, beſides all the other armies which are neceſſary for the defence of his hereditary, and his lately acquired dominions. If England ſhould prove equally pernicious to Spain, as Flanders has done, would there not be reaſon to dread the conſequences? Even the conſequence of ſucceſs may prove fatal; how much more thoſe which may ariſe from a diſappointment, by which Elizabeth, being delivered from her apprehenſions of danger at home, would be at greater leiſure than ever to ſupport the provinces in their rebellion; and by joining her maritime force with theirs, do infinite miſchief to the Spaniſh dominions, both in Europe and America. In my opinion, therefore, it will be better to ſuſpend the deſign of invading England, and to employ both the fleet and army in the reduction of the Netherlands. The rebels will not long reſiſt ſo great a force; and when they are ſubdued, the King, having fewer enemies to contend with,

with, will be much more able than at preſent to chaſtiſe the queen of England."

Duke of Parma's opinion.

THE duke of Parma, whom Philip conſulted on this occaſion, was of the ſame opinion as Idiaquez; and added, That before the King could enter upon the Engliſh expedition with a probability of ſucceſs, it was neceſſary to acquire poſſeſſion of ſome of the moſt conſiderable ſea-ports in Zealand, for the accommodation of his fleet.

Rejected by Philip.

PHILIP was not naturally either bold or raſh; yet he refuſed to liſten to theſe prudent counſels. Blinded by the ſplendid ſucceſs of his arms in the conqueſt of Portugal, he thought it impoſſible that Elizabeth could withſtand the powerful armament which he intended to employ againſt her. And if England were ſubdued, the reduction of his revolted ſubjects would quickly follow, as they would then be deprived of the only foreign aid by which they had been hitherto enabled to perſiſt in their rebellion. Nor would the conqueſt of the former, he thought, be either ſo tedious or ſo difficult as that of the latter; becauſe England was every where an open country, and the Engliſh, truſting to their inſular ſituation, had neglected to provide any fortified towns to retard the progreſs of an enemy. A ſingle battle by ſea, and

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and another by land, would decide the conteſt; and as the fleet which he was preparing was greatly ſuperior to any which Elizabeth could equip, ſo he could not ſuppoſe that her land-forces, undiſciplined, and unaccuſtomed to war, would be able to reſiſt his veteran troops, which had been long enured to victory, and were commanded by the greateſt general and the braveſt officers in the world.

State of Europe.

He was not ignorant how much reaſon the other European powers had to be jealous of his deſign; but he conſidered that happily they were at preſent either not inclined, or not in a capacity, to prevent him from carrying it into execution. The emperor of Germany was his friend and ally. The attention of the northern potentates was wholly engroſſed with the internal adminiſtration of their dominions. And the French monarch, who was more deeply intereſted than any other in oppoſing him, could with difficulty ſupport himſelf upon the throne againſt his rebellious ſubjects.

But there was nothing which contributed more to confirm him in his purpoſe, than the approbation which it received from the Pope [b]; who, although it has been aſſerted that no

[b] Sextus V.

perſon entertained a higher admiration of the character of Elizabeth, conſidered her as the moſt formidable enemy that the church had ever ſeen upon a throne. She had not indeed, on any occaſion, treated her Catholic ſubjects with that inhuman cruelty, of which Philip had ſet her an example in his treatment of the Proteſtants, but ſhe had ſhewn herſelf intent on extirpating the Catholic religion from every country in Europe, to which her power and influence could reach. For almoſt thirty years ſhe had been the chief ſupport of the Proteſtants in Germany, the Netherlands, and France. She had entirely aboliſhed the Popiſh faith in Scotland, as well as in her own dominions; and not ſatisfied of depriving the unfortunate Mary of her liberty, ſhe had lately, after the farce of a ſolemn trial, ordered that princeſs to be condemned as a traitor, and to ſuffer death. This action, for which Elizabeth was ſeverely cenſured by Proteſtants as well as Papiſts, excited in the violent mind of the Pontiff, the higheſt degree of rage and indignation. With theſe paſſions his intereſt concurred; and the hope of ſeeing England, which had formerly been the moſt precious jewel of the triple crown, brought back to its ancient obedience to the Holy See. He approved highly therefore of Philip's intended enterpriſe, exhorting him to perſevere in his deſign, and gave him

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assurances that he would befriend him in the execution of it to the utmost of his power. Next to an insatiable thirst after dominion, it had ever been Philip's principal ambition to be considered as the guardian of the church; and his vanity was not a little flattered at this time with having the sovereign Pontiff for his associate [c].

Artifice of Philip to deceive Elizabeth.

He proceeded therefore with much alacrity in completing his preparations. But although he resolved to spare no expence or pains to secure success; yet, that he might find Elizabeth unprepared, he concealed with care the purpose for which his armament was intended. A part of his fleet, he said, was to co-operate with his land-forces in the reduction of Holland, and the rest to be employed in the defence of his dominions in America.

Elizabeth had too much penetration to be so easily deceived by the artifices of a prince, with whose duplicity she was so thoroughly acquainted; and in the spring of the year one thousand five hundred and eighty-seven, she sent sir Francis Drake with a fleet to the coast of Spain to interrupt his preparations. By

[c] Bentivoglio, part ii. lib. iv. See a very different account in Gregorio Leti's Life of Sixtus, lib. vii.

this

this gallant ſeaman, the Spaniſh ſhips of war which had been ſent to oppoſe him were diſperſed, and near a hundred veſſels filled with naval ſtores and proviſions, beſides two large galleons, were deſtroyed in the harbour of Cadiz. Drake then ſet ſail for the Azores, where he took a rich carrack in her way from the Eaſt Indies, and afterwards returned to England loaded with ſpoils, having by this bold and fortunate adventure rendered it impoſſible for Philip to execute his enterpriſe againſt England till the following year.

Fruitleſs negotiation for peace.

NOTWITHSTANDING theſe hoſtilities, Philip ſtill affected to deſire that all the grounds of difference between him and Elizabeth might be removed, and gave orders to the duke of Parma to propoſe a negotiation for peace. It is not probable that the Queen was deceived by this, any more than by his former artifice. She reſolved however to appear to be caught in the ſnare: ſhe pretended to believe his declaration with regard to the deſtination of his fleet, and to liſten to his propoſal of negotiating an agreement. She readily accepted of the mediation of the king of Denmark; and that her conduct might have the greater appearance of ſincerity, ſhe urged the States to ſend ambaſſadors to Bourbourg, the place appointed for the conferences, and ordered her envoy to repre-

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ſent to them the expediency of putting a period to the war.

THE States were much alarmed with her propoſal, and ſuſpected that, in order to avert the ſtorm which threatened her, ſhe had reſolved to ſacrifice the confederacy, and to deliver up to Philip the Dutch towns in her poſſeſſion. She found it neceſſary to remove their apprehenſions on this head, by declaring, that as ſhe had not the remoteſt thoughts of forſaking them, ſo ſhe would never conſent to any terms of peace inconſiſtent with their ſecurity.

SHE could not however perſuade them to ſend ambaſſadors to the congreſs. "They were deeply ſenſible," they informed her, "of the weight of thoſe conſiderations, which her ambaſſador had urged, to induce them to think of peace. They lamented that ſpirit of diſcord which had ſeized on ſome towns of the confederacy, and they heard with great anxiety, of thoſe mighty fleets and armies which the king of Spain was preparing for their deſtruction. But their ſituation, though bad in ſome reſpects, was far from being deſperate; they were ſtill in poſſeſſion of more than ſixty towns and forts, each of which could make a vigorous reſiſtance againſt the enemy. In the two years during which the earl of Leiceſter had governed

governed them, eight millions of guilders had been raiſed for the public ſervice, and under a prudent adminiſtration they would be able not only to continue to afford the ſame expence, but even to augment it. But although their ſituation were in reality as ill as ſome had repreſented, it could not ſerve any good purpoſe to treat of peace with the king of Spain, who was unalterably determined never to grant them peace on ſuch conditions as either their intereſt or their conſciences would permit them to accept. And from paſt experience they were perſuaded, that their ſending ambaſſadors to the congreſs would be attended with the moſt pernicious conſequences. It would create in many perſons ſuch deſpair with regard to the ſtability of the preſent government, as would determine ſome to change their religion, and others to leave the Netherlands. It would raiſe the ſpirits of the Catholics, and induce both them and the Proteſtants to with-hold their ſhare of the public expences; the former, from the view of forwarding the peace, and the latter, from that of retiring into foreign parts. Thus, both the fleet and army, being ill paid, would become refractory, the commanders of towns and ſhips would provide for their future ſecurity, by entering into ſecret practices with the enemy; and in the midſt of that ſedition, confuſion, and treachery that would enſue, it

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would not be in the power of the States, or of the Queen, to prevent the people from accepting whatever terms of peace the king of Spain ſhould think fit to impoſe."

In theſe reaſons Elizabeth found it neceſſary to acquieſce; but ſhe perſiſted in the reſolution which ſhe had formed with regard to her own conduct, and ordered her ambaſſadors to repair to Bourbourg. In the conferences held there, various terms of accommodation were propoſed, with no ſincerity on the part of Spain, and with little hope of ſucceſs on the part of England. The Spaniſh miniſters ſtill continued to aſſure thoſe of England, that no invaſion of that kingdom was intended; and, conſidering how long this congreſs ſubſiſted (for it was not diſſolved till the arrival of the Spaniſh fleet in the channel), it ſhould ſeem that their aſſeverations were not wholly diſregarded by Elizabeth [d].

Elizabeth's preparations.

This artifice, however, did not prevent her from putting her kingdom into a poſture of defence. An army was raiſed amounting to eighty thouſand men, twenty thouſand of whom were ſtationed on the ſouth coaſt of the iſland, twen y-two thouſand foot and a thouſand horſe

[d] Meteren, lib. xiv. p. 459. Bentivoglio, part ii. lib. iv.

were poſted at Tilbury in Eſſex, under the earl of Leiceſter, and the remainder, commanded by lord Hunſdown, were kept near the Queen's perſon, in readineſs to march againſt the enemy whereſoever they ſhould attempt to land. Elizabeth did not truſt implicitly at this juncture either to her own judgment, or that of her counſellors of ſtate; lord Gray of Wilton, ſir Francis Knolles, ſir John Norris, ſir Richard Bingham, and ſir Roger Williams, officers of diſtinguiſhed reputation, were appointed to conſider of the meaſures proper to be purſued; and by their advice, all the ſea-ports which lay moſt conveniently for a deſcent were fortified; the militia was raiſed, their arms and manner of fighting aſcertained, and a reſolution formed, that if, notwithſtanding the precautions taken, it ſhould be found impoſſible to prevent the enemy from landing, all the country round ſhould be laid waſte, and a general engagement avoided till the ſeveral armies were combined.

While theſe prudent meaſures were purſued at land, Elizabeth exerted herſelf ſtrenuouſly in the equipment of her fleet. When ſhe began her preparations, it did not amount to more than thirty ſhips, and none of theſe were nearly equal in ſize to thoſe of the enemy. But this diſadvantage was in ſome meaſure com-

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penſated by the ſkill and dexterity of the Engliſh ſailors; and the number of her ſhips was ſoon augmented, through the alacrity and zeal which her ſubjects diſplayed in her defence. By her wiſe adminiſtration ſhe had acquired their eſteem and confidence. The animoſity againſt her perſon and government, which the differences in religion had excited in the minds of ſome, was at preſent ſwallowed up in that univerſal abhorrence which the Catholics as well as the Proteſtants entertained of the tyranny of Spain. Great pains were taken to keep alive and heighten that abhorrence. Accounts were ſpread of the horrid barbarities which the Spaniards had perpetrated in the Netherlands and America: deſcriptions were drawn, in the blackeſt colours, of the inhuman cruelties of the inquiſition, and pictures were diſperſed of the various inſtruments of torture employed by the inquiſitors, of which, it was ſaid, there was abundant ſtore on board the Spaniſh fleet. Theſe, and ſuch other conſiderations, made a ſtrong impreſſion, not upon Elizabeth's Proteſtant ſubjects only, but likewiſe upon the Catholics[e]; who, although the Pope had publiſhed a bull of excommunication againſt her, yet reſolved not to yield to the Proteſtants either in loyalty to their ſovereign, or in zeal

[e] Meteren, lib. xv.

for

for the independency of the ſtate. The whole kingdom was of one mind and ſpirit: ſome Catholics entered into the army as volunteers, and others joined with the Proteſtants in equipping armed veſſels. Every maritime town fitted out one or more. The citizens of London furniſhed thirty, although only fifteen were required of them; and between forty and fifty were equipped by the nobility and gentry throughout the kingdom. But all theſe ſhips were of ſmall ſize, in compariſon of thoſe which compoſed the Spaniſh fleet; and there was ſtill much ground for the moſt anxious apprehenſions with regard to the final iſſue of the war.

No perſon felt greater anxiety on this occaſion than Elizabeth; the principal object of whoſe prudent politics for thirty years, had been to avoid the critical ſituation to which ſhe was now reduced. She did not, however, ſuffer any ſymptoms of uneaſineſs to appear, but wore at all times a placid and animated countenance, and in her whole behaviour diſplayed an undaunted ſpirit, which commanded admiration and applauſe.

Preparations and conduct of the Dutch.

THE States of Holland, in the mean time, were not inattentive to the approaching danger, nor did they think themſelves leſs intereſted to provide againſt it, than if Philip had intended

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intended to begin his operations with an attack upon the Netherlands. From their fears of an immediate attack, they were delivered by intelligence of the enormous ſize of the Spaniſh ſhips, to which the coaſts of Holland and Zealand were inacceſſible. They turned their principal attention therefore to the aſſiſtance of their ally; and kept their fleet, conſiſting of more than eighty ſhips, prepared for action. At Elizabeth's deſire, they ſent thirty of that number to cruize between Calais and Dover; and, afterwards, when the duke of Parma's deſign of tranſporting his army to England was certainly known, they ordered Juſtin de Naſſau, admiral of Zealand, to join lord Seymour, one of the Engliſh admirals, with five and thirty ſhips, to block up thoſe ſea-ports in Flanders where the duke intended to embark [f].

THE principal Engliſh fleet was ſtationed at Plymouth, and the chief command of it was given to Charles lord Howard of Effingham, who had under him as vice-admirals, ſir Francis Drake, Hawkins, and Frobiſher, three of the moſt expert and braveſt ſeamen in the world.

The Spaniſh Armada.

IN the beginning of May one thouſand five hundred and eighty-eight, Philip's preparations,

[f] Meteren, lib. xv.

which

which had ſo long kept all Europe in amazement and ſuſpence were brought to a concluſion. That Armada, to which the Spaniards, in confidence of ſucceſs, gave the name of Invincible, conſiſted of one hundred and fifty ſhips, moſt of which were greatly ſuperior in ſtrength and ſize to any that had been ſeen before. It had on board near twenty thouſand ſoldiers, and eight thouſand ſailors, beſides two thouſand volunteers of the moſt diſtinguiſhed families in Spain. It carried two thouſand ſix hundred and fifty great guns, was victualled for half a year, and contained ſuch a quantity of military ſtores, as only the Spaniſh monarch, enriched by the treaſures of the Indies and America, could ſupply. 1583.

Duke of Parma's preparations.

PHILIP's preparations in the Netherlands were not leſs advanced than thoſe in Spain. Beſides a flouriſhing army of thirty thouſand foot and four thouſand horſe, which the duke of Parma had aſſembled in the neighbourhood of Nieuport and Dunkirk; that active general had, with incredible labour, provided a great number of flat-bottomed veſſels, fit for tranſporting both horſe and foot, and had brought ſailors to navigate them from the towns in the Baltic. Moſt of theſe veſſels had been built at Antwerp, and as he durſt not venture to bring them from thence by ſea to Nieuport, leſt

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left they ſhould have been intercepted by the Dutch, he was obliged to ſend them along the Scheld to Ghent, from Ghent to Bruges, by the canal which joins theſe towns, and from Bruges to Nieuport, by a new canal which he dug on the preſent occaſion. This laborious undertaking, in which ſeveral thouſand workmen had been employed, was already finiſhed, and the duke now waited for the arrival of the Spaniſh fleet; hoping, that as ſoon as it ſhould approach, the Dutch and Engliſh ſhips that cruiſed upon the coaſt would retire into their harbours.

Death of the Spaniſh admiral.

THE Armada would have left Liſbon in the beginning of May, but the marquis de Santa Croce, who had been appointed admiral, was, at the very time fixed for its departure, ſeized with a violent fever, of which he died in a few days; and, by a ſingular fatality, the duke de Paliano, the vice-admiral, died likewiſe at the ſame time. Santa Croce being reckoned the firſt naval officer in Spain, Philip had much reaſon to lament his death, and it ſhould ſeem that he found it extremely difficult to fill his place, ſince he named for his ſucceſſor the duke de Medina Sidonia, a nobleman of conſiderable reputation, but entirely unacquainted with maritime affairs. This defect in the commander in chief, Philip ſupplied in ſome meaſure,

measure, by giving him Martinez de Recaldo, a seaman of great experience, for his vice-admiral.

The Armada sets sail from Lisbon.

In these arrangements so much time was lost, that the fleet could not leave Lisbon till the twenty-ninth of May. It had not advanced far in its voyage to Corunna, at which place it was to receive some troops and stores, when it was overtaken by a violent storm and dispersed. All the ships however reached Corunna, though considerably damaged, except four[g]. They were repaired with the utmost diligence, the king sending messengers every day to hasten their departure, yet several weeks passed before they could be put in a condition to resume the voyage.

In the mean time a report was brought to England, that the Armada had suffered so much by the storm, as to be unfit for proceeding in the intended enterprise; and so well attested did this intelligence appear to queen Elizabeth, that, at her desire, secretary Walsingham wrote to the English admiral, requiring

[g] In three of these, the galley-slaves, consisting of English, French, and Turks, taking advantage of the confusion occasioned by the storm, overpowered the Spaniards, and carried the ships into a harbour on the coast of Bayonne. Meteren, p. 476.

him

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him to lay up four of his largeſt ſhips, and to diſcharge the ſeamen. Lord Howard was happily leſs credulous on this occaſion than either Elizabeth or Walſingham, and deſired that he might be allowed to retain theſe ſhips in the ſervice, even though it ſhould be at his own expence, till more certain information were received. In order to procure it, he ſet ſail with a briſk north wind for Corunna, intending, in caſe he ſhould find the Armada ſo much diſabled as had been reported, to attempt to complete its deſtruction. On the coaſt of Spain he received intelligence of the truth: at the ſame time the wind having changed from north to ſouth, he began to dread that the Spaniards might have ſailed for England, and therefore he returned without delay to his former ſtation at Plymouth.

Arrival of the Armada in the channel.

July 30th.

Soon after his arrival, he was informed that the Armada was in ſight. He immediately weighed anchor, and ſailed out of the harbour, ſtill uncertain of the courſe which the enemy intended to purſue. On the next day he perceived them ſteering directly towards him, drawn up in the form of a creſcent, which extended ſeven miles from one extremity to another. It was for ſome time believed that Plymouth was the place of their deſtination; and it was the opinion of many perſons in that age, that

that their enterprize would have been more ſucceſsful than it proved, had they landed there, and not proceeded up the channel. By doing this, it was ſuppoſed, they would have drawn Elizabeth's whole force to the ſouth-weſt coaſt of the iſland, and have rendered it eaſier for the duke of Parma to tranſport his troops. But in this expectation it is probable they would have been extremely diſappointed, as the Dutch fleet alone would have been able to block up the ſea-ports in Flanders; the Engliſh fleet might have deſtroyed the Armada had it once entered Plymouth harbour, and Elizabeth's land-forces would have been an over-match for all the Spaniſh troops which the Armada had on board. But if the duke de Medina ever intended to make a deſcent at Plymouth, he ſoon changed his deſign, and adhered cloſely afterwards to the execution of the plan preſcribed to him by the court of Spain. This was to ſteer quite through the channel till he ſhould reach the coaſt of Flanders, and after driving away the Dutch and Engliſh ſhips, by which the harbours of Nieuport and Dunkirk were beſieged, to eſcort the duke of Parma's army to England, and to land there the forces that were on board the fleet. In compliance with theſe inſtructions, he proceeded in his courſe, without turning aſide to the Engliſh, who

Plan of operations preſented by Philip.

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who were drawn up along the coaſt, and ready to receive him.

Prudent and gallant conduct of lord Howard.

LORD Howard, conſidering that the Spaniards would probably be much ſuperior to him in cloſe fight, by reaſon of the ſize of their ſhips, and the number of their troops, wiſely reſolved to content himſelf with haraſſing them in their voyage, and with watching attentively all the advantages which might be derived from ſtorms, croſs winds, and ſuch like fortuitous accidents. It was not long before he diſcerned a favourable opportunity of attacking the vice-admiral Recaldo. This he did in perſon, and on that occaſion diſplayed ſo much dexterity in working his ſhip, and in loading and firing his guns, as greatly alarmed the Spaniards for the fate of the vice-admiral. From that time they kept much cloſer to one another; notwithſtanding which, the Engliſh on the ſame day attacked one of the largeſt galeaſſes. Other Spaniſh ſhips came up in time to her relief, but in their hurry, one of the principal galleons, which had a great part of the treaſure on board, ran foul of another ſhip, and had one of her maſts broken. In conſequence of this misfortune ſhe fell behind, and was taken by ſir Francis Drake; who, on the ſame day, took another capital ſhip which had been accidentally ſet on fire.

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Superiority of the Engliſh ſailors.

SEVERAL other rencounters happened, and in all of them the Engliſh proved victorious, through the great advantage which they derived from the lightneſs of their ſhips, and the dexterity of the ſailors. The Spaniards in that age did not ſufficiently underſtand nautical mechanics, to be able to avail themſelves of the unuſual magnitude of their ſhips. The Engliſh ſailed round them, approached or retired with a velocity that filled them with amazement, and did infinitely greater execution with their cannon, for while every ſhot of theirs proved effectual, their ſhips ſuffered very little damage from the enemy, whoſe guns were planted too high, and generally ſpent their force in air.

The Armada oppoſite to Calais.

THE Spaniards however ſtill continued to advance till they came oppoſite to Calais: there the duke de Medina having ordered them to caſt anchor, he ſent information to the duke of Parma of his arrival, and intreated him to haſten the embarkation of his forces. Farneſe ſet out immediately from Bruges, where the meſſenger found him, for Nieuport, and he began to put his troops on board. But at the ſame time he informed Medina, that, agreeably to the King's inſtructions, the veſſels which he had prepared, were proper only for tranſporting the troops, but were utterly unfit for fight-

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ing; and for this reaſon, till the Armada were brought ſtill nearer, and the coaſt cleared of the Dutch ſhips which had blocked up the harbours of Nieuport and Dunkirk, he could not ſtir from his preſent ſtation, without expoſing his army to certain ruin, the conſequence of which would probably be the entire loſs of the Netherlands.

Is thrown into confuſion by the Engliſh fireſhips.

In compliance with this requeſt, the Armada was ordered to advance, and it had arrived within ſight of Dunkirk, between the Engliſh fleet on the one hand, and the Dutch on the other, when a ſudden calm put a ſtop to all its motions. In this ſituation the three fleets remained for one whole day. About the middle of the night a breeze ſprung up, and lord Howard had recourſe to an expedient which had been happily deviſed on the day before. Having filled eight ſhips with pitch, ſulphur, and other combuſtible materials, he ſet fire to them, and ſent them before the wind againſt the different diviſions of the Spaniſh fleet.

Auguſt 7th.

When the Spaniards beheld theſe ſhips in flames approaching towards them, it brought to their remembrance the havoc which had been made by the fireſhips employed againſt the duke of Parma's bridge at the ſiege of Antwerp. The darkneſs of the night increaſed the terror with

with which their imaginations where overwhelmed, and the panic flew from one end of the fleet to the other. Each crew, anxious only for their own preſervation, thought of nothing but how to eſcape from the preſent danger. Some of them took time to weigh their anchors, but others cut their cables, and ſuffered their ſhips to drive with blind precipitation, without conſidering whether they did not thereby expoſe themſelves to a greater danger than that which they were ſo ſolicitous to avoid. In this confuſion the ſhips ran foul of one another: the ſhock was dreadful, and ſeveral of them received ſo much damage as to be rendered unfit for future uſe.

Battle between the two fleets.

WHEN day-light returned, lord Howard had the ſatisfaction to perceive that his ſtratagem had fully produced the deſired effect. The enemy were ſtill in extreme diſorder, and their ſhips widely ſeparated and diſperſed. His fleet had lately received a great augmentation by the ſhips fitted out by the nobility and gentry, and by thoſe under lord Seymour, who had left Juſtin de Naſſau as alone ſufficient to guard the coaſt of Flanders. Being bravely ſeconded by Sir Francis Drake, and all the other officers, he made haſte to improve the advantage which was now preſented to him, and attacked the enemy in different quarters at the ſame time

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with the utmoſt impetuoſity and ardour. The engagement began at four in the morning, and laſted till ſix at night. The Spaniards diſplayed in every rencounter the moſt intrepid bravery; but, from the cauſes already mentioned, they did very little execution againſt the Engliſh, while many of their own ſhips were greatly damaged, and ten of the largeſt were either run aground, or ſunk, or compelled to ſurrender.

Loſſes ſuſtained by the Spaniards.

THE principal galeaſs, commanded by Moncada, having Mauriquez, the inſpector-general, on board, with three hundred galley-ſlaves and four hundred ſoldiers, was driven aſhore near Calais. She was quickly followed by ſome Engliſh pinnaces, and theſe were ſupported by the admiral's long-boat, in which he had ſent a body of ſelect ſoldiers to their aſſiſtance. Moncada himſelf, and almoſt all the Spaniards, were either killed, or drowned in attempting to reach the ſhore. The rowers were ſet at liberty. About fifty thouſand ducats were found on board. Mauriquez eſcaped, and was the firſt who carried the news of the diſaſter of the fleet to Spain.

ONE of the capital ſhips having been long battered by an Engliſh captain of the name of Croſs, was ſunk in the time of the engagement.

ment. A few only of the crew were ſaved, who related, that one of the officers on board having propoſed to ſurrender, he was killed by another who was enraged at his propoſal; that this other was killed by the brother of the firſt; and that it was in the midſt of this bloody ſcene, which paints the ferocious character of the Spaniards, that the ſhip had gone to the bottom[g].

THE fate of two other of the Spaniſh galleons is particularly mentioned by the cotemporary hiſtorians. One of them was called the St. Philip, and the other the St. Matthew, which had on board, beſides ſeveral other nobility, two general officers, Don Francis Toledo, of the family of Orgas, and Don Diego Pimentel, brother to the marquis of Tomnarez. After an obſtinate engagement, in which the admiral's ſhip fought along with them, they were obliged to run aſhore on the coaſt of Flanders, where they were taken by the Dutch. Toledo was drowned, and Pimentel, and all the reſt who ſurvived, were made priſoners.

THE duke de Medina was much dejected at theſe misfortunes, and ſtill more when he reflected on the ſuperior ſkill of the enemy. For it is well atteſted, that in all the engagements

The duke de Medina deſpairs of ſucceſs.

[g] Meteren and Grotius.

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which had paſſed ſince the firſt appearance of the Armada in the channel, the Engliſh had loſt only one ſmall ſhip, and about a hundred men. Animated by their paſt ſucceſs with ſanguine hopes of final victory, they were now more formidable than ever. Medina dreaded, from a continuance of the combat, the entire deſtruction of his fleet. He could not without the greateſt danger remain any longer in his preſent ſituation, and much leſs could he venture to approach nearer to the coaſt of Flanders.

Cauſe of his deſpair.

It now appeared how great an error Philip had committed, in neglecting to ſecure ſome commodious harbours in Zealand. He had from the firſt ſuppoſed that the enemy's ſhips would fly to their reſpective ports, as ſoon as his ſtupendous Armada ſhould appear. But this Armada had been made unfit for the purpoſe for which it was deſigned, by means of that enormous expence which he beſtowed in order to render it invincible. In conſtructing it, no attention had been given to the nature of thoſe narrow ſeas in which it was to be employed; and the conſequence of this important error was, that even if the Engliſh fleet had been unable to contend with the Spaniards in the deeper parts of the channel, yet they would have prevented them from landing: and the

Dutch

Dutch fleet lying in ſhallow water, to which the galleons durſt not approach, would ſtill have kept their ſtation, and have rendered it impoſſible for the Spaniſh fleet and army to act in concert.

He reſolves to return to Spain.

THIS the duke de Medina at length perceived, and he did not heſitate in reſolving to abandon the further proſecution of his enterpriſe. The only ſubject of his deliberation now was, how he might, with the leaſt difficulty and danger, get back to Spain. Had he been ever ſo much inclined to return through the channel, in which he muſt have been continually haraſſed by the enemy, yet the wind, which blew ſtrong from the ſouth, would have prevented him. He therefore reſolved to ſail northwards, and to make the circuit of the Britiſh iſles.

THIS reſolution was no ſooner underſtood by the Engliſh admiral, than having diſpatched lord Seymour with a part of the fleet, to join the Dutch in watching the motions of the duke of Parma, he ſet ſail himſelf with the greater part of it, in purſuit of the Spaniards. He followed cloſe in the rear for three days, without attacking them. This he declined, from the apprehenſion of his not having a ſufficient quantity of gun-powder, with which he had

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been ill ſupplied by the public offices. Had he not been deterred from renewing his attack by this provoking circumſtance, he might have forced the Spaniards to an engagement off Flamborough-head; and it is aſſerted by a reſpectable cotemporary hiſtorian [h], that ſo great was the diſtreſs of the Spaniſh fleet, and ſuch the admiral's dread of the long and dangerous voyage before him, that he would have ſurrendered without reſiſtance, in caſe he had been attacked. But he was ſaved from the diſgrace in which this action would have involved his name, through the neceſſity under which the Engliſh admiral found himſelf of returning to England, to ſupply the deficiency of his ſtores.

Diſaſters which befel the Armada.

LORD Howard had reaſon to be incenſed againſt thoſe, by whoſe negligence he was thus diſabled from completing the glory which his gallant conduct had procured him. In the iſſue, however, it would have been unfortunate if he had delayed his return. The two fleets ſailed in oppoſite directions, were not far diſtant from each other, when a dreadful ſtorm aroſe. The Engliſh reached home, though not without difficulty, yet without ſuſtaining any conſiderable loſs. But the Spaniards were expoſed to the ſtorm in all its rage, and became no leſs

[h] Grotius.

objects

objects of pity to their enemies, than they had lately been of dread and terror. Having hitherto kept near each other, leſt the Engliſh ſhould have renewed the attack, this circumſtance proved the firſt cauſe of their diſaſters. The ſhips were driven violently againſt each other, and thereby many of them were rendered an eaſy prey to the fury of the waves. At length they were diſperſed. In order to enable them to ride out the ſtorm, the horſes, mules, and baggage were thrown over-board. This precaution was of advantage only to ſuch of the ſhips as were ſtronger, or more fortunate than the reſt. Some of them were daſhed to pieces on the rocks of Norway, or ſunk in the middle of the ocean. Others were thrown upon the coaſts of Scotland, and the Weſtern Iſles. And more than thirty were driven by another ſtorm, which overtook them from the weſt, on different parts of the coaſt of Ireland. Of theſe, ſome afterwards reached home in the moſt ſhattered condition, under the vice-admiral Recaldo; others were ſhipwrecked among the rocks and ſhallows; and of thoſe which reached the ſhore, the crews were barbarouſly murdered; from an apprehenſion, it was pretended, that, in a country where there were ſo many diſaffected Catholics, it would have been dangerous to ſhew mercy to ſo great a number of the enemy. The duke de Medina having

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having kept out in the open ſeas, eſcaped ſhipwreck, and arrived at Saint Andero in Biſcay about the end of September.

THE calamities of the Spaniards did not end with their arrival in Spain. Two of the galleons which had withſtood the ſtorm, were accidentally ſet on fire, and conſumed to aſhes in the harbour. Great numbers, eſpecially of the nobility and gentry, accuſtomed to a life of eaſe and pleaſure, had died at ſea; and many more died afterwards of diſeaſes occaſioned by the hardſhips they had undergone.

VERY different accounts are given by different hiſtorians, of the total loſs ſuſtained. Some aſſert that it amounted to thirty-two ſhips, and ten thouſand men; but others, without pretending to aſcertain the number of men, which could not, they ſay, be leſs than fifteen thouſand, affirm that more than eighty ſhips were taken, deſtroyed, or loſt[i]. This dreadful calamity was ſenſibly felt all over Spain, and there was ſcarcely a ſingle family of rank in the kingdom that did not go into mourning for the death of ſome near relation; inſomuch that Philip, dreading the

[i] As the preſident De Thou, who lived at the time of this memorable event, pretends not to determine to which of theſe relations the greateſt regard is due, it would be in vain at this time to attempt to decide betwixt them.

effect

effect which this universal face of sorrow might produce upon the minds of the people, imitated the conduct of the Roman senate, after the battle of Cannæ, and published an edict to abridge the time of public mourning [k].

Rejoicings in England and Holland.

While the people of Spain were thus overwhelmed with affliction, there was nothing to be heard in England and the United Provinces but the voice of festivity and joy. In Holland medals were struck in commemoration of the happy event; and in both countries, days of solemn thanksgiving to Heaven were appointed for their deliverance. Elizabeth went for this purpose to St. Paul's cathedral, seated in a triumphal chariot, and surrounded with her ministers and nobles, amidst a great number of flags and colours which had been taken from the enemy; while the citizens were ranged in arms on each side of the streets through which she passed. Nor did the destruction of the Armada give joy only to the English and Dutch. All Europe had trembled at the thoughts of its success. For although it can hardly be supposed that Philip was so romantic as to flatter himself with the hopes of attaining universal monarchy, yet it is not to be imagined that he aspired only

[k] Meteren, lib. xiv. Grotii Historia, lib. i. Campana, Decad. vii. lib. i. Ferreras and Thuanus.

at

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at the conqueſt of England and Holland. He had before this time formed the plan, which he afterwards purſued, of ſubduing France: nor can it be believed that any thing leſs would have ſatisfied his ambition, than the ſubjection of every Proteſtant ſtate in Europe, and the utter extirpation of the reformed religion.

Philip's magnanimous behaviour.

His ambition was, on this occaſion, ſeverely mortified. But as he poſſeſſed in a high degree the art of concealing his emotions, he received intelligence of the diſaſter that had befallen him, with an appearance of magnanimity and reſignation to the will of Heaven, which, if it was not affected, deſerved the higheſt praiſe. He returned thanks to God, that the calamity was not greater. He iſſued orders to have the utmoſt care taken of the ſick and wounded, who had ſurvived the general cataſtrophe. And inſtead of forbidding the duke of Medina Sidonia to come to court, as is alleged by ſome hiſtorians, he wrote to him in the moſt obliging terms, expreſſing his gratitude for the zeal which he had diſcovered in his ſervice; and obſerving, that no man could anſwer for the ſucceſs of an enterpriſe, which, like that wherein the duke had been engaged, depended on the winds and waves[1].

[1] Ferreras, part xv. Strada, lib. v.

PHILIP'S

PHILIP's behaviour towards the duke of Parma on this difficult occaſion, contained the ſame diſplay of juſtice that appeared in his letter to Medina Sidonia. Notwithſtanding the many proofs which Farneſe had exhibited in the ſight of all Europe, of indefatigable vigour and activity, as well as of heroic valour, yet the failure of the expedition againſt England was by ſome aſcribed to his negligence in making the neceſſary preparations, and by others to his exceſſive caution or timidity. But Philip refuſed to liſten to theſe groundleſs calumnies. He ſtill continued to repoſe in the duke his wonted confidence; and teſtified towards him all that attachment and eſteem which his conduct in the Netherlands had deſerved. The truth is, that as the principal error in conducting the expedition had been committed, by neglecting the duke of Parma's advice, ſo no perſon was more deeply intereſted in its ſucceſs; ſince, if the Armada had opened a paſſage for his troops, the whole direction of the enterpriſe would have belonged to him, and the nobleſt opportunity, to which his ambition could aſpire, have been given, of exerting thoſe illuſtrious military talents which have acquired him ſuch diſtinguiſhed renown.

THE duke had the greater reaſon to entertain the hopes of victory, in caſe his army could have been tranſported to England, as Elizabeth had, from

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from her partiality for the earl of Leiceſter, beſtowed the chief command of her land-forces on that nobleman, who was ſo little entitled, either by his courage or his abilities, to ſo great a truſt. Her good fortune, or more properly the kind providence of Heaven, ſo conſpicuouſly exerciſed in her behalf, ſaved her from the conſequences with which this unjuſtifiable ſtep might have been attended. It was perhaps the only imprudent meaſure of which, at this difficult criſis, ſhe can be juſtly accuſed; and ſhe fully atoned for it by the wiſdom, vigour, and fortitude which ſhe diſplayed in every other part of her conduct.

PART

PART II.

ELIZABETH's ſituation now was extremely different from what it had ever been ſince her acceſſion to the throne. Having been delivered ſome time before the preſent period from the queen of Scots, who had long been a principal cauſe of her inquietude, ſhe had found the art of appeaſing the reſentment, and even of conciliating the favour, of the ſon of that unfortunate princeſs. She had united her Catholic and Proteſtant ſubjects in her defence, and had triumphed over her implacable enemy, the king of Spain. She had not the ſame reaſon as formerly to dread the power of that monarch, which he had exerted in vain for her deſtruction, and ſhe had very little reaſon to apprehend that he would ſoon renew his attempt to invade her dominions. To prevent this, by furniſhing him with employment elſewhere, had been long her principal motive for taking ſuch deep concern in the affairs of the Netherlands. This motive did not ſubſiſt in the ſame degree of force as formerly, yet ſhe reſolved to adhere faithfully to her engagements with the States, and ſtill to aſſiſt and ſupport them. After Leiceſter's reſignation,

Situation of Elizabeth.

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ſignation, ſhe had conferred the command of her troops in the Netherlands upon lord Willoughby, ſubjecting this nobleman, however, to the authority of the States, and leaving the command in chief to prince Maurice, to whom the States themſelves had lately committed it.

Prince Maurice.

It was not gratitude alone, or a reſpect for the memory of the late prince of Orange, that determined the confederated provinces to repoſe ſo great a truſt at this perilous conjuncture in his ſon, who was at this time only in the twenty-firſt year of his age. Maurice had, from his earlieſt youth, given proof of ſuperior prudence and capacity; and his conduct afterwards fulfilled the moſt ſanguine expectations of his countrymen. With much leſs moderation and ſelf-command, and leſs too of the art of governing the minds of men, which William poſſeſſed in ſo eminent a degree, Maurice was ſuperior to his father in military accompliſhments, and of theſe the confederacy ſtood more in need at the preſent period, than of political abilities.

Maurice had no opportunity of exerciſing his talents for war, from the time of Leiceſter's departure till the fate of the Spaniſh Armada was decided. A great number of his beſt troops had been put on board the fleet commanded

manded by Juſtin de Naſſau; all the garriſons of the maritime towns had been augmented, leſt the Spaniards ſhould have attempted to make a deſcent; and there was no body of forces left, ſufficient to enable him to take advantage of the duke of Parma's inactivity, by undertaking any military enterprize.

The duke of Parma meditates the ſiege of Bergen-op-Zoom.

THE firſt opportunity of action was afforded him by a reſolution which the Duke formed, as ſoon as he perceived there was no longer any proſpect of invading England, to beſiege the town of Bergen-op-Zoom. This town, as its name imports, is ſituated on the river Zoom, at a little diſtance from the place where that river falls into the Scheld; and by this laſt river the territory of Bergen is ſeparated from the iſle of Tolen. Farneſe thinking it neceſſary towards the ſucceſs of his intended enterprize, to be maſter of this iſland, ſent count Charles of Manſveldt with a body of eight hundred foot to take poſſeſſion of it; and in order to conceal his deſign, he ordered them to make a feint of marching towards Heuſden. This artifice however had not the deſired ſucceſs. Maurice had taken care to have both Bergen and Tolen properly furniſhed with troops for their defence.

AT low water it is practicable to paſs over to Tolen upon foot, and in this way count

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Manſveldt endeavoured to approach it. But the governor, count Solmes, was ſo well prepared to receive him, that Manſveldt was ſoon obliged to abandon his attempt, and in his retreat he loſt about four hundred men. In the mean time the duke of Parma had advanced with his army, and inveſted the town on the land ſide, without having met with any conſiderable oppoſition. But the beſieged beheld his operations with great indifference; their communication with Holland and Zealand was ſtill as free and open as before. In order to intercept it, they knew that the enemy muſt firſt reduce two ſtrong forts which ſtood between the town and the Scheld, and this they truſted could not be accompliſhed before the approach of winter.

October.

He is deceived by two Britiſh ſoldiers.

THE Duke immediately began his operations with an attack upon one of theſe forts; but before he had made any conſiderable progreſs, he conceived hopes of acquiring poſſeſſion of it in a way much more eaſy and expeditious than by open force. Two ſoldiers belonging to the garriſon, whom ſome hiſtorians call Scots, and others Engliſh, having gone over to Farneſe, offered to deliver the fort to him, on condition of his granting them a ſuitable reward for ſo great a ſervice. Farneſe lent a willing ear to their propoſal, and gave them

them the moſt flattering promiſes; but as he ſtill ſuſpected them of inſincerity, he made them confirm what they had told him by an oath, and required that they ſhould be carried bound in the midſt of the ſoldiers whom he intended to employ in executing the plan which they had ſuggeſted. To this, as well as to the oath required from them, they readily agreed. The Duke could no longer remain diſtruſtful, and ordered De Levya, one of his braveſt officers, to be ready immediately after ſun-ſet, with three thouſand infantry, to advance towards the fort. De Levya ſet out at the time appointed, and arrived at the gate when it was beginning to grow dark. Upon a ſignal given by the two Britiſh ſoldiers the port was opened, but no ſooner had about fifty Spaniards entered, than the portcullis was let down, and all the reſt excluded. Thoſe who had entered perceived the treachery of their guides, but being more ſolicitous to ſave their own lives than to take vengeance on the traitors, they ſuffered them to eſcape, and the Spaniards themſelves were inſtantly ſurrounded by the garriſon, and either put to the ſword or taken priſoners.

Of thoſe who were without, only ſuch as were near the gate were acquainted with what had happened, while the reſt who were ignorant of it ſtill preſſing forward, made it impoſ-

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ſible for the foremoſt to retire. Theſe men, rendered deſperate by their perilous ſituation, attempted to ſcale the ramparts, but they were ſoon repulſed by the garriſon, who were every where upon their guard. The guns of the fort began to play upon them. The darkneſs of the night increaſed their confuſion, and they fell into an ambuſh which the garriſon had prepared. A great number was killed, and many were ſwallowed up in the mud and water with which the fort was ſurrounded.

The Duke abandons his attempt on Bergen.

AFTER this misfortune the duke of Parma deſpaired of ſucceeding in his enterpriſe. Heavy rains had lately fallen, his troops began to grow ſickly, and all the country round, which was naturally wet, was become almoſt inacceſſible to his convoys of proviſions. Determined by theſe conſiderations, he raiſed the ſiege before the middle of November, after fortifying ſome paſſes in the neighbourhood of the place, to reſtrain the excurſions of the garriſon [m].

No ſooner had he drawn off his troops from Bergen, than, having put the Italians and Spaniards into winter-quarters, he ſent the Germans under count Peter Erneſt de Manſveldt

[m] Grotius Hiſt. lib. i. Bentivoglio, and Meteren, anno 1588.

to

to lay ſiege to Wachtendonck, in Upper Guelderland, a ſmall place, but ſtrongly fortified, and ſituated in the midſt of a marſhy ſoil. Farneſe was, notwithſtanding theſe circumſtances, determined to employ his troops in reducing it, by loud complaints which were made to him of the continual depredations of the garriſon. This garriſon conſiſted of troops formed by the celebrated Schenck, whoſe bravery would have baffled the utmoſt efforts of count Manſveldt, had it not been for a circumſtance which intitles the ſiege of this little town to a place in hiſtory. It was in this ſiege that bombs, the late invention of an inhabitant in Venlo, were firſt employed. To ſave the town from deſtruction, the citizens prevailed on the garriſon to conſent to a ſurrender, but not till they had ſallied out and killed a great number of the enemy; many of whom likewiſe periſhed by the inclemency of the ſeaſon, and the humidity of the air and ſoil.

The invention of bombs.

In conſequence of the loſs of men ſuſtained at this ſiege and that of Bergen, the duke of Parma found his army exceedingly diminiſhed. This conſideration alone muſt have been a ſenſible mortification to a general of ſo great activity and enterprize, but he was more deeply mortified at the difficulty which he found in ſupporting the forces that ſtill remained under

Anxiety of the duke of Parma.

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his command. They had begun to murmur on account of the arrears which were due to them, and he dreaded the loſs of that authority over them which he had hitherto maintained. He had earneſtly ſolicited remittances from the court of Spain, and had repreſented the fatal conſequences which muſt attend the irregular payment of his troops. But his requeſts had not for ſome time paſt been liſtened to as formerly, and ſome of the bills which he drew had been returned unpaid. This was owing partly to the low ſtate of Philip's finances, which, great as his reſources were, had been overburdened by the enormous expence in which his late armament had involved him; and partly to the malignity and envy of the Spaniſh miniſters. The Duke could not conceal his chagrin, which was augmented by the decline of his health, and the ſymptoms of a dropſy, which ſome years afterwards put a period to his life[n].

Gertrudenberg betrayed to the Spaniards.

In this ſituation he received great ſatisfaction from an event, which was one of the conſequences of the intrigues of the earl of Leiceſter. The garriſons of ſeveral towns had, through the influence of that nobleman's partizans, or from the deficiencies in their pay occaſioned by his miſconduct, ſhewn great con-

[n] Meteren, p. 503.

tempt

tempt for the authority of the States and prince Maurice; but they had all been brought back to their duty, except the garriſon of St. Gertrudenberg, which conſiſted of one thouſand five hundred foot and three hundred horſe, partly Dutch and partly Engliſh. This garriſon having indulged themſelves in greater exceſſes than any other, were conſcious of ſuch a degree of guilt as they thought could not eaſily be forgiven: they were therefore ſtill as refractory and ſeditious as ever, maintaining openly, that they were accountable to none but the queen of England; and ſeizing upon ſhips, and carrying off plunder from the friends as well as the enemies of the confederacy. The States, apprehenſive of their delivering the town to the enemy, applied every ſoothing expedient to prevent them. They offered them a full pardon of their offences, got lord Willoughby to interpoſe his influence, and made immediate payment of a great proportion of their arrears; but all endeavours were ineffectual. In the mean time Lanzavecchia, the governor of Breda, being well informed of their temper and diſpoſition, employed ſecret agents to confirm them in their ſeditious purpoſes, holding forth to them the rewards which they might hope for from the duke of Parma, while there was nothing to be expected from the queen of England or the States, but either an ignominious

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nious punishment, or perpetual diffidence and contempt. They hesitated for some time; but when an offer was made to them in the name of the duke of Parma, of full payment of their arrears, besides a sum of money equal to five years pay, they were unable to resist the allurement; they agreed to give up the town on the terms proposed, and began to prepare for the execution of their design, by disarming the inhabitants. Upon receiving intelligence of this infamous transaction, prince Maurice set out by sea, with a body of troops, in order to reduce the garrison by force of arms. But before he had time to make any progress in the siege, having been informed that the duke of Parma was upon his march to oppose him with a superior army, he thought it prudent to retire. The Duke soon afterwards entered the town, and having fulfilled his engagements to the garrison, he bestowed the government upon Lanzavecchia, as a reward for the service he had performed. Gertrudenberg was the first town in Holland which the Spaniards had acquired since their expulsion from that province about twelve years before; and it gave Farnese, on that account, the most sensible joy and satisfaction. The States, on the other hand, expressed their indignation against the traitors, by proscribing them; and it ought not to be forgotten, that through various accidents almost

all

all of them fell into the hands of the confederates, and had the sentence of proscription executed upon them with the utmost rigour. 1589.

From Gertrudenberg the Spanish army was sent under count Charles of Mansveldt, to reduce the towns of Heusden and Romersval, and the fort of Louvestein; but all their attempts on these places were baffled by the activity and vigour of prince Maurice and count Hohenloe.

The duke of Parma returned to Brussels, and not long afterwards he set out for Germany, to drink the waters at Spa, although it was believed he would not have gone at this season, which was the most proper for all military operations, if his army had been in a condition to enter upon any enterprize worthy of his former fame[o]. During his absence, prince Maurice was barely able to prevent count Mansveldt from making any new acquisition. The forces of these two generals were nearly equal; neither party was inclined to risk an engagement, and no rencounter passed between them that deserves to be recorded.

The duke of Parma at Spa.

May.

Some important services were in the mean time performed by the indefatigable Schenck

Achievements of Schenck.

[o] Grotius, p. 132.

in

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in the interior provinces. Having ſome time before the preſent period, propoſed to the States to build a fort upon the Rhine, at the place where that river divides itſelf into two branches, and forms the iſle of Betuwe[p], the States approved highly of his propoſal, and furniſhed him with every thing neceſſary for carrying it into execution. He finiſhed it with great diſpatch; and having fixed there his head-quarters, he over-ran all the country round, and ſeized every favourable opportunity of annoying the enemy. He took the city of Bonne, upon the Rhine, by ſurprize in the night. Having been informed that a body of troops were upon their march to reinforce Verdugo, the governor of Groningen, and were eſcorting a ſum of money to that place for the payment of the garriſon, he choſe his ground with ſo much ſkill, and attacked them with ſuch impetuoſity and ardour, that he routed them, and got poſſeſſion of the money without the loſs of a ſingle man. But there was nothing on which he was ſo intent as the recovery of Nimeguen, which ſome years before he himſelf had conquered for the Spaniards. Nimeguen ſtands on the banks of the Waal, at the diſtance of only a few hours ſail from the fort which Schenck had conſtructed. Having embarked his troops, he ſet out

[p] Called anciently Batavia.

with

with an intention to reach the town about the middle of the night. Through ſome accident or miſtake he did not arrive till the morning, when he happened unfortunately to land at a houſe where a number of perſons were aſſembled for the celebration of a wedding. By theſe perſons the alarm was inſtantly given to the reſt of the inhabitants, who were well acquainted with the enmity with which Schenck had for ſome time paſt been animated againſt them, and knew that an univerſal pillage would be the conſequence of his ſucceſs. They ran to arms from every quarter, made a furious attack upon his men, and, notwithſtanding the moſt intrepid reſiſtance, drove them towards their boats in great confuſion. Schenck endeavoured to rally them, but in vain. The town's people purſued, and ſlew many of them while they were attempting to eſcape. Schenck himſelf was wounded, and immediately afterwards his boat was overſet, and he, and all on board, were drowned. Such was the fate of this brave man at the age of forty, by whom, ever ſince his revolt, the Spaniards had been ſubjected to perpetual apprehenſions and alarms [q].

Death of Schenck.

No other material tranſaction occurred during this campaign but the ſiege of Rhinberg,

Battle of Rhinberg.

[q] Bentivoglio, p. 334.

which

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which was undertaken at the earneſt deſire of the elector of Cologn, and the charge of it committed by the duke of Parma to the marquis of Varambon. Colonel Vere, an Engliſh officer of high reputation, was ſent by the States to the relief of the beſieged, and between him and Varambon, a bloody battle was fought, in which the Engliſh commander gained a complete victory. After this he entered the town, and fortified it ſo ſtrongly, as enabled the inhabitants for ſome time longer to preſerve their liberty and independence.

The duke of Parma returns from Spa.

It was now the end of autumn, and the duke of Parma was returned from Spa. Soon after his return, his apprehenſions with regard to the conſequences of the irregular payment of his troops, were verified by the mutiny of a Spaniſh regiment which lay in garriſon at Courtray. From complaints the ſoldiers proceeded to threats, and at laſt openly refuſed to obey his commands. With the utmoſt difficulty he raiſed money ſufficient to appeaſe them. But as this was the firſt ſedition which had happened ſince the commencement of his government, he was the more ſenſibly afflicted by it, and dreaded, that the example which it afforded, would ſoon be followed by the garriſons in other towns.

1589. The surprise of Breda. 1590.

THIS event happened about the end of the year one thousand five hundred and eighty-nine; and in the month of February immediately following, another misfortune happened, which convinced the Duke, that prince Maurice was an antagonist of a character extremely different from that of any other with whom he had hitherto contended. This was the loss of the important city of Breda, of which Maurice got possession by a singular stratagem, suggested to him by the master of a boat, called Adrian Vandenberg, who had sometimes supplied the town and garrison with turf for firing. When Lanzavecchia, the governor, was at Breda, all vessels which came there were carefully examined; but the duke of Parma, having rewarded this crafty Italian, for the part which he acted in corrupting the garrison of St. Gertrudenberg, with the government of that town, still suffered him to retain that of Breda. Lanzavecchia found it necessary to be often absent from the latter of these places; and, during his absence, usually committed the charge of it to his son. Vandenberg having observed that on these occasions there was commonly great negligence in searching his boat, founded upon this circumstance his plan for taking the citadel by surprise. It was communicated to prince Maurice, who readily embraced it, and immediately applied himself to put it in execution. The boat

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boat was loaded in appearance with turf, as uſual; but the turf was ſupported by a floor of planks fixed at the diſtance of ſeveral feet from the bottom; and under this floor ſeventy ſelect ſoldiers were placed, under the command of Charles Harauguer[r], an officer of diſtinguiſhed valour and capacity. They had but a few miles to ſail; yet, through unexpected accidents, ſeveral days paſſed before they could reach Breda. The wind turned againſt them, the melting ice retarded their courſe, and the boat, having ſtruck upon a bank, was ſo much damaged, that the ſoldiers were for ſome time up to the knees in water. Their proviſions were almoſt ſpent, and one of their number was ſeized with a violent cough, which, if it continued, they foreſaw would certainly occaſion a diſcovery. This man had the generoſity to offer them his ſword, and to intreat them to kill him. They as generouſly declined it; and being reſolved to run all riſks, rather than embrue their hands in the blood of their companion, they ſtill perſiſted in their deſign. Happily their virtue was rewarded: the ſoldier's cough left him, and even the leak in their veſſel was ſtopt by ſome accidental cauſe.

In order to ſecure the abſence of Lanzavecchia, whoſe vigilance there was much ground

[r] A native of Cambray.

to

to dread, prince Maurice had made a feint of marching againſt Gertrudenberg, and this artifice produced the deſired effect. Lanzavecchia was abſent from Breda when the boat arrived. It was admitted within the fortifications of the caſtle, and the ſearch was made in the moſt ſuperficial manner.

NOTWITHSTANDING this, there was ſtill the utmoſt danger of a diſcovery, and it would certainly have been made, had not Vandenberg poſſeſſed an extraordinary ſhare of addreſs and art, which he exerted on this occaſion. There being a ſcarcity of fuel in the caſtle, the turf was immediately purchaſed; the ſoldiers of the garriſon were ſet to work in carrying it aſhore, and ſo great a number of hands were employed, that they would ſoon have uncovered the planks, and thereby have detected the plot, had not Vandenberg, pretending to be fatigued with labour and watching, and unable to aſſiſt the ſoldiers any longer in unloading, firſt amuſed them with diſcourſe, and then invited them to join him in drinking ſome wine which he had provided. His offer was readily accepted. The night came on, and the Spaniſh ſoldiers were all either aſleep or drunk. Vandenberg then ſet out, in order to give notice of his ſucceſs to prince Maurice and count Hohenloe, who, according to agreement, had in great ſilence brought

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brought forward a body of forces within a little diſtance of the town.

About the middle of the night, Harauguer iſſued forth from his retreat; and having divided his band into two bodies, he attacked, at the ſame time, both the guards which were placed at the gate towards the country, and thoſe which were ſtationed at another gate which led from the citadel to the town, and meeting with little reſiſtance, he ſecured poſſeſſion of the gates. Young Lanzavecchia ruſhed out againſt him with between thirty and forty of the garriſon; but theſe men were not able to withſtand the determined and deſperate valour of the aſſailants. They were all either put to the ſword or diſperſed, and Lanzavecchia himſelf was wounded and taken priſoner.

The alarm was ſoon communicated to the town, in which there was a numerous garriſon, conſiſting of five companies of Italian foot, and one of horſe. The citizens offered to co-operate with the garriſon in defending the fortifications, till the duke of Parma ſhould come to their relief; but this cowardly garriſon, being ſtruck with an univerſal panic, and having no commander in chief to direct their operations, ſuddenly forſook the town. In the mean time prince Maurice arrived in the citadel, and the

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inhabitants having now no garriſon to ſupport them, ſent a trumpet with an offer to ſurrender, on condition that they ſhould not be plundered. And to this prince Maurice readily agreed; but required that they ſhould pay him ninety thouſand florins to be diſtributed among his troops.

MAURICE received the greater ſatisfaction from this acquiſition, which had been attended with the loſs of only one man, as Breda had been for many years the hereditary property of his family; and for the ſame reaſon the citizens were leſs reluctant in ſubmitting to his authority. He appointed the brave Harauguer to be governor of the town, and liberally rewarded Vandenberg, and all the other ſailors and ſoldiers, in proportion to their merit.

THE duke of Parma, on the other hand, was extremely mortified with what had happened, and highly incenſed againſt his countrymen, the Italians, who had ſo baſely deſerted the town committed to their care. He ordered the officers to be arreſted, and afterwards commanded all of them to be executed, agreeably to the ſentence of a court-martial, except one, whom he pardoned in conſideration of his youth [t].

[t] Grotius. Bentivoglio.

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OLD Lanzavecchia's imprudence in committing ſo important a charge to ſo young a man as his ſon, was already ſeverely puniſhed by his ſon's impriſonment, and the loſs of his government of Breda. He puniſhed himſelf ſtill farther, by reſigning his government of Gertrudenberg. Such were the bitter fruits of that corruption for which this man had been ſo lately rewarded. According to the principles which warriors and politicians are ready to adopt, his conduct deſerved the reward which was beſtowed upon it; but to the friends of virtue it will give ſatisfaction to obſerve, that, in the courſe of providence, puniſhment is inflicted ſometimes not upon the treacherous alone, but on thoſe too by whom they are prompted, or encouraged in their treachery.

MEANWHILE Farneſe reſolving to recover the town, if poſſible, before prince Maurice ſhould have time to ſecure it, ſent count Manſveldt againſt it with a part of the army. But Maurice had no ſooner acquired poſſeſſion of the place, than he furniſhed it with proviſions ſufficient for many months, and ſtationed a garriſon in it conſiſting of one thouſand two hundred foot and four hundred horſe. Manſveldt did not therefore think it expedient to lay immediate ſiege to Breda; but, in order to cut off the communication of the garriſon with Holland,

Holland, he attempted to reduce a ſtrong fort in the mouth of the river Mark, which commanded the navigation of that river. From this attempt, however, he was obliged to deſiſt, after having loſt between ſix and ſeven hundred men. He then built another fort at the mouth of the river, and began to make preparations for beſieging the town itſelf. In order to divert him from the proſecution of his deſign, prince Maurice marched with a body of about five thouſand men towards Nimeguen, reſolving to beſiege that town in caſe Manſveldt did not relinquiſh his preſent enterpriſe. 1590.

FARNESE, ſenſible of the great importance of Nimeguen, ſent orders to count Manſveldt to lead his army thither without delay. Maurice perceived then that it was impracticable for him to attempt the ſiege with any probability of ſucceſs, and encamped his troops in the Betuwe, on the north ſide of the Waal, oppoſite to Nimeguen. Having fortified the banks of the river, to prevent count Manſveldt from tranſporting his forces, he built, in ſight of the enemy, a ſtrong fort, afterwards called by the name of Knotzenburg, directly oppoſite to the town; by which he not only deprived Nimeguen of all the advantages which it had hitherto derived from its ſituation; but, as the cannon of this fort could reach the town, the

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inhabitants were expoſed to continual danger. After having finiſhed this important work, he dug a navigable canal acroſs the Betuwe, from the Rhine to the Waal. This wiſe expedient rendered the navigation of the confederates in thoſe parts ſecure, by making it unneceſſary for their ſhips to paſs by Nimeguen; and it was of great advantage to all the country round, by leſſening the violence of the inundations to which that part of the Netherlands is ſometimes liable. The States of Guelderland and Overyſſel had a juſt ſenſe of the benefits which they derived from his operations, and they teſtified their gratitude by electing him governor of theſe two provinces.

THE

HISTORY

OF THE REIGN OF

PHILIP THE SECOND,

KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK XXII.

PART I.

FROM the capacity and vigour which Maurice had already diſplayed, Philip might have perceived that he ſhould probably find full employment in the Netherlands for all the forces which, in the preſent ſtate of his finances, he was able to ſupport. And conſidering the unfortunate iſſue of his enterprize againſt Elizabeth, and how much the reputation of his arms and counſels had ſuffered from his long unſucceſsful ſtruggle with the inhabitants of the United Provinces, it might have been expected that he would have ſeen the

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abſurdity of that prepoſterous ambition which had led him to undertake new conqueſts before he had reduced his own dominions under obedience. It does not appear that he ever ſeriouſly entertained the thoughts of renewing his attempt againſt England; but having never relinquiſhed his deſigns on France, he had maintained his connections with the heads of the Catholic league; and notwithſtanding the difficulty which he found in paying his army in Flanders, he had from time to time ſupplied them with conſiderable ſums of money.

The Catholic league.

THESE factious leaders had now more occaſion than ever for his aſſiſtance. After the treaty mentioned above, which Philip concluded with the duke of Guiſe at Joinville in the year one thouſand five hundred and eighty-five, the flames of war between the Catholics and Proteſtants had been kindled afreſh from one end of the kingdom to the other. Henry, well acquainted with the ſecret intentions of Guiſe and his partizans, which were no leſs hoſtile to himſelf than to the Calviniſts, would gladly have employed all his power for their deſtruction; but he ſoon perceived that he was unable to contend openly with ſo great a force as they had provided againſt him, and therefore diſguiſing his reſentment for the affront offered to his authority, he reſolved to accede

to

to the league, in hopes of acquiring the direction of it, by declaring himſelf its head and protector. In conſequence of this reſolution, great preparations were made for proſecuting the war againſt the Calviniſts, and three different armies were raiſed. One of theſe Henry commanded in perſon; another was ſent under the duke de Joyeuſe againſt the king of Navarre; and the third was led by the duke of Guiſe, to oppoſe a numerous army of Germans, who were upon their march to the aſſiſtance of the Hugonots. Joyeuſe loſt both his army and his life in the battle of Coutras; but the duke of Guiſe, who made up for the ſmall number of his troops, by his ſuperior conduct and intrepidity, proved victorious over the Germans, and thereby acquired an increaſe of popularity and fame, which gave him uncontrollable influence over almoſt all the Catholics in the kingdom. Elated with his ſucceſs, and conſcious of his power, this ambitious leader could no longer delay the execution of his deſigns; but reſolved, after depoſing the King, and confining him to a cloiſter, to place the infirm and aged cardinal of Bourbon upon the throne; hoping to engroſs the whole adminiſtration, and to ſecure the ſucceſſion to himſelf in the event of the cardinal's demiſe. Henry beheld with much dread the precipice on which he ſtood; and, in order to avoid it, had recourſe to that

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deteſtable expedient, of which, in his youth, he had ſhewn his approbation, in the maſſacre of St. Bartholomew, by commanding both the duke of Guiſe, and his brother the cardinal, to be aſſaſſinated.

This murder, which even Henry pretended to juſtify only by the plea of neceſſity, did not produce the effect which he expected. Inſtead of intimidating his enemies, it ſerved to inflame their minds with wrath and indignation. In Paris, where the ſpirit of the league had long raged with the utmoſt fury, the people broke his ſtatues to pieces, the eccleſiaſtics declaimed againſt him in the bittereſt and moſt abuſive terms, and the Sorbonne declared him to have forfeited the crown. His ſubjects almoſt every where roſe up in arms againſt him, and the duke of Mayenne, brother of the Guiſes, a prince of extraordinary prudence and capacity, was choſen commander in chief in his brother's room.

In this ſituation Henry had no reſource left but in the king of Navarre, whom he had deceived and perſecuted. But this generous and heroic prince readily forgot the injuries he had received from him, and made haſte to march with a numerous army to his aſſiſtance. Thus powerfully ſupported, Henry became an overmatch

match for his enemies, and he would ſoon have compelled the city of Paris to ſurrender, when a period was put to his life by a fanatic monk, who, being ſeduced by his ſuperiors, burned with the deſire of meriting Heaven, by embruing his hands in the blood of his lawful prince. Such was the unfortunate end of Henry III. the laſt of the race of Valois, which had reigned over France for almoſt three hundred years.

Acceſſion of Henry IV.

THE king of Navarre, the undoubted heir of the crown, and whom the deceaſed monarch had nominated his ſucceſſor, was immediately proclaimed King in the camp, by the name of Henry IV. a name which will be for ever reſpected, not by the French nation alone, but by every friend of mankind and of virtue. Brought up in the hardeſt ſchool of adverſity, patient, frugal, and laborious; brave and wiſe; ſincere, humane, and generous; of the ſtricteſt integrity, and the moſt untainted honour; he had long commanded the admiration of his enemies, as well as of the impartial world. Never did any prince ſucceed to a throne, adorned with more ſplendid, more ſubſtantial, or more amiable accompliſhments; yet ſo fierce was the ſpirit of religious bigotry with which his ſubjects were inflamed; ſo great their abhorrence of Calviniſm; and ſuch their dread,

that

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that Henry, who was himſelf a Calviniſt, although the moſt moderate of his ſect, would, in imitation of the queen of England, overturn the Popiſh religion, that many of the Catholics inſtantly forſook his camp; nor would any of them have been perſuaded to remain with him, had he not given them ground to entertain hopes of his converſion.

In Paris he had a numerous party who would willingly have recogniſed his right, in caſe he would have agreed to embrace the Popiſh faith. There were others who, under the pretence of religion, had no other ends in view but to ſecure and perpetuate that unbounded licence which they had long enjoyed, of perpetrating the moſt atrocious crimes; and there were many who, having been gained over by Spaniſh influence, had, in concert with Mendoza, the Spaniſh ambaſſador, and Cajetan, the Pope's legate, a partizan of Spain, formed the deſign of conferring the crown, either on Philip himſelf, or his daughter Iſabella [a].

The duke of Mayenne, who had adopted his brother's plan in all its branches, hoped to make theſe parties ſubſervient to his own elevation to the throne. This deſign, however,

[a] Grand daughter of Henry II.

he

he concealed with care; and that he might have leiſure to prepare the means of putting it in execution, he prevailed on a great majority to concur in electing the cardinal of Bourbon king; to which meaſure likewiſe, Philip, actuated by a ſimilar intention, gave his conſent.

Henry in the mean time finding himſelf unable, from the great deſertion of his forces, to maintain his preſent ſituation before Paris, retired into Normandy, to wait there, till ſuccours, which he expected from Elizabeth, ſhould arrive. Mayenne, putting himſelf at the head of an army much more numerous than that of the King, purſued and attacked him in his fortifications near the town of Arques; but having been repulſed with great ſlaughter, and having ſuffered afterwards a total overthrow in the battle of Ivry, in which, as on many other occaſions, Henry's ſuperior bravery ſupplied his want of numbers, Mayenne was obliged, with the ſhattered remains of his army, to take refuge in the metropolis. There he ſtayed no longer than till he had conſulted with the duke of Nemours, the governor, with regard to the proper meaſures of defence, in caſe the city ſhould be beſieged by the victorious army; after which he ſet out for Picardy, to meet the duke of Parma, from whom he expected a reinforcement of troops. The King arrived ſoon after

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1590. Siege of Paris.

after in the neighbourhood of Paris, and having made himſelf maſter of the courſe of the Seyne and the Marne, and blocked up every entry by which proviſions might be conveyed into the town, he inveſted it on every ſide, and ſoon reduced the inhabitants to extreme neceſſity.

By the perſuaſion however of their leaders, ſeconded by the Spaniſh miniſter and the Pope's legate; by the decrees of the Sorbonne, and the harangues of the clergy; they were confirmed in the reſolution which they had formed from the beginning to endure every calamity, rather than receive an heretical king, whoſe authority they were taught to believe they could not acknowledge, without endangering their ſalvation.

Philip's views on France.

In their preſent diſtreſsful ſituation they had no proſpect of relief, but from the arms of Spain; nor was Philip leſs inclined now to interpoſe in their behalf, and that of the league in general, than formerly. The affairs of France were at this time the principal object of his attention; and he would gladly have exerted himſelf againſt the King with his utmoſt vigour, eſpecially as the cardinal of Bourbon was lately dead, if the preſent juncture had been favourable to his ambitious deſign, of ſeizing the

the monarchy for himſelf or his daughter; by which, more than by zeal for the Catholic faith, he had long been actuated. But having penetrated into the views of Mayenne, and found that from him and all his party he had reaſon to expect the moſt ſtrenuous oppoſition; he conſidered, that if Henry were utterly ſubdued, the Catholics, ſtanding then no longer in need of his aſſiſtance, would probably unite againſt him, and, without regard to the obligations which he had laid them under, render all his expence and labour fruitleſs. He reſolved, therefore, agreeably to the advice of the duke of Parma, to protract the war, and to afford the league only ſuch aſſiſtance as might prevent the King from acquiring an entire aſcendant over them; hoping thereby to waſte the ſtrength of both the contending parties, and ſooner or later to oblige them to comply with whatever terms he ſhould be pleaſed to preſcribe.

Conformably to this plan, the duke of Parma, with whom Mayenne had an interview at Condé, gave him only two thouſand ſeven hundred foot and eight hundred horſe. But as this reinforcement was inadequate to the purpoſe for which it had been ſolicited, Philip became apprehenſive that the reſolution of the beſieged might fail; and dreaded, that if Henry

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were once maſter of the capital, a prince of ſo great ability and addreſs might ſoon compel the reſt of the kingdom to ſubmit to his authority. To prevent this, he reſolved to poſtpone every conſideration of prudence and intereſt to the raiſing of the ſiege; and ſent poſitive orders to the duke of Parma, to conduct his army to France for this purpoſe, with the utmoſt expedition. Farneſe, though poſſeſſed of capacity and courage equal to the moſt difficult and dangerous enterpriſe, would gladly have diverted Philip from his deſign. He repreſented to him the dangerous conſequences with which the abſence of his troops from the Netherlands would be attended; and he attempted to make him ſenſible of the extreme uncertainty of thoſe advantages which he expected to derive from taking ſo deep an intereſt in the affairs of France. But Philip, blinded by his ambition, could not relinquiſh thoſe deluſive hopes which he had long fondly indulged, of adding France to his dominions. He was deaf to the duke's prudent remonſtrances, and only liſtened to his advice, ſo far as to conſent that he might return to the Low Countries, when the ſiege of Paris ſhould be raiſed.

The duke of Parma's firſt expedition into France.

FINDING the King thus obſtinate and inflexible, Farneſe committed the government, during his abſence, to count Peter Erneſt of Manſveldt,

Manſveldt, and appointed his ſon count Charles to command the ſmall number of troops, which he deſigned to leave behind him for the defence of the Netherlands. He then applied himſelf with great anxiety to make the neceſſary preparations for his march: for he was well aware of the difficulty which he muſt encounter in his intended enterpriſe againſt a prince of ſo great abilities as the king of France, in the midſt of his dominions, and at the head of a victorious army, commanded by a gallant and almoſt invincible nobility. This conſideration, however, far from intimidating him, ſerved only to make him exert, with more than ordinary vigour, thoſe illuſtrious talents with which he was endowed; leſt now, when he was about to enter the liſts with ſo great a rival for military fame, he ſhould forfeit that high renown which his former atchievements had procured him.

Comparison of him with Henry.

HENRY was at this time about forty years of age, and Farneſe a few years older. From their earlieſt youth they had been alike diſtinguiſhed by the love of arms; and had paſſed their lives either in learning, or in practiſing the art of war. They poſſeſſed alike the talent of conciliating the affections of their troops, without any relaxation of diſcipline, or diminution of authority. They were equal too in perſonal

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perſonal courage, in quick diſcernment, and in fertility of genius. But the King was more prompt in his deciſions; the duke more cautious and circumſpect. The latter, always cool, and maſter of himſelf, tranſgreſſed on no occaſion the bounds of the ſtricteſt prudence; but the former was often betrayed by his natural impetuoſity and ardor, rather to act the part of a common ſoldier, than of a general, and unneceſſarily to expoſe his perſon to danger. From the ſame impetuoſity of temper, the King was ever fond of ſtriking a deciſive blow, by a pitched battle in the field; whereas the duke choſe rather to accompliſh his deſigns by ſtratagem and dexterity, without bloodſhed. Notwithſtanding this diverſity in their characters, they were indiſputably the greateſt captains of the age in which they lived, and may be compared, without ſuffering by the compariſon, with the moſt illuſtrious commanders either in ancient or in modern times.

His wiſe precautions.

FARNESE was ready to ſet out from Bruſſels in the beginning of Auguſt, with an army of fourteen thouſand foot and three thouſand horſe. On his arrival in France, having convened his principal officers together, he explained to them the conduct proper to be obſerved in the preſent expedition; and repreſented

ſented the neceſſity of requiring a ſtrict attention from every individual in the army, to all the rules of military diſcipline. They were about to enter into a kingdom where, the people being naturally jealous of the Spaniards, ſuſpicions would be eaſily excited, that, inſtead of having come to their aſſiſtance, he intended to reduce them under the government of Spain. Againſt giving ground for theſe ſuſpicions, which might defeat the intentions of the King, they muſt be continually on their guard, and take effectual care to reſtrain the troops from offering any violence to the natives. They were ere long to purſue their march in the face of a bold and enterpriſing enemy; and for this reaſon it would be neceſſary that the moſt perfect order ſhould be obſerved, that no tumult ſhould be permitted in their quarters, and no ſoldier allowed to leave his colours night or day, upon any pretence whatever; that the country ſhould be reconnoitred with the utmoſt care; that they ſhould take up their quarters every evening a conſiderable time before ſun-ſet; that the troops ſhould ſtand under their arms, till the intrenchments were completed: and that their intrenchments ſhould be as ſtrongly fortified, as if the enemy were in ſight.

THE duke ſecured the execution of theſe orders, by the activity and vigilance which he

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exerted. Although he had many officers of high reputation under him, yet he reſolved not to put implicit truſt in any of them. From charts or maps, joined to the information which he received from the natives, he had acquired a thorough knowledge of the country through which he was to paſs. He heard in perſon the reports of all the parties which he ſent to reconnoitre; marked out the encampments with his own hand, and beſtowed ſuch particular attention on every thing which he deemed of the leaſt importance, that he left himſelf no other time for repoſe, but the few hours between beating the reveille, and the marching of the troops.

In order to preſerve his men freſh and vigorous for the time of action, he marched gently forwards; and did not arrive at Meaux, which is ten leagues diſtant from Paris, till the 23d of Auguſt. He was joined at Meaux, by the duke de Mayenne, with ten thouſand foot and one thouſand five hundred horſe; and from this place he ſent intelligence to the beſieged, that he hoped to be able in a few days to relieve them.

Diſtreſs of the Pariſians.

Their patience was almoſt exhauſted. They had been for many days reduced to the moſt deplorable condition. Great numbers had died of

of want, or of diſeaſes occaſioned by the unwholeſome food to which they had been obliged to have recourſe; and though their bigotry made them ſtill entertain the thoughts of a ſurrender with horror, it had required the utmoſt vigilance on the part of the governor, to prevent it from taking place. They believed it to be impoſſible for them to hold out even for a few days, at the end of which the duke of Parma had given them hopes of his arrival. Of this deſperate ſituation, their leaders did not fail to inform him, nor did he delay advancing towards them one moment longer than was neceſſary in order to ſecure a fortunate iſſue to his enterprize.

Henry raiſes the ſiege.

HENRY had for ſeveral weeks entertained the moſt ſanguine hopes of being able to terminate the ſiege before the duke could arrive[b]. He was now extremely chagrined and mortified, and was at the ſame time thrown into great perplexity, with reſpect to the meaſures proper to be purſued. Unwilling to quit his prize, when he was upon the point of ſeizing it, he would gladly have divided his army, and leaving a part of it, to continue the blockade, have led the reſt to meet the enemy. But as it had lately ſuffered great diminution by ſick-

[b] It had laſted four months.

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neſs, he apprehended that he would find ſufficient employment for the whole, in defending himſelf againſt the Spaniards. After much heſitation, he raiſed the ſiege, and ſet out to oppoſe the duke of Parma, before he ſhould approach nearer the town [c].

HAVING advanced as far as Chelles (which lies about four leagues diſtant from Paris) he pitched his camp in a ſpacious plain, which is terminated by two hills of a gentle aſcent, ſeparated from each other by the road that leads to Meaux. The duke of Parma's army was encamped on the other ſide of theſe hills, and was well ſecured by ſtrong entrenchments. In this ſituation the two armies remained for ſeveral days. The duke did not now lie under the ſame neceſſity as before, of precipitating his approach to Paris, becauſe the citizens having ventured, after the King's departure, to make excurſions into the country, had furniſhed themſelves with ſome proviſions from the places adjacent; and the King durſt not attack ſuch ſtrong intrenchments, defended by an army ſuperior in number to his own. But being eager to engage, and dreading the daily diminution of his forces from the ſickneſs

[c] His army amounted to twenty thouſand foot and five thouſand horſe.

which

which prevailed among them, Henry ſent a defiance to the duke of Mayenne, calling upon him to quit his den, in which he lay more like a fox than a lion, that the conteſt between them might be decided, and an end put to the calamities of the kingdom.

Stratagem of the duke of Parma.

MAYENNE ſent the herald who brought this challenge to the duke of Parma, who anſwered, ſmiling, That his preſent conduct, he perceived, was not agreeable to the King; but that he had been accuſtomed to fight, only when he himſelf thought proper, and not when it was convenient for his enemies; and he added, That far from declining battle, he would offer it as ſoon as the intereſt of the cauſe which he had come to ſupport, ſhould render it expedient. Agreeably to the ſpirit of this reply, Farneſe kept his army within their lines for two days longer; during which time he was employed in examining the ſituation of the country, and in conſidering how he might accompliſh the end of his expedition, without hazarding an engagement. Having at length fixed his plan of operations, without communicating it to the duke of Mayenne, or any other of his officers, he gave out, that he now intended to offer battle. Of the van, which conſiſted of two ſquadrons of lances, with all the light horſe in his army, he gave the command to the mar-

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quis de Renti, with inſtructions, that as ſoon as he ſhould reach the top of the interjacent hill, he ſhould ſpread out his troops, and make as large a front as poſſible; and then begin to deſcend ſlowly towards the enemy, but not to engage without further orders, whatever provocation he ſhould receive. He committed the charge of the main army to the duke de Mayenne, and that of the rear to the ſieur de la Mothe; while he reſerved liberty to himſelf to ride from one part of the army to the other, as occaſion ſhould require.

When the King was informed of this diſpoſition and movement of the Spaniſh army, he could not doubt that the duke had at length reſolved to try the fortune of a battle. His eyes ſparkled with joy. He drew up his army in battle array, with the utmoſt celerity and ſkill; but reſolved to wait till the enemy ſhould deſcend to the plain, where he might enter the liſts with them on equal terms.

When the van of the Spaniſh army had formed ſo large a front, as totally obſtructed the view of every thing behind them, the duke commanded de Renti to ſtop, and to wait for the King, in caſe he ſhould think fit to aſcend the hill. Then clapping ſpurs to his horſe, he galloped back to the duke de Mayenne, who was

was advancing with the main army, and taking him by the hand, he ſaid, with a cheerful animated countenance, "Paris will ſoon be delivered now, my lord; but for this purpoſe we muſt turn back, and direct our march to another quarter." He then deſired both Mayenne and La Mothe to march towards Lagny, a town on the other ſide of the Marne, and inſtructed them to take poſſeſſion of the ground on this ſide, directly oppoſite to the town, and to employ all their troops in drawing ſtrong lines of circumvallation round their camp.

THESE orders were executed with great expedition. A battery of the largeſt cannon was planted over againſt the town; and the camp was fortified in ſuch a manner with trenches, breaſt-works, and redoubts, as to render it impregnable.

WHEN this was done, the marquis de Renti, who for ſeveral hours had amuſed the enemy with hopes that he intended to come down from the hill, began to file off towards Lagny; after having planted a body of ſelect troops, under an officer of the name of Baſta, in certain woody parts of the hill, to ſecure his retreat.

THE King in the mean time knew nothing of what had paſſed on the other ſide of the hill;

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and when he ſaw the marquis de Renti depart, he ſent a detachment after him to attack his rear, and, if poſſible, to diſcover the duke's deſign. But this detachment fell unexpectedly among the Spaniſh troops under Baſta; and a furious rencounter enſued, which continued with various ſucceſs till night, when both parties retired to their reſpective camps. The King remained all night entirely ignorant of the operations of the enemy. He could not ſuppoſe that Farneſe, a general ſo diſtinguiſhed for his caution, would attempt to tranſport his forces over the Marne, in order to advance to Paris, on the other ſide of that river, while ſo ſtrong a fortified paſs as Lagny lay behind him. And it was ſtill more difficult to believe, that in the face of ſuch an army as lay ready to attack him, he would undertake the ſiege of Lagny, eſpecially as the river lay between him and that place. It was the laſt of theſe meaſures, however, on which the duke of Parma had reſolved; and all his movements on the day before had been made in order to inſure ſucceſs. Next morning the King received intelligence of his deſign, but he had the mortification to perceive that it was beyond his power to prevent him from carrying it into execution. On each hand he was perplexed with inſurmountable difficulties. The fortifications of the Spaniſh army were already ſo complete, that

that he could not attack them with the ſmalleſt hopes of ſucceſs. If he ſhould remain where he was, Lagny would certainly be loſt, and thereby a paſſage to Paris opened on the other ſide of the river; and if he ſhould tranſport his army, in order to ſave Lagny, the duke would then be at liberty to march directly by the road on this ſide to the relief of the beſieged.

THERE was no other expedient in his power, but, while he remained in his preſent ſituation, to ſend reinforcements from time to time to the garriſon of Lagny.

He takes Lagny.

THE duke of Parma meanwhile puſhed forward the ſiege of that place with the utmoſt celerity and vigour; having, as already mentioned, planted a battery on this ſide of the river, he opened it next morning, and ſoon laid a great part of the wall in ruins. The garriſon, however, ſtill believed themſelves to be ſecure, as the river was between them and the enemy; but the duke had thrown a bridge of boats over it ſome miles above the town, and had already tranſported ſeveral thouſands of his braveſt troops. Theſe troops were ready to mount the breach as ſoon as it was made practicable. In the firſt aſſault they were repulſed with great bravery by the garriſon, but an error in military diſcipline, committed by La-ſin, the governor,

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vernor, quickly decided the fate of Lagny. Inſtead of relieving thoſe who had ſuſtained the firſt aſſault, by changing them file by file, according to an eſtabliſhed rule in the defence of places, he attempted to do it all at once, and thereby threw his men into confuſion. This blunder was perceived by the aſſailants, who returned inſtantly to the charge with redoubled fury, and after taking La-ſin himſelf priſoner, put moſt of the garriſon to the ſword, while the King ſtood a ſorrowful ſpectator of the loſs of the place, and the ſlaughter of his troops.

Relief of Paris.

AFTER the taking of Lagny, no other obſtacle remained to prevent the Spaniards from approaching Paris on that ſide of the river, but the garriſons at the bridges of St. Maur and Charenton. Theſe were eaſily overcome, and the convoys with proviſions advanced without moleſtation to the gates of the city. The joy of the Pariſians on this occaſion may be more eaſily imagined than deſcribed; they poured forth in multitudes to receive that food of which they ſtood ſo much in need, and every tongue celebrated in the higheſt ſtrains the praiſes of their deliverer.

Error of the French monarch.

No perſon admired more that dexterity by which the duke of Parma had accompliſhed his deſign,

deſign, than the King himſelf; but his generous ſpirit was ſeverely mortified, and he had the greater reaſon for the chagrin which he felt on this occaſion; becauſe if, inſtead of encamping his army at Chelles, he had followed the counſel of the wiſe La Noue, and advanced as far as Claye, Lagny might have been ſaved, and the Spaniſh army ſo long retarded, that the Pariſians muſt have thrown themſelves upon his mercy.

HENRY's uneaſineſs was greatly augmented when he conſidered, that at preſent it was impoſſible for him by any bold deciſive ſtroke to retrieve his error. He knew it to be vain to entertain the hopes of forcing the duke of Parma, now when the end of his expedition was accompliſhed, to expoſe his troops to the riſk of a battle. His own army was greatly weakened by ſickneſs, and the fatigues of a long campaign. All the country round being laid waſte, he began to feel a ſcarcity of proviſions; his exchequer was exhauſted, and many of his nobility and gentry, who ſerved at their own expence, having no farther expectations this ſeaſon of either ſubduing Paris, or compelling the enemy to engage, were impatient to depart. Determined by theſe motives, he retired to St. Dennis, and having diſbanded the greateſt part of his forces, he ſent the nobility to provide for

He diſbands his army.

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for the ſecurity of the ſeveral provinces in which their intereſt lay, retaining only a flying army of his beſt troops, with which he intended during the winter to check the progreſs of the enemy.

Siege of Corbeil,

THIS little army was not ſo formidable as to prevent the duke of Parma from undertaking whatever enterprize he ſhould incline. At the deſire of Mayenne, and the other heads of the league, he laid ſiege to Corbeil; and, notwithſtanding the moſt obſtinate reſiſtance, he took it by aſſault, but not till he had ſpent many days in the ſiege, and loſt a great number of men.

BEING deſirous to preſerve in his own hands an acquiſition which had coſt him ſo dear, he propoſed to the leaders of the league to put in Corbeil a garriſon of his Walloon or Italian forces. By this propoſal, perhaps, he meant only to make trial of their diſpoſition towards the Catholic king; or, conſidering how averſe he himſelf had ever been to his preſent expedition, he intended to make Philip ſenſible of the difficulty of deriving any ſubſtantial advantage from taking ſo deep an intereſt in the affairs of France.

WHATEVER was his motive, Mayenne and the other leaders declined conſenting to his propoſal, and in their refuſal gave him a clear diſcovery

discovery of their jealousy and suspicion. This discovery confirmed him in his opinion, that matters were far from being ripe for the execution of Philip's designs, and that probably he should never be able to accomplish them by any other means than by protracting the war, till the strength and patience of the contending parties were exhausted. This plan had, as mentioned above, been recommended to Philip by the duke himself; and conformably to it, he resolved, since neither party was in immediate danger of being overpowered, to return to the Netherlands. Other motives concurred in determining him to form this resolution; the inclemency of the season, the sickliness of his army, the want of money, and a scarcity of provisions; which last was so great, as made it necessary for him sometimes to suffer his troops to plunder the inhabitants, although he foresaw that his granting this permission must not only prove prejudicial to his discipline, but contribute likewise to alienate the affections of the people, and thereby to obstruct his master's views.

The Catholic leaders, who had expected that he would have remained in France till the King was totally subdued, laboured with much importunity to divert him from his purpose; but all their arguments were ineffectual. The

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ſtate of affairs in the Netherlands, he informed them, rendered his return indiſpenſably neceſſary, but he would ſend them money, and leave ſuch a number of troops as would enable them to proſecute the war. Neither the money [d] nor troops [e] which he promiſed were anſwerable to the ſanguine expectations which they had formed. They ſaw that Philip, notwithſtanding the ſeeming zeal with which he eſpouſed their cauſe, was ſurely actuated by ſome private motive of ambition; that there was nothing farther from his intention than to bring the war to a concluſion, and that he would never contribute effectually to their gaining a victory over their enemies, unleſs he himſelf were to reap the fruits of it. They found it neceſſary however to conceal their ſuſpicions, and to accept of the ſcanty ſupply of money and troops which the duke had offered. Farneſe in the mean time was preparing for his march; and, as he could not doubt that Henry would give him all the annoyance in his power, he employed the ſame precautions as he had done formerly when he left the Netherlands. Having drawn up his army in four diviſions, he marched always in the order of battle: the country through which he paſſed was diligently

[d] Thirty thouſand ducats.

[e] Between five and ſix thouſand.

reconnoitred

reconnoitred by the light horſe, and his camp was every evening ſecured by ſtrong intrenchments.

The duke returns to the Netherlands.

NOTWITHSTANDING theſe precautions, the King was determined not to ſuffer him to return unmoleſted. With this intention he had brought a ſelect body of troops to Compeigne, near the borders of Picardy, and he ſet out with them from that place, as ſoon as he got information of the enemy's route, inflamed with the deſire of taking vengeance for the injuries he had received. Henry had full ſcope in the preſent ſcene of action for his wonted bravery and vigilance, nor did he ſuffer any opportunity to eſcape of exerting theſe qualities with ſignal damage to the enemy. Hovering perpetually round them, he attacked them ſometimes in the front, when they leaſt expected it, ſometimes in the flank, and ſometimes in the rear, giving them no reſpite night or day, and filling their minds with continual apprehenſions and alarms.

No general could have made greater efforts with ſo ſmall a force; and if the Spaniards had been commanded by a general leſs diſtinguiſhed than the duke of Parma for prudence and circumſpection, it is impoſſible, conſidering the length of their march, the badneſs of their roads,

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roads, and the ſeaſon of the year, but they muſt have been often thrown into confuſion, and the greater part of them deſtroyed. But the duke's vigilance was not inferior to the activity of the King; while he was perpetually on his guard, and ever ready to aſſiſt whatever part of his army was attacked, he ſuffered no provocation to divert him from the proſecution of his march; and at laſt he brought his troops, though not without conſiderable loſs, yet in good order, into the province of Hainault[f].

[f] D'Avila, lib. xi. Bentivoglio, part ii. lib. v. Thuanus, lib. xcix. ſect. vi. and vii.

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PART II.

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1590. Affairs of the Low Countries.

THE duke of Parma, on his return to the Netherlands, found that all the unhappy conſequences which he foretold had ariſen from his abſence. Having drained his finances by the French expedition, many of the troops left in the Low Countries had mutinied on account of their want of pay. The forces of the confederated ſtates had over-run the fertile provinces of Brabant and Flanders; and prince Maurice, having made himſelf maſter of a great number of the ſmaller towns upon the frontier, had paved the way for future conqueſts.

THESE misfortunes gave the duke of Parma the greater uneaſineſs, as he had little proſpect of being able ſoon either to retrieve his loſſes or to make repriſals on the enemy. Finding by his inſtructions from the court of Spain, that Philip was as much intoxicated as ever with his ambitious views in France, he was obliged to ſtation the greateſt part of his troops in the provinces of Artois and Hainault, where they might be ready to march, if neceſſary, to the aſſiſtance of the league. And thus ſeveral of the moſt important towns which lay next to

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the revolted provinces, being badly furniſhed with garriſons to defend them, were expoſed an eaſy prey to the enemy. The confederates were too ſagacious not to diſcern the advantage which was thus preſented to them: and whereas they had, till lately, been ſatisfied with defending their frontier, which they had done with much anxiety, and often without ſucceſs; they now took courage from the diſtractions in which Philip's prepoſterous ambition had involved him, and reſolved to exert themſelves with vigour in carrying on an offenſive war.

Prince Maurice ſubdues

THE year one thouſand five hundred and ninety-one had juſt begun, when colonel Norris led out the garriſon of Oſtend, which had been reinforced by troops from England; and having taken the fort of Blackemberg, between Oſtend and Sluys, he laid a great part of Flanders open to his incurſions. Soon afterwards another party of the forces of the States ſurpriſed the forts of Turnhout and Weſterlo, in Brabant. But theſe conqueſts were inconſiderable, when compared with thoſe of prince Maurice, who, having put his troops in motion as early as the ſeaſon would permit,

Zutphen,

opened the campaign with the ſiege of Zutphen, and ſoon compelled the garriſon to ſurrender.

FROM

1591. and Deventer.

FROM this place he led his army againſt Deventer, a town of ſtill greater importance than Zutphen. Deventer had been, as above related, betrayed to the Spaniards by Sir William Stanley; and Maurice was earneſtly ſolicited to undertake the ſiege of it, at this time, by colonel Vere, who was fired with the generous ambition of wiping out the reproach which Stanley's treachery had brought upon his countrymen. Vere diſplayed in this ſiege all that bravery and conduct, for which he is ſo highly celebrated by the cotemporary hiſtorians; and next to Maurice, who conducted the attack with conſummate prudence, he principally contributed to the reduction of the place. It was vigorouſly defended by the count de Berg, couſin-german to the prince; but the count being grievouſly wounded, and the wall on that ſide where Vere commanded laid in ruins, the garriſon capitulated in a few days after opening the trenches, and the inhabitants returned under obedience to the States [g]. 10th June.

THE duke of Parma in the mean time laid ſiege to the fort of Knotzenberg, which Maurice had built in the end of the preceding year. By this fort, the confederates commanded the navigation of the river, and gave ſuch an-

[g] Vide Bentivoglio, p. 350. Grotius, p. 145. Meteren, p. 530.

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noyance to Nimeguen, as made the duke extremely uneaſy about the fate of that important city. In order to conceal his deſign, he directed his march firſt towards the fort of Schenck. But Maurice was not deceived by this feint, and had taken care to ſtrengthen the garriſon of Knotzenberg with an addition of ſome choſen troops.

He defeats the Spaniſh horſe.

THE duke therefore met with the moſt vigorous reſiſtance, and loſt a great number of his men; ſtill, however, he perſiſted in the ſiege. Maurice, dreading his ſucceſs, relinquiſhed a ſcheme which he had formed for the reduction of Groningen, and having paſſed the Waal, he pitched his camp within ſight of the enemy. As he did not poſſeſs ſufficient force to attack their lines, he intended only to encourage the garriſon by his preſence, or to ſtraiten the duke's quarters, and to intercept his convoys. Many ſkirmiſhes paſſed with various ſucceſs, till Maurice at length found an opportunity of putting in practice the following ſtratagem: having planted an ambuſh of his braveſt troops, he marched up to the enemy's camp, attended by count Solmes and colonel Vere, at the head of ſome companies of horſe. The duke, leſs circumſpect and cautious on this occaſion than uſual, ſent out ten companies of Spaniſh and Italian horſe to attack him. A fierce

fierce rencounter enſued. Agreeably to orders, the prince's troops ſoon turned their backs and fled. The royaliſts purſued with ardour, till they had paſſed a narrow defile and a bridge, when Maurice returned ſuddenly to the charge, and the ſoldiers in ambuſh pouring in upon them from both ſides, their return to the camp was intercepted, and almoſt all of them were put to the ſword or taken priſoners.

This diſaſter afflicted the duke of Parma in the moſt ſenſible manner; a great number of the officers who fell were his countrymen, many of whom were perſons of rank, in whoſe fortune he was particularly intereſted. He perceived that, if he remained in his preſent ſituation, he muſt find it extremely difficult, from the diminution of his cavalry, to ſupply his army with proviſions, and he had not as yet made any conſiderable progreſs in the ſiege.

He would ſtill however have proſecuted his enterpriſe, if he had not been obliged to deſiſt from it by orders which he received from Philip, to act only on the defenſive in the Netherlands, and to ſpare his troops as much as poſſible for another expedition into France. Maurice hoped to have gained ſome advantage over Farneſe in his retreat from Knotzenberg; but both in this, and in his paſſage over the Waal,

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such wise precautions were employed, as rendered it impossible for the prince to annoy him; while they filled that young hero with the highest admiration of the duke of Parma's skill, and furnished him with important lessons in the military art, which he put in practice on many occasions afterwards with signal glory and success.

The reduction of Hulst,

HAVING passed the river, and put his troops in safety, the duke ordered new levies to be made in Germany, Burgundy, and the southern provinces of the Netherlands; after which, he went, on account of his indisposition, to drink the waters at Spa. He had no sooner set out, than prince Maurice, having embarked four thousand foot and six hundred horse, made a sudden descent on that part of Flanders called the county of Waes, and invested the town of Hulst. Mondragone, the governor of Antwerp, lost no time in drawing together such forces as were stationed in the neighbouring places, with an intention to raise the siege. But Maurice having pierced the dykes, had laid the country under water, and rendered it impossible for Mondragone to approach. Agreeably to the intelligence which had induced the prince to engage in his present enterprise, the garrison of Hulst was weak, and they were badly furnished both with provisions and military

tary ſtores. Their defence therefore was ſpiritleſs and feeble, and they ſoon agreed to a ſurrender.

and Nimeguen.

From Hulſt, Maurice returned unexpectedly to Knotzenberg; and as there was no Spaniſh army near, he threw a bridge over the Waal, and laid ſiege to Nimeguen. The garriſon, conſiſting of Germans and Walloons, made ſeveral ſallies to retard his approach: and, if they had been ſeconded by the townſmen, the reduction of a place of ſo great extent and ſtrength as Nimeguen, muſt have detained him long. But he had for ſome time paſt held a ſecret correſpondence with ſome of the principal inhabitants, and the people in general were extremely diſaffected to the Spaniſh government. They took courage now, when Maurice was at hand to ſupport them, and having riſen tumultuouſly, required the garriſon, in the moſt peremptory manner, to put an end to their calamities by a ſurrender of the town. The garriſon, conſcious of their inability to reſiſt both the citizens and the enemy, complied with their requeſt; and Maurice was received by them rather as their deliverer from ſlavery, than as a conqueror by whoſe arms they had been ſubdued. They were admitted to the ſame privileges as the other towns of the confederacy;

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and although the adminiſtration was put into the hands of the Proteſtants, yet no puniſhment was inflicted on any of the Catholics, by whom the city had been kept ſo long under the Spaniſh government.

AFTER this important acquiſition, Maurice ſet out for the Hague, and received there the moſt flattering teſtimonies of gratitude, attachment, and reſpect. The prudence with which his enterpriſes had been concerted, and the celerity and vigour with which he had carried them into execution, filled all Europe with his renown, and gave his countrymen the moſt ſanguine hopes of future proſperity and ſucceſs.

State of the confederacy.

THEIR condition was extremely different at this period from what it had ever been ſince the confederacy had been formed: till lately they had experienced an uninterrupted courſe of calamities; they had been perpetually diſturbed with inteſtine broils, and had lived under continual anxiety, occaſioned partly by the neighbourhood of their active enterpriſing enemy, and partly by the perfidious deſigns of thoſe whom they had intruſted with the reins of government. But their domeſtic diſſenſions were now compoſed; the enemy was removed

to

to a greater distance, and their frontier was formed either by towns strongly fortified, or by navigable rivers, in which they could avail themselves of the superiority of their naval force. They were no longer disquieted by suspicions of the fidelity of their governors; and the loss which they had suffered by the death of the prince of Orange, was compensated by the extraordinary merit of his son.

French affairs.

But there was nothing which contributed so much to inspire them with their present hopes, as their knowledge of Philip's attention being still as much engrossed as ever with the affairs of France. In prosecution of his plan for acquiring the sovereignty of that kingdom, by fomenting the war, he had, after the duke of Parma raised the siege of Paris, afforded the leaders of the league only such assistance as was necessary to save them from being overwhelmed. Their power was at this time exceedingly reduced, while that of the King had received a proportional augmentation. By his bravery and good conduct, joined to his clemency and moderation, Henry had allured great numbers of his rebellious subjects to their duty; and had, at the same time, engaged the Protestants in Germany, and the queen of England, to interest themselves more deeply than ever in his cause. For several months past he had

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had been abſolute maſter of the field, and he had lately begun the ſiege of Rouen, with an army amounting nearly to thirty thouſand horſe and foot. Both the town and garriſon were commanded by the Sieur de Villars, who diſplayed the higheſt degree of intrepidity, vigilance, and ſkill in the defence. But there was little probability of his being able to defend it long againſt ſo powerful an army, whoſe operations were conducted by ſo great a maſter in the art of war.

Siege of Rouen.

THE duke de Mayenne, and other Catholic leaders, dreaded that the reduction of ſo important a place as Rouen would prove fatal to their party, and they had exerted themſelves ſtrenuouſly to relieve it; but having no army, with which they could venture to enter the liſts with the King, they had recourſe as formerly to Philip, and ſpared no pains to convince him, that if he did not ſpeedily interpoſe, Rouen, and all the other towns in their poſſeſſion, muſt ere long ſubmit to the King's victorious arms. They were ſeconded in their application by the Spaniſh miniſters in France; and in conſequence of inſtructions ſent from Madrid to the duke of Parma, that general, after his return from Spa, had been entirely occupied in preparing to lead his army a ſecond time to the aſſiſtance of the league.

HIS

1591. Duke of Parma's second expedition into France.

His preparations were finiſhed about the middle of December, and on the 21ſt of that month he began his march, taking the ſame precautions as in his former expedition. He was joined by the duke de Mayenne in the province of Picardy, and his army, after the reinforcement brought him by the duke, amounted to five-and-twenty thouſand foot and ſix thouſand horſe.

As, in order to preſerve his troops freſh and vigorous, he marched only a few miles each day, it was near the end of January before he reached the province of Normandy. At that time the ſiege of Rouen was far advanced, and the garriſon was reduced to the laſt extremity. When the King therefore heard of the duke of Parma's approach, he could not reſolve to relinquiſh his enterpriſe; but he left his infantry to proſecute the ſiege, and advanced towards the duke with his cavalry, in hopes that, by haraſſing and retarding him on his march, the garriſon would be obliged to capitulate before he could arrive.

Danger of Henry at Aumale.

By his vigilance, intrepidity, and quick diſcernment, Henry was admirably fitted for the bold and dangerous enterpriſe in which he was now engaged; but his impetuous courage was not always

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always under the government of prudence, and betrayed him ſometimes into raſh and deſperate attempts, more becoming an officer of inferior rank, than a general or a king. Of this he gave a ſtriking proof in his conduct on the preſent occaſion. Having advanced before the reſt of the cavalry with three or four hundred horſe, he met, unexpectedly near the town of Aumale, with the forerunners of the duke of Parma's army, and he repulſed them with little difficulty; but although the whole Spaniſh army was in ſight, he would not retire till he had taken a view of the order of their march, nor even after he ſaw the duke's light horſe advancing towards him. With theſe likewiſe he encountered, and fought long and deſperately, till many of his troops had fallen by his ſide, and he himſelf was wounded. Had not the duke of Parma ſuſpected an ambuſcade, he might eaſily have cut off the King's retreat. He was urged by Mayenne to ſend forward more troops for that purpoſe, but he refuſed to comply with the duke's requeſt; and when he was afterwards reminded of the opportunity which he had loſt, he replied, that he could not reproach himſelf for his conduct, as he ſuppoſed, that, in the king of Navarre, he had a great general to contend with, and not merely the captain of a troop of horſe.

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HENRY was no ſooner able, after his wound, to get on horſeback, than he reſumed his firſt deſign of annoying the enemy on their march; and this he did with more circumſpection than before, but with ſuch indefatigable vigour and activity, as kept the duke of Parma in perpetual alarms. Several warm rencounters paſſed, in which the ſucceſs was various. The duke's vigilance, and the perfect diſcipline which he maintained, preſerved his army from ſuſtaining any great calamity. His march however was conſiderably retarded, and there was much reaſon to apprehend, that the beſieged would be compelled to ſurrender before he could advance to their relief.

Spirited conduct of Villars.

NOTHING leſs than the intrepidity and ſkill of Villars could have protracted the ſiege to ſo great a length. This brave man, far from having any thoughts of capitulating, aſpired to the glory of raiſing the ſiege without the aſſiſtance of the Spaniards. With this view he reſolved to take advantage of the abſence of the King, and to exert at once his whole force in an attack on the beſiegers. Never was attack conducted with more intrepidity and vigour. Great numbers of the royaliſts were put to the ſword; the marſhal de Biron, their commander in chief, was wounded; their trenches were filled up; many of their cannon

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cannon were ſpiked, or buried in the ditch; and their ſtores of proviſion and ammunition were either carried into the town or deſtroyed. Villars was at laſt repulſed, and obliged to retire within the walls; but not till the enemy had ſuffered ſo much loſs by the deſtruction of their works and ſtores, that he expected to be able to defend the town for ſeveral months longer, if his garriſon were reinforced.

Of this happy change in his ſituation, Villars gave immediate notice to the duke of Parma, and adviſed him to turn his arms to ſome other quarter, where they might be employed with greater advantage to the common cauſe. It was ſuſpected, that vanity had conſiderable influence in prompting Villars to give this advice. The duke was within two days' march of Rouen when he received it, and he immediately called a council of war to conſider of what was proper to be done.

He was himſelf of opinion, that he ought ſtill to purſue his march, in order to attack the enemy before they had recovered from their confuſion; and he obſerved, that if he ſhould only ſend a reinforcement to the garriſon, as the governor had deſired, the king of Navarre would inſtantly renew the operations of the ſiege, and probably exert himſelf with greater vigour

vigour than before. But the duke de Mayenne and the other French nobility, leſs bold on this occaſion than the duke of Parma, repreſented, that, notwithſtanding the diſaſter which had befallen the royaliſts, it would be extremely dangerous to attack them in their intrenchments whilſt their cavalry were ſo numerous; that when the nobility, who ſerved without pay, and were already impatient under the length of the ſiege, and the rigour of the ſeaſon, ſaw that there was no proſpect of a battle, they would leave the camp, and retire to their reſpective homes; that the duke might then attack the King with the higheſt probability of ſucceſs; and that till then the troops might either be employed in ſome other enterpriſe, or conducted to winter-quarters, whence they might iſſue forth freſh and vigorous, when a more advantageous ſeaſon for action ſhould arrive. Whether Mayenne ſpoke from conviction on this occaſion, or from his dread of the duke of Parma's acquiring too great a ſuperiority over the King, is doubtful. Farneſe was not entirely ſatisfied with his reaſoning, and could not approve of a reſolution to neglect one favourable opportunity, on account of the uncertain expectation of another. But as the propoſal was perfectly conſiſtent with his plan of protracting the war, he complied with it;

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and, having ſent eight hundred ſelect troops to reinforce the garriſon of Rouen, he led his army back to Picardy, and inveſted the town of St. Eſprit de Rue.

He had no ſooner ſet out, than the King applied himſelf with the utmoſt diligence to the proſecution of the ſiege of Rouen; and as he received at this time a ſeaſonable ſupply of cannon and ammunition from the States of Holland, he was enabled to carry on his operations with greater ſucceſs than ever.

The ſiege of Rouen raiſed.

In a few weeks the garriſon was again reduced to the moſt critical ſituation, and Villars, notwithſtanding the confidence, of which he had lately given ſo ſtrong a proof, was obliged to let the duke of Parma know, that, if he did not return to his relief before the twentieth of April, he would find it neceſſary to give up the town. Mayenne was now as ſolicitous to perſuade the duke of Parma to lead his army againſt the King, as he had been formerly reluctant and averſe. And the duke more readily yielded to his deſire, as certain intelligence had been received, that, agreeably to Mayenne's prediction, the cavalry in the King's army did not at this time amount to more than the half of their former number. Having drawn off his troops from St. Eſprit de

de Rue, he ſet out without delay for Rouen, and proceeded with ſo great expedition, that he performed the ſame march in ſix days, which had formerly coſt him twenty. BOOK XXII. 1591.

THE King was equally diſappointed and ſurpriſed when he heard of his approach. He dreaded the danger to which his army would be expoſed, if he remained in his preſent ſituation, between ſo brave a garriſon on the one hand, and the Spaniſh army on the other; and he would have gone to meet the duke of Parma at a diſtance from the town; but finding, upon an accurate review of his troops, that they were greatly inferior in number to the enemy, he raiſed the ſiege, after it had laſted five months, and retired to Pont de l'Arche, with a reſolution to wait there for a return of his nobility. The duke of Parma in the mean time advanced in battle array, and entered Rouen in a kind of triumph. From Rouen he led his army, by the advice of Mayenne, and the other leaders of the league, againſt Caudbec, which it was thought neceſſary to reduce, before the deliverance of Rouen could be deemed complete. April 20.

IN taking a review of the fortifications, and marking the ground for batteries, which he did as on other occaſions, with his own hand, Duke of Parma wounded at Caudbec.

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he received a wound by a muſket-ball, which entered his arm a little below the elbow, and pierced downward till it lodged in his wriſt. Without any change in his voice or countenance, he continued to give his orders as before, nor could his ſon and the other by-ſtanders perſuade him to retire till he had inſtructed them fully in his deſigns. In order to diſcover the courſe of the ball, his ſurgeon found it neceſſary to make three different inciſions; and the pain occaſioned by theſe and the wound brought on a fever, which confined him to his bed for ſeveral days. This accident had almoſt proved fatal to his army and to the league. The ſiege of Caudbec was conducted agreeably to his direction, and was ſoon brought to a concluſion; but in undertaking this ſiege, the duke had committed the only conſiderable blunder which we meet with in the hiſtory of his life. Caudbec lies in the peninſula of Caux, which is formed by the Seine on the weſt, and the ſea and the river d'Eu, or Breſle, on the north and eaſt. As the King, by poſſeſſing the towns of Eu, Arques, and Dieppe, commanded the entrance into Caux from the eaſt, it was impoſſible for the army of the league to get out of it, but either by croſſing the Seine, or returning ſouthward the ſame road by which they had entered the peninſula. In this way they might have eſcaped, if they had

had attempted it in time; and perhaps they would have done ſo, had it not been judged neceſſary for the general's recovery that he ſhould remain for ſeveral days at Caudbec. 1592.

The Spaniſh army blocked up in Caux.

THE King quickly perceived the advantage which was preſented to him, and exerted himſelf with ardour to improve it. Having, immediately after he had raiſed the ſiege of Rouen, diſpatched meſſengers, to ſummon his nobility to return to his camp, they had obeyed his ſummons with their wonted alacrity; and in the ſpace of a few days, his army was augmented to ſeventeen thouſand foot, and between ſeven and eight thouſand horſe. With this army he left Pont de l'Arche on the 30th of April, and arrived on the ſame day within ſight of the enemy, who had encamped at Yvetot, which lies at the diſtance of three or four miles from Caudbec.

HENRY's firſt care was to fortify his camp in ſuch a manner, that it might not be in the power of the enemy to compel him to engage; and his next, to make himſelf maſter of all the defiles through which they might attempt to force their paſſage. Many hot rencounters happened, in which both parties gave conſpicuous proofs of proweſs and intrepidity. The royaliſts were frequently repulſed from their ſta-

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tions, and much blood was ſpilt. But at laſt they accompliſhed their deſign, and hemmed in the enemy ſo cloſely that it was no longer practicable for them to approach to the outlet from the peninſula. In this ſituation they remained a fortnight. Their ſtock of proviſions was almoſt ſpent, and Henry began to indulge the flattering hope, that in a few days they would lay down their arms.

Their paſſage of the Seine at Caudbec.

NOTHING but the bold inventive genius of the duke of Parma could have ſaved them from this diſgrace: he had erred when he entered the peninſula, while ſo vigilant an enemy as Henry was ſo near. Neither the importunity of the chiefs of the league, nor his ignorance of the country, nor the hopes of finiſhing his enterprize before the King could arrive, are entirely ſufficient to juſtify his conduct. But he now fully atoned for his imprudence in expoſing his troops to ſo great a riſk, by the extraordinary capacity and vigour which he exerted in their deliverance.

As ſoon as he had recovered from the diſtreſs occaſioned by his wound, and taken a view of the poſition and ſtrength of the enemy, he perceived that it would be in vain to attempt to force their lines; and conſequently, that there was no other way by which he could ſave his

his army from captivity or ruin, but by tranſporting it over the river. To this expedient he reſolved to have recourſe, and he communicated his deſign to the duke de Mayenne, and ſome other of his moſt experienced officers, who all pronounced it to be impracticable. They knew how difficult it was to paſs even the moſt inconſiderable river in ſight of an enemy, and they could not conceive it poſſible for an army ſo much incumbered with artillery and baggage, to paſs ſo broad a river as the Seine at Caudbec, when not only a powerful enemy, ſo vigilant as the King, but the Dutch ſhips of war likewiſe, were prepared to obſtruct their paſſage.

THE duke was fully ſenſible of all the difficulties with which his enterprize muſt be attended, but as the urgent neceſſity of his ſituation would not ſuffer him to relinquiſh it, he perſiſted in his reſolution of attempting to carry it into execution.

HAVING firſt cleared the river of the Dutch ſhips, by planting batteries along the banks, he ordered the Sieur de Villars to hold all the boats and barks at Rouen in readineſs, and to prepare a number of rafts of ſtrong beams fit for tranſporting the artillery. After this, taking advantage of a thick miſt, on the 16th of May,

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he ſent out his cavalry by day-break, as if he intended an attack, and while the enemy were thus amuſed, he drew off his infantry from Yvetot to Caudbec. The cavalry followed; and as ſoon as they had retired, the King advanced with all his forces, having no ſuſpicion of the Duke's deſign, and wondering that he ſhould have choſen to move his camp to a ſituation in which it was more confined and ſtraitened than before. Henry ſtill thought of nothing but blocking up the paſſages, and fortifying his camp ſo as not to be obliged to accept of battle.

While the King was thus occupied, the Duke employed a great number of pioneers in raiſing two forts, one on each ſide of the river, directly oppoſite to each other, which he planted with cannon, and lined with muſketeers. To prevent the King from taking the alarm, he maintained all the ſame appearances as formerly, of a deſign to enlarge his quarters, and frequent ſkirmiſhes were fought.

At laſt, every thing neceſſary being prepared, the rafts and the boats (of which there was a great number at Rouen employed in the river trade) fell down with the ebbing tide, in the evening of the 20th of May; and, on the ſame night, the greateſt part of the troops, artillery, and

and baggage was tranſported. The king perceiving early next morning a change in the appearance of the enemy's camp, ſent the baron de Biron to reconnoitre it. The baron returned immediately at full gallop, calling out, that the Spaniards were paſſing the river. Henry ſet out without delay, at the head of his cavalry. When he came in ſight, he had the mortification to obſerve, that only two or three thouſand of the Spaniards remained on this ſide, and that they were ſo ſkilfully defended by the fort, that he could not approach them without ſacrificing the lives of many of his troops. He then planted his artillery on a hill which commanded the paſſage, and the Dutch ſhips came up the river from Quillebeuf; but before the cannon were ready to fire, and before the Dutch were near enough to do execution, the rear of the Spaniards, conducted with much prudence by prince Rannucio, the duke of Parma's ſon, had landed ſafe on the other ſide, and ſet the boats on fire.

NEITHER the King nor any of the French nobility had ever ſuſpected that ſuch a retreat was poſſible; and this circumſtance, joined to the nature of the ground near Caudbec, which concealed the duke of Parma's operations, contributed not a little to the fortunate iſſue of his enterpriſe. Henry had for ſeveral days enter-

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tained the moſt ſanguine hopes of gaining a deciſive victory, which would probably have given him immediate poſſeſſion of his kingdom; and his mortification now was in proportion to the confidence of his former expectations: it was the more ſenſible and galling, as his infantry was ſo much exhauſted by the hardſhips of a tedious winter's campaign, that it was impoſſible for him at preſent either to purſue the enemy, or to renew the ſiege of Rouen. The duke de Mayenne entered this city with a part of the forces, and the duke of Parma directed his march towards the Netherlands, where he arrived in a few weeks without receiving any moleſtation by the way [h].

Hiſtory of Antonio Perez.

WHILE Philip thus kept alive the flames of war in France, he had the good fortune to preſerve his Spaniſh dominions in a ſtate of undiſturbed tranquillity; and as a kingdom in this ſituation furniſhes few materials for hiſtory, hardly any tranſaction paſſed in Spain during ſeveral years preceding the preſent period that deſerves to be recorded; but in the courſe of this year an affair happened, which, while it marks the character and ſhews the ſecret life of Philip, was attended with the moſt ſerious conſequences.

[h] D'Avila, lib. xiii. Bentivoglio, part ii. lib. vi.; and Thuanus, lib. ciii.

HAVING

HAVING been engaged in a love intrigue with Anna Mendoza princeſs of Eboli[1], he had committed the conduct of it to his ſecretary Antonio Perez, who having frequent opportunities of converſing with that princeſs, had become no leſs enamoured of her than the King; and it was generally believed that ſhe had made him a full return to the paſſion which her beauty had inſpired. At the time when Antonio's correſpondence with the princeſs was much talked of, Eſcovedo, the friend and confident of Don John of Auſtria, had arrived from the Netherlands, to ſolicit the King for the return of the Italian and Spaniſh forces; and finding the ſecretary averſe to Don John's deſigns, he reſolved to take vengeance on him, by making a diſcovery to the King of what was reported of Antonio's familiarity with the princeſs of Eboli. Philip readily believed this intelligence, and conceived an implacable reſentment againſt the ſecretary; but he was animated at the ſame time with hatred no leſs implacable towards Eſcovedo; who, he believed, had fomented Don John's ambition, and would ſooner or later engage that prince in ſome deſperate enterprize inconſiſtent with his allegiance. Philip reſolved to employ one of theſe men as the inſtrument of his vengeance againſt the other,

[1] The wife of Ruy Gomez de Silva.

and

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and gave a private order to Perez to have Eſcovedo aſſaſſinated. This order was executed without delay, and ſoon afterwards a proſecution was begun againſt the murderer, with Philip's permiſſion, by the widow and children of Eſcovedo. Philip intended by this meaſure to remove all ſuſpicions of being acceſſary to the murder. But dreading that Perez might, for his own exculpation, make a full diſcovery, he wrote him ſeveral letters with his own hand, requiring that he would conceal the order which had been given him, and aſſuring him, that a ſtop ſhould ſoon be put to the proſecution. It was ſtopped accordingly; and although Perez was forbid to come to court himſelf, he was allowed for ſome years to tranſact the ſeveral branches of public buſineſs which had been intruſted to him, by his deputies or clerks. But no time could aſſuage the King's reſentment: after ſix years he commanded him to be tried for malverſation in the diſcharge of his office, and having ordered a fine of thirty thouſand ducats to be impoſed on him, he threw him into priſon and loaded him with chains. Perez was offered his liberty on condition that he ſhould give up all the King's letters relative to the murder of Eſcovedo. He delivered ſome of them, and was releaſed; but Philip was no ſooner in poſſeſſion of the letters, than a new proceſs on account of the murder

was

was commenced. Perez was again thrown into priſon, and put to the torture; and he now perceived, that nothing leſs than his death was intended. With the aſſiſtance of his wife and friends he eſcaped and fled to Arragon, his native country, where he expected to avail himſelf of the rights and privileges of the Arragonians. Philip no ſooner heard of his eſcape, than he diſpatched certain officers after him, who overtook him in the town of Calataiude; and having forced him from a monaſtery, where he had taken refuge, conducted him to Saragoſſa. When he arrived in that city, he appealed to the Juſtiza, to whom, according to a fundamental law of the conſtitution, an appeal was competent from every other judge whether civil or eccleſiaſtical.

By the Juſtiza, Perez was lodged in the ſtate-priſon, called the Manifeſtation, to remain there till his cauſe ſhould be tried. But although no perſon could legally enter this priſon, without the ſpecial permiſſion of the Juſtiza, the marquis of Almenar, the King's attorney-for Arragon, broke into it with a body of armed men, and carried off Perez to the priſon of the Inquiſition. The people, who had ever been accuſtomed to hold the perſon and authority of the Juſtiza in the higheſt veneration, were inflamed with rage at this indignity,

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PEREZ was again lodged in the priſon of ſtate, and remained there for ſeveral months, during which time the governor, or viceroy, ordered thirteen of the principal lawyers of Saragoſſa, to examine whether the cauſe belonged more properly to the Juſtiza, or to the court of inquiſition. After long deliberation they declared, that it would be a violation of the liberties of Arragon, if Perez were tried by any other judge than the Juſtiza; but afterwards, being either corrupted or intimidated, they reverſed this ſentence, under the pretence of the priſoner's having held a ſecret correſpondence with the king of France, a heretic, and pronounced that it belonged to the inquiſition to take cogniſance of his cauſe.

THE Juſtiza paid no regard to this opinion of the lawyers, but perſiſted in defending the privileges of his office, and in refuſing to deliver up the priſoner. The viceroy had recourſe to force; and having drawn together a great number of the familiars of the inquiſition, he broke

broke open the ſtate priſon, loaded Perez with chains, and was carrying him off in a ſort of triumph, when the people aroſe a ſecond time, and ſet him at liberty. He immediately left the town, and made his eſcape into France, where he gave uſeful information to the King with regard to the deſigns and meaſures of the court of Spain. 1592.

PHILIP in the mean time reſolved not to neglect the opportunity which this ſedition of the Arragonians afforded him, to ſhew how little he regarded thoſe rights and privileges of which they had ſhewn themſelves ſo tenacious. Having formed an army of the troops which were quartered in different parts of Caſtile, he gave the command of it to Alphonſo Vargas, with inſtructions to march to Saragoſſa with the utmoſt expedition; and to prevent the Arragonians from preparing for reſiſtance, he gave out that this army was intended to aſſiſt the Catholics in France. The Arragonians however having received certain intelligence of his deſign, began to prepare for their defence. Lanuſa, the Juſtiza, having convened the principal inhabitants, and read to them a fundamental law of their conſtitution, by which it is declared, that they have a right to oppoſe by force the entrance of foreign troops into Arragon, even though the King himſelf ſhould lead them, it

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was decreed with unanimous consent, that conformably to this law they should take up arms on the present occasion, to prevent the entrance of the Castilians under Vargas.

INTIMATION of this decree was sent to the other cities of the province, and the inhabitants of Saragossa repaired in great numbers to the standard of liberty that was erected. But they had no leader of sufficient capacity to conduct them, and there was no time for the people in other places to come to their assistance. Vargas having arrived much sooner than they expected, they were overwhelmed with terror, and threw down their arms.

The Justiza of Arragon put to death.

VARGAS entered the city without opposition, and cast such of their leaders as had not made their escape into prison. Among these were the duke de Villa Hermosa, the count of Aranda, and the Justiza. The two first he sent prisoners to Madrid, but he put the Justiza publicly to death without either trial or sentence, and then confiscated his effects, and levelled his houses with the ground; ordering proclamation to be made in the city, that such should be the punishment of all those who, like Lanusa, should adventure to dispute the authority of the King.

THE

THE people heard this inſulting proclamation with unſpeakable grief and indignation; but they were obliged to lament in ſecret the ruin of thoſe invaluable rights which they were unable to defend. The palace of the inquiſition was fortified, that it might ſerve the purpoſe of a citadel; and a ſtrong body of Caſtilian troops were quartered there and in the town, where they remained till the minds of the citizens were thoroughly ſubdued. Philip thought it unneceſſary to aboliſh formally their conſtitution of government, as he had given them ſufficient proof how inſignificant they would find it, if they ſhould ever truſt to it as a barrier againſt the encroachments of the regal power.

Sickneſs of the duke of Parma.

WHILE this tranſaction paſſed in Spain, the duke of Parma had returned from France to the Netherlands, and from thence the bad ſtate of his health had made it neceſſary for him to go once more to drink the waters at Spa. In the time of his French expedition, many of the troops which he had left behind him had mutinied; and on his return from Spa, he had the mortification to find, that prince Maurice had ſubdued the two important towns of Steenwich and Coverden, although the former of theſe places had been fortified in the ſtrongeſt manner, and was defended by a brave and determined

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termined garriſon of one thouſand ſix hundred men.

THE duke's chagrin at theſe events contributed to quicken the progreſs of his diſeaſe, which having baffled the power of medicine, had now reduced him ſo low, that finding himſelf unable to fulfil the duties of his office, he had applied to the King for liberty to retire.

His death.

BUT Philip believing that no other perſon was ſo able to bring his ſchemes in France to the deſired iſſue, refuſed to grant his requeſt; and when he ſignified his refuſal, ſent him inſtructions to return as ſoon as poſſible to the aſſiſtance of the League. The duke would not deſert a ſtation which he had filled with ſo much honour, and reſolved to ſtruggle with his diſtemper to the laſt. Having by new levies ſupplied ſome of the vacancies in his army, he went, on the 29th of October, to Arras, and there applied with his wonted aſſiduity to haſten the neceſſary preparations for his expedition. The ſtrength of his mind counterbalanced for ſeveral weeks the weakneſs of his body. From the vigour which he diſplayed, thoſe about him conceived hopes that his death was ſtill at a conſiderable diſtance. But on the third of December, immediately after ſigning ſome diſpatches which had been prepared for his ſubſcription,

ſcription, he expired in the forty-ſeventh year of his age, and the fourteenth of his government of the Netherlands.

and character.

In this manner died Alexander Farneſe, duke of Parma, who claims our admiration, no leſs for his political wiſdom and ſagacity, than on account of thoſe more ſplendid military talents which have procured him ſuch diſtinguiſhed renown. It was by his prudence, moderation, and addreſs, more than by the force of arms, that he re-united ſo great a part of the Netherlands to the Spaniſh monarchy; and if Philip had paid the ſame regard to his opinion on all occaſions, which he did on ſome, it is probable that the United Provinces would have been compelled to return to their allegiance. England might in that caſe have been ſubdued, and France might have been ſwallowed up by the exorbitant power of Spain. Though it was happy for Europe that Philip, blinded by flattery and ambition, refuſed to liſten to the counſels that were offered him, yet we muſt admire that ſuperior ſagacity and penetration by which they were ſuggeſted.

The duke of Parma in his youth gave no indications of thoſe extraordinary qualities with which nature had endowed him, and men were even diſpoſed to think unfavourably of his un-

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derſtanding; but in the war with the Turks, in which he ſerved under John of Auſtria, the flame of his genius broke forth, and burnt afterwards through the whole of his life with unabating ſplendor. His perſon was graceful, his eyes lively and penetrating, his manner courteous, his addreſs inſinuating, and his temper generous and humane.

His vices, ſays a reſpectable Dutch writer[k], were thoſe of the age in which he lived, or of the court in which he had been educated; but what theſe vices were, neither this, nor any other hiſtorian has informed us. He appears not to have poſſeſſed that winning ſimplicity of manners, that perfect ingenuity and candour, by which his great rival for military fame, the French monarch, was ſo eminently diſtinguiſhed; yet the Proteſtant, as well as Popiſh hiſtorians acknowledge, that as he was dutiful and faithful to his prince, ſo he maintained the moſt inviolable fidelity in all his engagements with the people of the Netherlands who ſubmitted to his arms.

[k] Grotius.

THE

HISTORY

OF THE REIGN OF

PHILIP THE SECOND,

KING OF SPAIN.

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AFTER the death of the duke of Parma, Philip committed the government of the Netherlands to count Peter Erneſt of Manſveldt, whom he ordered to ſend an army, without delay, under the command of his ſon count Charles, to the aſſiſtance of the League. In obedience to this order, Charles immediately began his march with ſix thouſand foot and one thouſand horſe, which was the greateſt number of troops that could be ſpared from the defence of the Netherlands. Theſe troops, when joined by thoſe of the duke de Mayenne, compoſed an army of fifteen thouſand foot and three thouſand horſe, of which the duke was inveſted with the chief command.

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1593. Count Manſveldt governor.

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1593. Siege of Noyon.

He began his operations with the ſiege of Noyon, in which he exerted himſelf with extraordinary vigour, and compelled the garriſon to ſurrender, before the King could arrive to their relief. From Noyon the troops were led in Lower Picardy, where ſome inconſiderable places were reduced. But ſoon after this ſucceſs, count Manſveldt with the Spaniſh army returned to the Netherlands; and the operations of war were interrupted by certain political negotiations, from which Philip expected to derive greater advantage than from the progreſs of his arms.

Convention of the States of the League.

Having, during ſeveral years, waſted the blood and treaſure of his ſubjects, in fomenting the war in France, in expectation of ſome favourable opportunity of ſeizing upon the crown, his patience had been for ſome time paſt exhauſted; and he had reſolved to make trial, whether it was practicable to realiſe thoſe alluring hopes by which he had ſo long been actuated. With this view his miniſters had repeatedly requeſted the duke of Mayenne to ſummon an aſſembly of the States of the League, that it might be known what Catholic prince they inclined to chooſe for their ſovereign. Mayenne ſtill cheriſhed the hopes of attaining the ſovereignty himſelf, in ſome future more favourable criſis; and he abhorred the thoughts

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of having the French nation ſubjected to the dominion of Spain. Influenced by theſe motives, he had on different pretences declined for ſeveral months complying with Philip's requeſt; but finding that he would not be diverted from his purpoſe, the duke had yielded to his importunity, and as lieutenant general of the kingdom, had iſſued a ſummons for the States to meet at Paris on the twenty-ſixth of January one thouſand five hundred and ninety-three. Philip ſent the duke of Feria, and Mendoza, an eminent Spaniſh lawyer, to this aſſembly; and he fondly imagined, that, by their influence, and that of the cardinal Piacenza, the Pope's legate, a majority of the deputies might be perſuaded to abrogate the Salic law, and to place his daughter Iſabella on the throne.

Diſcovery of Philip's views.

But it ſoon appeared how much his miniſters in France had deceived him, and been themſelves deceived. Neither the money which he had ſecretly beſtowed to increaſe the number of his partizans, nor the armies which he had employed at ſo great an expence in their behalf, had produced in any conſiderable degree the effects which he expected. Some of the greateſt bigots in the party, and ſome of the loweſt of the people, had given credit to his profeſſions of zeal for religion; even the eyes of theſe men were now opened, and they

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perceived how little they had been indebted to the friendſhip of a prince, who now diſcovered, that his principal deſign in aſſiſting them againſt their enemies, had been to take advantage of their diſtreſs, and to reduce them to the unhappy condition of a province of Spain. For it was in this light they conſidered his propoſal; and were no leſs alarmed at his demand of their crown for Iſabella, than if he had demanded it for himſelf. In theſe ſentiments the deputies were ſecretly confirmed by Mayenne. But as both he and they were conſcious that they were utterly unable to contend with Henry, if Philip ſhould forſake them, they ſtudied to conceal their averſion to his propoſal. They neither agreed to it, nor rejected it; but expreſſed their ſolicitude with regard to the perſon whom the Catholic King ſhould make choice of for his daughter's huſband; and inſiſted, that in the event of her election, ſhe ſhould not be married to any foreign prince.

THE Spaniſh miniſters informed them, that their maſter had indeed deſigned to give her in marriage to Erneſt archduke of Auſtria; but ſince it was not agreeable to the States, he was willing to beſtow her upon the duke of Guiſe. The duke de Mayenne did not expect this conceſſion, and was greatly diſconcerted when the

Spaniſh miniſters produced inſtructions, empowering them to make it. He was ſtung with the preference which was given to his nephew before his ſon; and he now ſecretly reſolved to obſtruct the election of Iſabella, to the utmoſt of his power. Finding it neceſſary however to diſguiſe his ſentiments, he affected to be highly pleaſed with the propoſal; but alleged, that a regard to the honour of his Catholic majeſty, as well as to the ſafety of the duke of Guiſe, required that the election of Iſabella ſhould be deferred till an army was aſſembled, ſufficient to overpower her enemies, and to fix her upon the throne. At preſent there was no army in France able to contend with the king of Navarre, and a conſiderable time muſt elapſe before ſo great a force as was neceſſary could be raiſed. The Spaniſh miniſters were ſenſible of the ſtrength of this objection; they likewiſe knew that, without the aſſiſtance of Mayenne, they could not perſuade the States to proceed to the election; and therefore, without great oppoſition, they agreed to a delay. In this manner did the duke de Mayenne, influenced partly by ambition, and partly by concern for the freedom and independence of the kingdom, diſappoint for the preſent Philip's plan to enſlave it; and other events afterwards happened, which would have rendered it impoſſible, even

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for Mayenne himſelf, had he been ſo inclined, to carry it into execution.

Henry IV. embraces the Catholic religion.

THE king of France, who knew the purpoſe for which the States had been convened, though he was in a great meaſure ignorant of Mayenne's views, dreaded violently his concurring with the Spaniards; and felt great anxiety with reſpect to the conſequences which might follow. For Philip, he believed, would regard an election made by the States of the League, though only a ſmall part of the kingdom, as a ſufficient foundation for his daughter's claim, and would employ all his power to ſupport it, whatever prejudice might thence ariſe to his affairs in the Netherlands. On the firſt opening of the aſſembly, Henry publiſhed an edict declaring it to be illegal. And he gave permiſſion at the ſame time to the Catholic lords of his party, to enter into a conference with thoſe of the League; intending to prevent the States from proceeding to extremities, by affording them the proſpect of his ſpeedy converſion to the Popiſh faith.

THIS expedient was in ſome meaſure attended with the deſired effect. The nobility of the League, diſquieted with the apprehenſions of being reduced under the dominion of Spain, and

and conſcious, that, if Philip ſhould abandon them, they muſt ſoon yield to the King's victorious arms, were thrown into extreme perplexity; and many of them ſhewed that nothing was wanting but Henry's converſion, to determine them to acknowledge his authority. This condition however was ſtill as neceſſary as ever. From the long continuance of the war, their religious prejudices were become unconquerable. With theſe their ſenſe of honour and conſiſtency conſpired, and their regard to an oath which they had ſworn, never to acknowledge an heretical prince for their ſovereign. They were confirmed in their reſolution, by the Pope's legate, and by the archbiſhop of Lyons, and other partiſans of Spain; and were ſtill as much determined as ever to adhere to their engagements, without regard to any inconveniences or dangers, to which they might thereby be expoſed.

WHILE the delay of the King's converſion proved an inſurmountable objection againſt him with the members of the League, it gave the moſt ſenſible uneaſineſs to ſuch of the Catholics as had eſpouſed his cauſe. They had been induced to remain with him, after the death of the late King, by his promiſe of embracing their religion. They had often urged him to fulfil this promiſe. Amidſt the hurry of

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of arms, he found it eaſy to employ excuſes, with which they had hitherto been ſatisfied. But their patience was now exhauſted. They entertained ſuſpicions that he had dealt inſincerely with them. Though brave and warlike, they were ſick of the hardſhips and fatigues of war; and they began to hold conferences together, on the ſubject of transferring their allegiance to Henry's couſin, the cardinal of Bourbon. Henry perceived that the critical period was now come, when he muſt reſolve either to change his religion, or to forego the crown, and expoſe himſelf and his Proteſtant ſubjects to the fury and vengeance of all the Catholics in France, ſupported by his inveterate enemy the king of Spain. Even ſome of the Proteſtant leaders were ſo candid as to acknowledge, that without embracing the Catholic faith, he would never be able to preſerve poſſeſſion of the throne; and they exhorted him to embrace it, if his conſcience would permit, as the only means by which they, as well as his other ſubjects, could be ſaved from ruin.

NEVER was an ingenuous prince placed in a more diſtreſsful ſituation. And never was a virtuous mind aſſailed by temptations more alluring. For he was not impelled only by ambition, or the deſire of ſecuring a great and mighty monarchy to himſelf and his poſterity.

The

The desire of delivering his people from calamities, which were become intolerable, cooperated with his ambition, and both together put his integrity to the severest trial. 1593.

Without any longer delay, he invited the Catholic divines throughout his kingdom, to come and instruct him in the principles of their religion; and having heard them discourse concerning several of the points in dispute between the Protestants and them, he declared himself, entirely satisfied with their arguments, and soon afterwards went to mass in the church of St. Dennis, where he read aloud his confession of the Catholic faith, and promised to maintain and defend it, against whatever attempts might be made for its subversion.

Henry's conduct on this occasion was very differently interpreted by his cotemporaries, according as they stood well or ill affected to his person, or to the religion which he had embraced. It was alleged by some, that he had given a convincing proof of his indifference with regard to all religion, and that his conversion could be considered in no other light, but as hypocrisy and grimace. But others more justly observed, that if Henry had been capable of so great insincerity as his enemies ascribed to him, he would have listened to his interest

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intereſt at a much earlier period, and not have ſo long expoſed himſelf to the danger of being for ever excluded from the throne. That no other ſatisfactory account could be given of his delay, but the ſcruples with which his regard to truth and his ſenſe of honour had inſpired him. That it was not ſurpriſing, that a prince who had paſſed his life amidſt the tumults of war, ſhould have been but very imperfectly acquainted with the niceties of theological diſputes; or that his opinions in matters of ſuch difficult deciſion, ſhould have been gradually bent to a compliance with ſo great an intereſt as he had at ſtake. And conſidering how candid and ſincere he had ever ſhewn himſelf in all his conduct, it might juſtly be ſuppoſed that he had ſtill preſerved his integrity, and that his religious ſentiments had in reality undergone that change which he now expreſſed with ſo much ſeeming ſerioufneſs and ſolemnity.

Effects of Henry's converſion.

WHATEVER were the real motives of Henry's conduct, it diffuſed a general joy and ſatisfaction among his ſubjects. Worn out with the miſeries of ſo long a war, they exulted at the proſpect of peace, though ſtill at ſome diſtance; and being now freed from the faſcination of their religious prejudices, they could perceive and admire thoſe illuſtrious virtues in the

the character of their ſovereign, by which he was ſo highly qualified to make them happy.

THE Spaniſh miniſters, on the other hand, the cardinal legate, and the duke de Mayenne, were greatly alarmed at this event, and ſtill more when they obſerved the reception which the news of it met with among the people. They repreſented it as a political device, intended to prevent the election of a Catholic prince. They perſuaded a great number of their adherents to ſwear that they would not acknowledge Henry for King, unleſs his converſion were ratified by the Pope; and at the ſame time they employed all their influence at the court of Rome, to diſſuade the Pope from granting him an abſolution.

Philip ſtill adheres to his plan.

PHILIP was not diſcouraged from the proſecution of his ſcheme, either by the oppoſition which it had received from the States of the League, or by the converſion of the King. He became ſenſible however of his error in pitching on the duke of Guiſe (a young nobleman indeed of great merit and moderation, but poſſeſſed of little power or influence) for his daughter's partner in the throne. This error he corrected, and ordered his miniſters to acquaint the duke de Mayenne, that he was now determined to give the preference to *his* ſon.

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ſon. In conſequence of this declaration, a negotiation which Mayenne had begun for reconciling himſelf to the King, was broken off. That powerful leader and the Spaniards were henceforth on more amicable terms; and there was no longer any reaſon to doubt, that in future he would exert himſelf with vigour in promoting their deſigns [a].

State of his affairs.

But there was much leſs probability at the preſent than any former period, that theſe deſigns would ever be accompliſhed. Philip had no general after the duke of Parma's death, qualified to enter the liſts with the king of France. His treaſury was exhauſted, and even his credit was reduced ſo low, that the Genoeſe, and other Italian merchants, from whom he had already borrowed ſeveral millions of money, refuſed to lend him any more. His commanders in the Netherlands had not been able to make the neceſſary levies. His troops there were fewer in number than they had ever been ſince the commencement of the war; and yet ſo great arrears were due to them, that the officers found it impracticable to maintain their authority. The greateſt part of the Spaniſh ſoldiers in the Low-Countries had, upon their return from France, forſaken their ſtandards;

[a] D'Avila, lib. xiv. Thuanus, lib. cvi, cvii.

and

and having elected officers, and a commander in chief, from among themselves, they had begun to exercise the most oppressive rapacity upon the inhabitants of the southern provinces.

THE example of the Spaniards was quickly followed by the Italians and Walloons. The people in the open country were plundered in the most unmerciful manner. Those dreadful scenes of devastation were renewed, which had been acted after the death of Requesens; and the Flemings had never suffered so much from the enemy, as they now suffered from troops engaged to protect and defend them.

Siege of Gertrudenberg.

PRINCE Maurice in the mean time exerted all his wonted activity to improve the advantage which these disorders afforded him, for extending the territories of the States. There was no town which the confederates were more desirous of acquiring than Gertrudenberg; which, as it lies nearer them than Breda, subjected them to perpetual anxiety for the preservation of that important city; besides giving annoyance to their inland trade, and furnishing the Spaniards with an easy entrance into Holland.

DURING the winter, Maurice had made diligent preparation for the siege of this place; and

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and early in the ſpring, he was ready to take the field with ſuch an army as he judged ſufficient to inſure ſucceſs. In order to prevent the enemy from ſuſpecting his deſign, he directed his march firſt towards Sluys and Dunkirk; afterwards to Bois-le-Duc and Grave; and when by theſe feints he had induced count Manſveldt to divide his forces, he turned ſuddenly to Gertrudenberg.

Mansveldt, anxious to avoid the reproach to which the loſs of a place of ſo great conſequence would expoſe him, drew together all the forces which could be ſpared from the garriſons of the other towns, with an intention to attempt to raiſe the ſiege. Prince Maurice expected this, and conducted his operations with the utmoſt celerity. Not only his pioneers, amounting to three thouſand, but a great number of his troops were employed day and night in fortifying his camp, both on the ſide towards the town, to prevent the eruptions of the garriſon, and on the ſide towards the country. And not ſatisfied with this, he broke down the dyke of the river, and laid a great part of the adjacent country under water. After which, having approached the town as uſual by trenches, he opened batteries againſt it at different places; and kept up a continual fire

fire upon it from his fleet, on the ſide towards the river [b].

THE garriſon, conſiſting of Burgundians and Walloons, made a brave and vigorous reſiſtance, and thereby gave count Manſveldt time to advance to their relief. The count's army amounted to more than double the number of the beſiegers; and he attacked their intrechments in different places, where the inundation permitted his approach. But Maurice had conſtructed his works with ſo much art, and ſtrengthened them in ſuch a manner with forts and redoubts, at proper diſtances, that all count Manſveldt's attempts proved ineffectual. The count's quarters were at the ſame time greatly ſtraitened by the garriſon of Breda, which ſallied out upon him, and made conſiderable ſlaughter among his troops. He found it neceſſary to retire, and Gertrudenberg ſoon afterwards capitulated. In the garriſon there were ſeveral of thoſe ſoldiers, who ſome years before had ſold the town to the Spaniards. Theſe men ſuffered the puniſhment due to their treachery; but all the reſt, and the inhabitants of the place, received the moſt advantageous and honourable terms.

[b] The Maeſe at Gertrudenberg is more properly a branch of the ſea, than a river,—and admits of the largeſt ſhips.

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1593. COUNT Manſveldt had, in order to retrieve his honour, by making repriſals upon the enemy, led his army from Gertrudenberg, to inveſt an important fort belonging to the confederates, called Creveceur. But this attempt likewiſe was fruſtrated by the celerity of Maurice, who arrived before the count's lines were finiſhed; got between him and the fort, and, though greatly inferior in number, obliged him quickly to raiſe the ſiege.

DURING the reſt of the campaign, Manſveldt acted on the defenſive; and no other event happened in the Netherlands this year, that deſerves to be recorded [c].

Erneſt, archduke of Auſtria, governor of the Netherlands.

1594. ALTHOUGH Philip had, after the death of the duke of Parma, committed the government to count Manſveldt, he had from the firſt intended that the count ſhould reſign it into the hands of Erneſt archduke of Auſtria. This prince arrived in the beginning of the year one thouſand five hundred and ninety-four at Bruſſels; and was received there with every mark of joy and ſatisfaction. He was a prince of a modeſt and gentle diſpoſition; but he poſſeſſed not the capacity and vigour requiſite in the preſent critical ſituation of af-

[c] Bentivoglio and Grotius, lib. iii.

fairs.

fairs. Conſcious of his want of military talents, he fondly flattered himſelf with the hopes of prevailing on the revolted provinces to return to their allegiance by argument and perſuaſion. And with this view he ſent an invitation to the States to appoint ambaſſadors to treat with him concerning peace. But the States rejected his invitation, and accompanied their refuſal with declaring, "That, as from experience they could not repoſe any confidence in the King of Spain, ſo they would never enter into any treaty of reconcilement with him; but would maintain their liberty to the laſt, and lay down their lives ſooner than ſubmit to that intolerable yoke from which they had been ſo happily delivered." 1594.

If it is true, as the Dutch hiſtorians relate, that two murderers were detected at this time, whom the Spaniſh miniſters had employed to aſſaſſinate prince Maurice, it will not appear ſurpriſing that this declaration of the States ſhould have contained expreſſions of reſentment; eſpecially as they were now in a much more flouriſhing condition than before, and had much leſs reaſon than at any former period to dread the power of Spain. For Philip, they knew, was ſtill more intent on acquiring the crown of France, than on recovering his hereditary dominions; and was likely to waſte

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his ſtrength in that chimerical attempt, before he could be made ſenſible of his folly.

Affairs of France.

THE ſituation of affairs in that kingdom became daily more unfavourable to his views; and the King's converſion ſoon produced the happy effects which were expected to ariſe from it.

Wiſe and generous conduct of the King.

THE citizens of Meaux were the firſt who ſent him a tender of their ſubmiſſion; not long afterwards, the Pariſians opened their gates to receive him; and the example of the metropolis, which had ever been the chief ſtrength of the League, was quickly followed by Rouen, Lyons, and almoſt all the other great towns in the kingdom. Henry's conduct was admirably calculated to promote that affectionate zeal of his ſubjects, of which he received at this time ſo many ſtriking proofs. For ſeveral years he had ſuffered from them the moſt cruel injuries and affronts; but his generous ſpirit, ſuperior to reſentment, abhorred the thought of puniſhing thoſe who were willing to lay down their arms; and he received the ſubmiſſion of his moſt inveterate enemies with a degree of goodneſs and condeſcenſion, which, while he won *their* hearts, determined many others to imitate their example.

He granted, to all who ſubmitted to him, the moſt favourable terms; confirmed their privileges, as if they had done nothing to forfeit them; adhered with inviolable fidelity to his engagements, and publiſhed an edict of general indemnity, in order to ſet the minds of the people every where at eaſe, and to convince them that it would be their fault, and not his, if the public tranquillity were not ſpeedily reſtored.

By theſe meaſures, which were equally prudent and magnanimous, the ſtrength of the League was reduced ſo low, that Philip and the duke of Mayenne might have eaſily perceived the vanity of their deſigns.

Philip's motives for proſecuting the war.

It can hardly be imagined, that either the one or the other could any longer ſeriouſly entertain the hopes of ſucceſs. But Mayenne was ſo deeply engaged with the Spaniards, that he knew not how to extricate himſelf with honour; eſpecially as he had ſolemnly ſworn, with many others of his party, that he would never acknowledge Henry for his ſovereign, till he ſhould receive abſolution from the Pope. And though Philip could not now be ſo chimerical, as to expect to procure the crown for Iſabella, yet he could not overcome that implacable hatred, with which he had long been animated againſt

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the French monarch, in whom (judging of Henry from himſelf) he expected to find an irreconcileable and mortal foe. Beſides, he was not ignorant of the juſtice of Henry's claim to the kingdom of Navarre, which Ferdinand the catholic had wreſted from Henry's anceſtors by fraud and violence; and he could not doubt that this active, victorious prince would, as ſoon as his affairs were ſettled in France, either attempt to recover his hereditary kingdom, or endeavour to procure a compenſation for it, by invading the Spaniſh dominions in the Netherlands.

MOVED by theſe conſiderations, Philip reſolved to continue his hoſtilities, and, by joining his forces with thoſe of the duke of Mayenne, to make himſelf maſter of as many towns as poſſible on the eaſtern frontier of France.

Siege of La Capelle.

THIS reſolution he communicated to the archduke Erneſt; who, agreeably to his inſtructions, ſent count Charles of Manſveldt early in the ſpring to invade the province of Picardy, with an army of between eleven and twelve thouſand men. The count laid ſiege to the town of La Capelle; and as he attacked it unexpectedly, he ſoon obliged the garriſon to

9th May. capitulate.

THE

1594. Siege of Laon.

THE King had ſet out from Paris as ſoon as he received intelligence of the ſiege, but could not arrive in time to prevent the ſurrender. Having been joined on his march by the dukes De Nevers and Bouillon, and finding himſelf at the head of a conſiderable army [d], he reſolved to undertake ſome important enterpriſe, by which he might be compenſated for the loſs of La Capelle. One of the moſt conſiderable towns in that part of the kingdom was Laon, a place of great extent, ſtrongly fortified, and well provided with every thing neceſſary to ſuſtain a ſiege. The garriſon, which was numerous, was commanded by De Bourg, one of the braveſt officers of the League; and there was at that time in the town, beſides a great number of other nobility, the count of Somerive, the duke de Mayenne's ſecond ſon. Theſe conſiderations, far from diſcouraging the King from beſieging Laon, were the motives which determined him to inveſt it, and he carried on his operations againſt it with his uſual activity and vigilance.

THE beſieged gave him all the annoyance and interruption in their power; and in ſome ſallies which they made, before he had time to cover his troops, he loſt more than four hundred men. But his anxiety with regard to

[d] Twelve thouſand foot, and two thouſand horſe.

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the iſſue of this enterpriſe, aroſe principally from the neighbourhood of the Spaniſh army, which was joined at this time by the duke de Mayenne, whom Philip, in order to prevent him from entering into an accommodation with the King, had entruſted with the chief command.

Mayenne attempts in vain to raiſe the ſiege.

VARIOUS motives concurred on this occaſion to determine Mayenne to exert himſelf with vigour. There was much need of ſome ſplendid inſtance of ſucceſs to ſupport the drooping ſpirits of his party. Laon was the moſt conſiderable town which remained in his poſſeſſion; and, beſides his ſon, and many of his faithful adherents, he had left his moſt valuable effects in it, as in a place where there was little danger of their falling into the hands of the enemy. He loſt no time in marching to its relief. His army conſiſted of nearly the ſame number as that of the King; but being inferior in cavalry, he found it neceſſary to approach the town on that ſide, on which there lay a wood or foreſt, where the enemy's horſe could not be eaſily employed. Henry had penetrated into his deſign, and taken poſſeſſion of the wood with a part of his troops. Mayenne at firſt obliged them to retire; but the royaliſts, having immediately received a reinforcement from the camp, returned to the charge, and ſtood their ground

ground for ſome time with great bravery againſt the Spaniſh veterans. They would have been compelled however to give way a ſecond time, if the royal cavalry, which had advanced to their relief, under the baron[e], now marſhal de Biron, had not, conformably to their valiant leader's example and command, diſmounted from their horſes, and thrown themſelves into the front of the battle. The King himſelf ſoon after came up with the greateſt part of his army; and, if the ground had permitted it, a general engagement would have enſued; but it allowed only of ſkirmiſhes, which continued with various ſucceſs till the evening; when Mayenne, dreading that the King might ſend his cavalry to attack his rear, drew off his forces to a little diſtance from the wood.

ALTHOUGH the nature of the ground in this rencounter prevented the King from availing himſelf of the ſuperiority of his cavalry; yet this ſuperiority proved afterwards of the greateſt uſe. Mayenne being obliged to bring his proviſions through an open country from places at the diſtance of ſeveral miles, the King ſent out his horſe in numerous bodies to intercept his convoys; and, although the Duke attempted to bring them under a ſtrong guard in the night,

[e] His father had been lately killed at the ſiege of Epernay.

ſometimes

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ſometimes from one place, and ſometimes from another; yet ſuch was the vigilance of the duke de Longueville, and the marſhal de Biron, to whom the King gave the charge of intercepting them, that almoſt none of them were ſuffered to eſcape. Theſe bold adventurous leaders were continually in motion. No guards which Mayenne could ſpare were able to withſtand their vigorous attack, and his army was at laſt reduced to ſo great diſtreſs, as made it neceſſary for him to decamp. He was ſenſible how difficult he muſt find it to retire in the face of a ſuperior army; but if he remained any longer in his preſent ſituation, his troops, he perceived, muſt either periſh for want, or lay down their arms.

His maſterly retreat.

THE Duke had hitherto been unfortunate in his enterpriſes, and his misfortunes had contributed to obſcure his fame; but, on this occaſion he gave a conſpicuous proof of conſummate military ſkill, as well as of the moſt unqueſtionable perſonal courage and reſolution. His troops, drawn up in the moſt maſterly manner, were every where ſo well prepared to receive the enemy, that the King, who attacked him with his cavalry, as ſoon as they began their march, found it utterly impracticable to penetrate their ranks, whilſt Mayenne himſelf marched on foot in the rear, fought on

ſome

ſome occaſions as a common ſoldier, and, by the gracefulneſs of his perſon, added to the fortitude which he diſplayed, commanded univerſal admiration. In this manner he advanced ſlowly, till he reached a narrow defile, where he had planted ſome batteries of cannon; from the dread of which, the King ordered his troops to halt, and ſuffered the Duke to purſue his march to La Fere without any farther moleſtation.

Laon ſurrenders.

HENRY then reſumed his operations before the town. The beſieged, though deprived of all hopes of relief, perſiſted for ſome time in their defence; but at laſt, finding their numbers greatly diminiſhed, they offered to ſurrender, on condition that the garriſon and the count of Somerive ſhould be allowed to march out with the honours of war; and to this condition the King readily conſented, from his deſire of preventing bloodſhed, and ſaving the fortifications of the town. The capitulation was ſigned on the twenty-ſecond of July. The terms of it were religiouſly fulfilled; and Henry, far from diſcovering ill-humour or reſentment for the oppoſition which he had met with, embraced with pleaſure the preſent opportunity of teſtifying his eſteem for the duke de Mayenne, by ſhewing particular marks of reſpect and kindneſs to his ſon.

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1594. Submiſſion of the duke of Guiſe.

So much goodneſs, united with ſo much heroiſm and magnanimity, had charms in the eyes of Henry's enemies that were irreſiſtible. The reduction of Laon, and his generous treatment of the inhabitants and garriſon, were quickly followed by the voluntary ſurrender of Chateau-Thiery, Amiens, and Cambray. The duke of Lorrain, who from the beginning had given his aſſiſtance to the League, choſe now to be at peace with a prince, in whoſe favour fortune, and his own merits, had produced ſo remarkable a revolution. And the duke of Guiſe, whom the Spaniards had tantalized with a glimpſe of royalty, but had afterwards neglected, moved partly by this conſideration, and partly by his admiration of the King, entered into a treaty of reconciliation with him; and having delivered to him the towns of Rheims, Vitry, Rocroix, and ſeveral other places in Champaigne, he was rewarded by Henry with the government of Provence[f].

Siege of Groningen by prince Maurice.

During the courſe of theſe events, ſo adverſe to Philip's views in France, prince Maurice was engaged in the moſt important enterpriſe which he had hitherto undertaken, the ſiege of Groningen. That city, though almoſt

[f] D'Avila, lib. xiv. Thuanus, lib. ci. Meteren, lib. xiii. Bentivoglio, ann. 1594. Sully's Memoirs, lib. vi.

ſurrounded

ſurrounded with the territories of the States, had been preſerved till now in its allegiance to Philip, by Verdugo, a Spaniſh officer of great abilities, with whoſe aſſiſtance the Catholic part of the inhabitants had been able to keep the Proteſtants under ſubjection. Jealous however of their liberty, they had never conſented to admit any Spaniſh garriſon within their walls, but three thouſand of the citizens, trained to the uſe of arms, had been inliſted in the King's ſervice for the defence of the town, while nine hundred of his foreign troops were permitted to take up their quarters in the ſuburbs.

MAURICE had long meditated the reduction of Groningen, not only becauſe it would be of itſelf an acquiſition of great value to the confederacy, but becauſe it was the only place of conſequence in thoſe parts under the Spaniſh dominion, and furniſhed an eaſy entrance to the Spaniards into the northern provinces. Much pains had been taken, and great exertions made by Verdugo for its ſecurity. Many bloody rencounters had paſſed between him and the forces of the States, in which, from the ſmalneſs of his numbers, and not from the want either of bravery or conduct, he was generally unſucceſsful; and Maurice, powerfully

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powerfully seconded in all his operations by his cousin count William of Nassau, had at length reduced Verdugo to the necessity of quitting the province, and had made himself master of almost every pass by which the citizens could receive assistance or supplies.

They had not neglected to inform the archduke of the imminent danger to which they were exposed. At their request, the emperor of Germany had transmitted to Philip a representation, importing, that although they desired nothing so much as to maintain their allegiance, and had preserved it long amidst much greater hardships and difficulties than any of his other subjects had endured, yet if the army were not immediately sent to their assistance, they would soon find it necessary to open their gates to the enemy. Philip, far from disregarding their application, made them the most gracious and flattering reply; and sent orders to the archduke to postpone every other object in the Netherlands to the relief of Groningen. But the greatest part of his forces were at this time engaged in the war in Picardy; and the remainder having mutinied against their officers, on account of their want of pay, refused to obey the governor's commands.

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PRINCE Maurice therefore applied to the profecution of the ſiege, with very little apprehenſion of meeting with any interruption from the Spaniards, although, agreeably to his uſual cautious maxims, he fortified not only his quarters, but likewiſe the ſeveral paſſes which led to them from the ſouthern provinces. By beginning to open his trenches at a diſtance from the town, the ſiege was ſomewhat retarded, but he thereby prevented the loſs of men which would otherwiſe have been ſuſtained. On the third of June his batteries were unmaſked, and ſoon afterwards all the outworks were laid in ruins. The beſieged, alarmed with the rapidity of his progreſs, called the foreign troops, which were quartered in the ſuburbs, to their aſſiſtance. The defence was conducted for ſeveral weeks with the higheſt ſpirit and intrepidity, and much blood was ſpilt. But, Maurice having blown up a ravelin, which was one of the principal defences of the place, the courage of the inhabitants began to fail, and there was nothing to be heard but complaints of the ingratitude of the King, in thus abandoning to their enterpriſing enemy a people ſo diſtinguiſhed for their attachment and fidelity.

THEIR chief magiſtrate, Van Balen, who had long been ſecretly averſe to the Spaniſh government, improved with great dexterity the opportunity

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tunity which their preſent temper afforded him. He ſtudied to confirm them in their ſentiments of the King's ingratitude: he repreſented to them the folly of flattering themſelves with the hopes of relief from a prince, who was more intent upon conquering the dominions of others, than providing for the ſecurity of his own. He painted in ſtrong colours the miſeries which they muſt ſuffer, if either the ſiege were to be prolonged, or the town to be taken by aſſault; and, by expatiating on the advantages which would accrue to them from acceding to the union of Utrecht, he endeavoured to make them ſenſible, that if freedom from a foreign yoke was an object to be deſired, it was infinitely more for their intereſt to ſubmit to the generous enemy, who now beſieged them, than even to be delivered from the ſiege.

THESE exhortations made the deſired impreſſion even upon the minds of thoſe who were moſt attached to the Catholic religion. That attachment had been long their only tie to the Spaniſh government; and it was overcome at this time by their indignation on account of Philip's negligence in providing for their defence, joined to their deſire of participating of that civil liberty, which had proved the ſource of ſo much proſperity and happineſs to the confederated provinces.

A DE-

1594. Groningen united to the confederacy.

A DEPUTATION of the principal inhabitants was ſent to treat of a ſurrender; and the prince, without heſitation, granted them the moſt advantageous terms. The city of Groningen was declared to be henceforth a member of the union of Utrecht. All the exemptions and ancient privileges of the inhabitants were confirmed; the civil government of the place was allowed to remain on the ſame footing as before, and liberty of conſcience was eſtabliſhed, with this reſtriction, that no other religion but the reformed ſhould be publicly exerciſed. The citizens, on the other hand, engaged to acknowledge the ſupreme authority of the States; to ſubmit to the general laws of the union; to contribute their ſhare of the public expences; and to admit ſuch a garriſon into the town as the States ſhould judge neceſſary for its ſecurity. The foreign ſoldiers were permitted to depart with their arms and baggage. The capitulation was ſigned on the 23d of July; and on the ſame day prince Maurice entered the town. He remained in it for ſome time till certain articles of the capitulation were executed, after which, having committed the government to his kinſman, count William of Naſſau, he ſet out for the Hague[g].

[g] Meteren, lib. xvii. Bentivoglio, part iii. lib. i. Grotius, lib. iii.

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1594. Mutiny of the Spaniſh and Italian ſoldiers.

WHILE Philip's power ſuffered ſo great a diminution in the northern provinces, his affairs in Brabant were daily more and more involved in diſorder and confuſion. The archduke had, with the utmoſt difficulty, raiſed money to ſatisfy the Walloon and Spaniſh mutineers; but no ſooner had theſe men returned to their duty, than the Italians, to whom the ſame arrears were due, reſolved to employ the ſame means to effectuate their payment. Many of the officers concurred with the private men in forming this reſolution, and they put it inſtantly in execution, by ſeizing on the town of Sichen, where a part of their number had been ſtationed. They were joined by ſoldiers from all the garriſons in the neighbourhood, who continued flocking to them, till they amounted to two thouſand horſe and foot.

The mutineers protected by Maurice.

NOT ſatisfied with laying the country round the town under contribution, they ſpread themſelves over the province, made excurſions to the very gates of Bruſſels, where the governor reſided, and plundered the people with as much cruelty as if they had been engaged in open war. The governor having tried the power of perſuaſion without effect, reſolved to employ force to reduce them; and for this purpoſe he ſent the Spaniſh troops which he had lately pacified, under Lewis de Velaſco, to beſiege Sichen.

Sichen. In the beginning of this ſedition, prince Maurice had made the mutineers an offer of ſhelter and protection in the territories of the States, and they readily agreed to accept this offer in caſe they ſhould find it neceſſary; but informed him, that they would defend themſelves in Sichen as long as they were able, againſt the Spaniards. They accordingly did ſo, and made ſeveral deſperate ſallies, in which many on both ſides were ſlain. Finding however that the place was too weak to be long defended againſt an enemy ſo much ſuperior in number, they retired under the fortifications of Breda and San Gertrudenberg, where proviſions were ſold to them by the ſubjects of the States. The intention of Maurice in this ſingular treatment of an enemy, was only to prolong the term of their diſobedience. He made no attempt to perſuade them to enter into the ſervice of the confederacy, but gave permiſſion to the archduke to ſend an ambaſſador to treat with them; and when, after a tedious negociation, they had agreed to take up their quarters in Tirlemont, and to remain there till their demands were ſatisfied, without renewing their hoſtilities, Maurice readily allowed them to depart. They required a Spaniſh nobleman to be given as a hoſtage for the fulfilment of the governor's promiſes; and ſo great was the diſorder of the King's finances at this period,

His motive.

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that theſe troops were ſuffered to remain inactive at Tirlemont for near a year before their arrears were paid [h].

Death of Erneſt;

Fuentes named governor.

BEFORE the expiration of this term, the governor was ſeized with a hectic fever, of which he died on the twentieth of February, in the forty-ſecond year of his age. He named the count of Fuentes for his ſucceſſor, and his choice was ſoon after ratified by the King. This nobleman, having been ſent into the Netherlands a little before the death of the duke of Parma, had, agreeably to Philip's inſtructions, during the government of count Manſveldt and the archduke, poſſeſſed a principal ſhare in the adminiſtration. By his advice, or more properly by his authority, count Manſveldt had publiſhed a barbarous edict, commanding all priſoners to be put to death; and ordering the King's troops, who, in their excurſions into the territories of the States, had been ſatisfied, for ſeveral years paſt with levying contributions, henceforth to lay waſte the country with fire and ſword.

THE States, in return, publiſhed a manifeſto, in which they expreſſed their abhorrence of this

[h] Grotius, lib. iii. Meteren, lib. xvii. p. 581. Bentivoglio, part iii. lib. i.

barbarity;

barbarity; but at the ſame time declared, that if the governor did not recal his edict againſt a certain time, they would retaliate the cruelty which it preſcribed upon the troops and ſubjects of the King. This meaſure had been urged by Fuentes, on the pretence of ſhortening the duration of the war, although the experience of his kinſman, the duke of Alva, might have convinced him, that, conſidering the ſtrength to which the confederacy had attained, it would ſerve only to increaſe the calamities of the war, and to render it perpetual. Count Manſveldt came ſoon to be ſenſible, that theſe muſt be the conſequences, and either revoked his edict, or gave orders to prevent it from being carried into execution.

Diſcontent of the Flemiſh nobles.

Fuentes however ſtill continued to exerciſe an unlimited influence in the government. The Flemiſh nobility complained bitterly, as in the time of cardinal Granvelle, of the inſignificance to which they were reduced, and before the death of the archduke they had given ſome ſtriking proofs of their diſcontent. This diſcontent was greatly heightened when the count was appointed governor; they ſaw then how little ſincerity there had been in thoſe ſoothing promiſes which the King had made them ſome years before, when they conſented to the return of the foreign troops. They perceived

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how little truſt and confidence he repoſed in them, and were ſenſible at laſt of the truth of what the prince of Orange had ſo often told them, that, by their agreement with the duke of Parma, they would reduce their country to the miſerable ſtate of a province of Spain. The duke d'Arſchot and count Charles of Manſveldt, who had reaſon to expect to have been preferred before Fuentes, would not ſubmit to the indignity put upon them, but reſigned their employments, and left the Netherlands. The duke d'Arſchot died afterwards in Venice, and count Manſveldt in Hungary, where he commanded the emperor's army againſt the Turks.

Vigorous conduct of Fuentes.

FUENTES in the mean time entered upon the exerciſe of his office, and, notwithſtanding the prejudices which the Flemings ſeem juſtly to have entertained againſt him, he ſoon diſcovered that his abilities were not unequal to the charge with which he was inveſted. He applied with great ſucceſs to quell the mutinous ſpirit of the army, and in a few months put it upon a much more reſpectable footing, both as to diſcipline and numbers.

Declaration of war between France and Spain.

PHILIP had greater occaſion now than ever for abilities and vigour in the perſon to whom he committed the government of the Netherlands.

ſands. The league in France was about to expire, notwithſtanding his exertions to prevent it; and the French monarch, being firmly ſeated on his throne, declared war againſt him, prohibiting all commerce with his ſubjects, and granting liberty to the French to invade and plunder, and take poſſeſſion of whatever dominions belonged to the crown of Spain.

Henry's motives.

THIS meaſure was condemned by many, as being highly inexpedient at the preſent juncture, on account of the exhauſted ſtate to which his kingdom was reduced by the long continuance of the civil wars, and no perſon was more ſenſible of the ſtrength of this objection than the king himſelf; but he believed that, in the preſent temper of the Catholic king, peace could not be obtained from him upon honourable terms. He was perſuaded, that war with the Spaniards muſt of neceſſity continue ſome time longer; and he thought, that as nothing would contribute more to extinguiſh the flames of civil diſcord than a foreign war, it would be eaſier to intereſt his Catholic ſubjects in the proſecution of it, if it were regarded as a war between the crowns, to which political motives had given birth, than if it were ſuffered to remain on its preſent footing, and conſidered as carried on by Philip for the ſake of religion. It is not indeed improbable, that perſonal ani-

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mosity added force to these incitements. Philip had ever treated Henry in the most contemptuous manner; and, under the mask of religion, had endeavoured first to exclude him, and afterwards to expel him from the throne. Henry detested that artifice and duplicity in Philip's character, of which, in his late attempt to procure the abolition of the Salic law, he had given such incontestible evidence; and the terms in which his declaration of war was expressed, demonstrate, that resentment had, on the present occasion, a considerable influence on his conduct.

PHILIP's answer to this declaration was perfectly conformable to his character. All his interferences in the affairs of France had proceeded, he said, from his concern for the prosperity of the people, and the security of the Catholic faith; and he declared, that his intention now was not to enter into war with the crown or nation of France, but only to persevere in protecting the true Catholics of that kingdom from the oppression of the prince of Bearn and his adherents [i].

Prosecution of the war.

BOTH kings had been employed, before their declaration of war, in preparing for the recom-

[i] D'Avila, lib. xiv.

mencement

mencement of hoſtilities; and Henry, beſides his domeſtic preparations, had entered into a treaty of alliance offenſive and defenſive with the United Provinces. Agreeably to an article of this treaty, the States ſent a body of horſe and foot, under Philip, count of Naſſau, to invade the province of Luxemburg. Their enterpriſes were for ſome time attended with ſucceſs; but Fuentes, having diſpatched the brave Verdugo with ſuperior forces to oppoſe them, they were obliged, after ſeveral rencounters, to quit the province; and were ſoon after recalled, and ſtationed near the frontier of Brabant, where it was expected they would be of equal ſervice to the French monarch, by detaining the Spaniards in the Netherlands.

Siege of Catelet.

THE army of the States, however, even after it was joined by theſe troops, was not able to furniſh full employment to thoſe which the governor had prepared. He left an army under Mondragone to check the progreſs of prince Maurice, and ſet out himſelf for Picardy with the reſt of his forces. His firſt enterpriſe was the ſiege of Catelet, of which he made himſelf maſter in a few weeks, though it was ſtrongly fortified, and bravely defended by the garriſon.

Affairs of Gomeron and d'Orvilliers.

DURING this ſiege, Fuentes had reaſon to flatter himſelf with the hopes of acquiring poſ-

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ſeſſion of the caſtle and town of Ham without bloodſhed. The caſtle was held by an officer called d'Orvilliers, and the town by his half-brother, whoſe name was Gomeron. Theſe two men had been violent partizans of the league, and the latter reſolved to deliver the town to the Spaniards rather than to the king of France, but he demanded from Fuentes a reward of twenty thouſand crowns for the town, and a ſtill higher reward, if he ſhould prevail upon his brother (which he engaged to do) to deliver up the caſtle. The count readily agreed to theſe terms, and paid him the twenty thouſand crowns upon his admitting a thouſand Spaniſh troops into the town; but required Gomeron himſelf and his two younger brothers to remain with him as hoſtages, till the caſtle likewiſe ſhould be put into his poſſeſſion. To this Gomeron conſented, from a fond perſuaſion that his brother would imitate his example, rather than expoſe *him* and his other brothers to the reſentment of the Spaniards, eſpecially as their mother was in the caſtle, whoſe intreaties he expected d'Orvilliers would be unable to reſiſt. But d'Orvilliers choſe rather to abandon his brothers to their fate, than betray his charge to the enemies of his country; and he admitted the duke de Bouillon into the caſtle, with a numerous body of the King's troops, who attacked the Spaniards

niards in the town, and either put them to the ſword or took them priſoners. The mother of Gomeron, now trembling with anxiety for her children's preſervation, came to Fuentes, and repreſented, that d'Orvilliers repented of what he had done, and was willing to deliver the caſtle to him, if he would come himſelf with his army to receive it. The count, believing her repreſentation to be true, the more readily as ſhe herſelf ſeemed entirely convinced of the truth of it, advanced with his forces towards Ham; but finding that the mother had been deceived, and that, in order to avoid her importunity, d'Orvilliers had left the place, and reſigned his government to another, he was inflamed with rage, and put Gomeron to death in preſence of the army. This unhappy man did not perhaps deſerve ſo ſevere a puniſhment from the hands of Fuentes; but it was due to the treachery and egregious folly into which his avarice had betrayed him[k].

Siege of Dourlens.

FROM Ham the count conducted his troops, after they had reſted ſome days, to lay ſiege to Dourlens. This town being near the frontier of the Netherlands, was ſtrongly fortified and garriſoned by a conſiderable number of ſelect troops. Still however it was neceſſary, in or-

[k] Bentivoglio, part iii. lib. ii.

der

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der to prevent it from falling into the enemy's hands, that the garriſon ſhould be augmented: and no ſooner had the marſhals Bouillon and Villars, whom the King had ſent to watch the motions of the Spaniſh army, heard that Dourlens was inveſted, than they aſſembled all the troops in the neighbourhood, amounting to a thouſand foot and fifteen hundred horſe, and advanced towards the town, in hopes of being able to force their way through the enemy's entrenchments; but Fuentes having received intelligence of their deſign, left a part of his forces to guard his trenches, and marched out with the reſt, in order of battle, to an advantageous ſituation at a little diſtance from the town. When the duke of Bouillon obſerved Fuentes ſo well prepared for his defence, he counſelled marſhal Villars to retire; but that intrepid general, whoſe courage was ever too ardent and impetuous, refuſed to comply, and ſtill continued to advance, till his troops were almoſt ſurrounded by the Spaniards. A deſperate and bloody battle enſued; in which, from their great inferiority in reſpect of number, the French were almoſt entirely cut to pieces, Villars himſelf was ſlain, and the cavalry, after great loſs, were obliged to retire.

DURING the combat, the garriſon ſallied out upon the troops which had been left to defend the

the camp and trenches; but through the wiſe precaution which had been taken, the Spaniards proved victorious; and Fuentes reſumed, with freſh ſpirit and vigour, the operations of the ſiege. Among the beſieged there were more than three hundred gentlemen, who inſpired the garriſon with the ſame generous ſpirit by which they themſelves were actuated, and defended the town ſeveral days with extraordinary courage and reſolution. But their ſkill and conduct were not equal to the bravery which they diſplayed. In an aſſault on the thirty-firſt of July they were overpowered by the aſſailants, and almoſt the whole garriſon, amounting to more than a thouſand men, with their governor the count of Dinan, were put to the ſword. 1595.

Siege of Cambray.

FUENTES, emboldened by his ſucceſs, reſolved next to lay ſiege to Cambray; the reduction of which was the principal object of his preſent expedition.

THIS important city had been wreſted from the Spaniards, as is above related, by the duke of Anjou; and Anjou had bequeathed it to his mother Catharine of Medicis, by whom a French gentleman of the name of Balagny had been appointed governor both of the town and citadel. Balagny, taking advantage of the troubles

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troubles in France, had for ſeveral years acknowledged no ſuperior; and as he had ſtudied to maintain ſome degree of neutrality between the contending parties, he had been ſuffered to act as ſovereign both of the city and its territory. But apprehending, after the diſcomfiture of the League, that it was neceſſary for him to make a choice either of the king of France or Spain for his protector, he agreed to acknowledge his dependence on the French monarch, on condition, that he ſhould be permitted to enjoy under him poſſeſſion of the ſovereignty, with the title of the prince of Cambray; and to theſe terms Henry the more readily conſented, as he dreaded that, if he rejected them, they would be granted by the king of Spain.

Balagny, being thus confirmed in his poſſeſſion, ſpared no expence or pains in ſtrengthening the fortifications of the place. The garriſon amounted to three thouſand foot and ſix hundred horſe, the greateſt part of which were French troops of the moſt unqueſtionable bravery. The town was ſtrong, and it was well furniſhed with military ſtores and proviſions.

Determined by theſe conſiderations, ſome of the principal officers in the Spaniſh army

endeavoured to perſuade the count de Fuentes to relinquiſh his deſign, by repreſenting, that before he could accompliſh it, either the winter ſeaſon would overtake him, or the French monarch, being diſengaged from his enemies in other quarters, would arrive with a ſuperior army, and attack him after his troops were diminiſhing in number, and exhauſted with the operations of the ſiege; but Fuentes, ambitious to diſtinguiſh his adminiſtration by ſo important an acquiſition, and elated by the ſucceſs with which his enterpriſes had been hitherto attended, refuſed to liſten to theſe remonſtrances; and, having received a great augmentation of forces from the neighbouring provinces, he began his operations without delay. They were carried on with a degree of ſkill and vigour which would have reflected honour on the greateſt generals of the age; and notwithſtanding the moſt intrepid defence, conducted with much prudence by the celebrated de Vic, whom Henry had ſent with a reinforcement of troops to the aſſiſtance of the beſieged, the count opened his batteries in a few weeks ſo near the town, that ſome of its principal defences were deſtroyed, and a great part of the wall was laid in ruins. Still however his ſucceſs was doubtful. He encountered the moſt diſcouraging difficulties in furniſhing his troops with proviſions; and nothing but the

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the moſt unconquerable reſolution, added to the dread of tarniſhing the glory which he had already acquired, could have prevented him from abandoning his attempt.

Cambray given up by the citizens.

But he was ſaved from that mortification, by the inhabitants of the town, who having been long accuſtomed to the mild adminiſtration of their archbiſhops, had borne with extreme impatience the haughty imperious behaviour of Balagny; and had been almoſt reduced to deſpair, by the extortion, rapine, and inſolence of his wife, by whom he ſuffered himſelf to be entirely governed. The citizens had ſecretly ſent a deputation of their number to the French monarch, intreating him to deliver them from the yoke of their oppreſſor, and offering on that condition to ſubmit to his authority, and to receive a garriſon of his troops. But through the influence of the famous Gabrielle d'Etrées, whom Balagny had gained over to his intereſt, Henry not only refuſed to comply with their requeſt, but confirmed Balagny in his uſurped authority.

The inhabitants, inflamed now with reſentment againſt the King, as well as againſt Balagny, reſolved to embrace the firſt opportunity of putting themſelves under the dominion of their former maſter the king of Spain; and they

they were confirmed in their reſolution, by the numerous eccleſiaſtics in the town, who hoped by this meaſure to effectuate the re-eſtabliſhment of the archbiſhop, whom Balagny had expelled. Having formed their plan, they delayed the execution of it, till Balagny and De Vic were wholly occupied in taking meaſures againſt an aſſault, which they believed to be intended by the Spaniards. At that time they ran to arms, and made themſelves maſters of one of the gates of the city. De Vic, Balagny, and his wife, ſpared no pains to divert them from their purpoſe, but all their endeavours proved ineffectual. Two of the principal citizens were immediately ſent to Fuentes, with an offer to ſurrender the town on the following conditions, to which he readily agreed: That the ſoldiers ſhould be reſtrained from plunder: That all paſt offences ſhould be forgiven: That the citizens ſhould enjoy their wonted privileges, and the archbiſhop be reſtored to his ancient juriſdiction and authority.

The garriſon immediately retired into the citadel, where they expected to have been able to defend themſelves for a conſiderable time. But having found, upon ſearching the magazines, that there was hardly proviſions enough to ſupport them for three days, they agreed on the firſt ſummons to capitulate. The wife of

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Balagny had reduced them to this neceſſity, by ſelling, at an exorbitant price, without her huſband's knowledge, the proviſions which had been laid up in ſtore.

During the ſiege, this woman had diſcovered a degree of ſpirit, capacity, and courage, above her ſex; but being unable to bear the conſciouſneſs of that egregious folly into which her avarice had betrayed her, and which was now attended with conſequences ſo fatal to her ambition, ſhe was overwhelmed with anguiſh and deſpair; and refuſing to take either medicine or food, ſhe died miſerably, before the citadel was delivered to the Spaniards.

The capitulation was ſigned on the ſeventh of October, and the garriſon marched out with all the honours of war upon the ninth; immediately after which, Fuentes having ſtationed five hundred Spaniards in the citadel, and two thouſand Germans in the town, ſet out for the Netherlands with the reſt of his forces, and put them into winter-quarters in Flanders, Artois, and Hainault[1].

Affairs in Burgundy.

The reader will not ſuppoſe that the active ſpirit of the French monarch could be unemployed

[1] D'Avila, lib. xv. Bentivoglio, part iii. lib. ii.

during

during the courſe of theſe diſaſtrous events. He was deeply affected by the loſs of the important towns which had been conquered by Fuentes, and would have marched in perſon to their relief, had he not believed that his preſence was ſtill more neceſſary in another part of his dominions. For Philip having reſolved to proſecute the war with vigour in different quarters at the ſame time, had ordered Velaſco, the conſtable of Caſtile and governor of Milan, to lead an army of ten thouſand men into Burgundy; and theſe troops were, upon their arrival in Franche Compté, joined by the duke de Mayenne with a thouſand foot and four hundred horſe. This army was greatly ſuperior to any which marſhal Biron, who commanded in theſe parts, could aſſemble to oppoſe it; and Henry dreaded that the province of Burgundy would be ſpeedily over-run. Having therefore ſent orders to his troops in different parts to follow him, he ſet out himſelf at the head of one thouſand eight hundred horſe and foot, with an intention to haraſs the enemy, till the reſt of his army ſhould arrive.

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Battle of Fontaine-Françoiſe.

THE Spaniards had paſſed the Saone, and advanced as far as Fontaine-Françoiſe, when Henry attacked them on their march, with a degree of impetuoſity and ardor that filled Velaſco with aſtoniſhment. The King was bravely

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ſupported on this occaſion by the marquis de Mirebeau, the count de Gramont, and ſeveral others of his nobility; but above all, by the intrepid Biron, who fought long after he was covered with the blood that flowed from a wound which he had received in the beginning of the engagement. The King, by his exhortations, and ſtill more by his example, inflamed his troops to a degree of madneſs. At the head of his ſquadrons, he plunged ſword in hand into the midſt of the enemy, broke through their ranks, and threw their van into confuſion.

HAD Velaſco ordered his whole army to advance, it is impoſſible but Henry muſt have been ſurrounded and overpowered. But his courage on this occaſion ſupplied the want both of caution and of numbers. Velaſco, intimidated by the unexampled boldneſs which he had ſeen diſplayed, gave orders for a retreat, and left the King in poſſeſſion of the field of battle. Early next morning he repaſſed the Saone, notwithſtanding the earneſt remonſtrances of the duke de Mayenne, who had procured certain intelligence of the ſtrength of the enemy. Mayenne then intreated Velaſco to leave him a part of the forces to raiſe the ſiege of Dijon, which had been inveſted by a party of the royaliſts, and to enable him to de-

fend ſuch other towns on this ſide of the river as were ſtill in his poſſeſſion. But this likewiſe the Spaniſh general refuſed, and continued to retire till he reached the town of Gray; where he fortified his camp in the ſtrongeſt manner, with a reſolution to act only on the defenſive, in caſe the royal army ſhould advance.

Reconcilement of Mayenne with the King.

VELASCO, who was utterly unpractiſed in the military art, appears to have been ſtrongly actuated with a dread of the ſuperior ſkill and bravery of the King. But the duke de Mayenne likewiſe perceived, in his conduct towards *him*, on this occaſion, manifeſt ſymptoms of diffidence and diſtruſt. This the Duke could not help attributing to Velaſco's inſtructions from the court of Spain; and he could not doubt, that through the ill offices of the Spaniſh miniſters in France, Philip had conceived ſome freſh jealouſy of his deſigns. He was therefore thrown into great perplexity, while he believed that he ſhould ere long be abandoned by the Spaniards, as he had already been by moſt of his adherents in France; and could hardly ſuppoſe that now, when his power was reduced ſo low, he would be able to obtain advantageous conditions from the King. After long deliberation, he formed the reſolution of going to Madrid, to juſtify his con-

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duct to Philip againſt the miſrepreſentations of his miniſters. But he was ſaved from that fatal ſtep, by the invincible goodneſs of the French monarch, who, having been informed of his diſtreſs, ſent Lignerac, a friend and confident of the Duke, to aſſure him of his eſteem, and to inform him, that he was ſtill ready to receive him into favour, and to grant him the moſt honourable terms.

Henry did not require an immediate ſubmiſſion from him, becauſe the Duke had often declared, that he would never acknowledge his authority till the Pope ſhould grant him abſolution; but he deſired that he ſhould retire to Chalons, one of his own towns, and wait there for that event, in full confidence that no advantage ſhould be taken in the mean time, either of himſelf or his adherents.

Mayenne, who knew with how much ſafety he might rely on Henry's promiſe, and was deeply penetrated with a ſenſe of the generous offer which had been made to him, accepted of it without heſitation, and left the Spaniſh camp.

Soon after this agreement, Henry advanced to the banks of the Saone, with a reſolution to tranſport his forces, conſiſting of ſeven thouſand foot and two thouſand horſe, into Franche Compté,

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Compté, where Velaſco lay intrenched. In ſpite of the troops which had been planted to diſpute his paſſage, he forded the river about three miles below the town of Gray, and then led his army towards the enemy; but finding their intrenchments too ſtrongly fortified to be attacked with any probability of ſucceſs, he turned aſide, and began to lay waſte the country, or to levy contributions from the inhabitants. Velaſco remained ſtill within his camp. At length the Swiſs Cantons, as friends and protectors of the people of Franche Compté, interpoſed their influence. At their deſire, the King readily deſiſted from his depredations; and having led back his troops into his own dominions, he reſolved to march as ſoon as poſſible, to the frontiers of the Netherlands.

The pope grants Henry abſolution.

He was in daily expectation, at this time, of receiving the Pope's abſolution, which had been much longer delayed than he expected, through the violent oppoſition of the Spaniſh miniſters at Rome; but Clement, now perceiving that Henry was firmly eſtabliſhed on the throne, and dreading that by a longer delay he might exhauſt his patience, and provoke him to throw off his allegiance to the Holy See, reſolved to run the riſk of giving offence to Philip, and on the 16th of September pronounced the ſentence of abſolution. This

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event gave inexpreſſible joy to all the true Catholics of France; and the treaty of agreement which had been begun with the duke de Mayenne, was ſoon after brought to the deſired concluſion. Such other members of the League as had not already ſubmitted, imitated the example of their leader. Internal peace was every where eſtabliſhed, and Henry had leiſure to apply his whole attention to the Spaniſh war [m].

Affairs of the Netherlands.

THE tranſactions in the Netherlands this year were leſs important and intereſting than in any former campaign ſince the commencement of the war, which was principally owing to the governor's prudent choice of the vigilant, experienced Mondragone, as commander in chief of the forces during his abſence. About the middle of July, prince Maurice beſieged the town of Groll; but Mondragone, having augmented his army, by making draughts from the garriſons of the neighbouring towns, advanced towards him with ſo much celerity, that not having had time to complete his entrenchments, Maurice was obliged to raiſe the ſiege. The two armies lay long in ſight of

[m] D'Avila, lib. xiv. Thuanus, anno 1595. Perefixe Elzevir, p. 230, &c.

each

each other; and as they were nearly equal in ſtrength, and both generals exerted an equal degree of vigilance and circumſpection, they effectually prevented one another from undertaking any important enterpriſe.

THERE were frequent ſkirmiſhes with various ſucceſs; but the only one which deſerves to be mentioned was a rencounter near the river Lippe, where Maurice ordered count Philip de Naſſau, with five hundred horſe, to lie in ambuſh in a wood, to intercept a party of the enemy which had been ſent out for proviſions. Of this Mondragone had received intelligence, and with great ſecrecy ſtationed a body of horſe ſtill more numerous in another wood, at a little diſtance from the firſt. When the Spaniſh foragers arrived at the ambuſcade, they were attacked on every ſide, and repulſed with conſiderable ſlaughter; but being ſpeedily reinforced by their friends in the neighbouring woods, they returned to the charge. The Dutch troops, aſtoniſhed to find themſelves caught in their own ſnare, were at laſt overpowered by numbers; three hundred of them, with their commander, were killed, and the reſt obliged to ſave themſelves by flight.

Death of Mondragone.

THIS was the laſt memorable event of the campaign, although the two generals remained in

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in ſight of each other till the end of October, when they broke up their camps, and put their troops into winter-quarters; and Mondragone died not long after at the age of ninety-two, having to the laſt preſerved ſufficient vigour to fulfil, with diſtinguiſhed reputation, all the duties of a commander. He had ſerved in the Netherlands near fifty years, and had a principal ſhare in almoſt every military enterpriſe, yet he had the ſingular fortune to eſcape without a wound [n].

[n] Grotius, lib. iv. Bentivoglio, part iii. lib. ii.

During the courſe of the tranſactions recorded in this book, the Dutch performed their firſt expedition to India; but as their acquiſitions at this time were inconſiderable, and their moſt important conqueſts over Philip's ſubjects in that diſtant region were not atchieved till ſeveral years after the preſent period, I have reſerved the relation of the whole for the hiſtory of the ſubſequent reign.

THE

HISTORY

OF THE REIGN OF

PHILIP THE SECOND,

KING OF SPAIN.

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FROM the capacity and vigour of which the count de Fuentes had given ſo many proofs ſince his acceſſion to the government, there was reaſon to expect, that he would have been ſuffered long to retain poſſeſſion of it; but Philip, having from the beginning intended that he ſhould continue governor only for one year, had immediately after the death of Erneſt fixed upon the cardinal archduke Albert for his ſucceſſor.

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1595. The archduke Albert governor of the Netherlands.

THIS prince, nephew to Philip, and youngeſt brother to the Emperor, had been intruſted with the regency of Portugal. By his prudent adminiſtration he had acquired univerſal eſteem; and

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and Philip, who entertained the higheſt opinion of his abilities, believed that no perſon was better qualified either to proſecute the war with vigour, or by an acommodation to bring it to the deſired concluſion.

He arrived at Bruſſels about the middle of February, one thouſand five hundred and ninety-ſix, having brought with him a reinforcement of Italian and Spaniſh troops, and which was of ſtill greater utility, a ſum of money, amounting to fifteen hundred thouſand crowns [a].

The

[a] Albert likewiſe brought with him, at this time, Philip, eldeſt ſon of the late prince of Orange, who, as above related, had been ſeized by the duke of Alva, and ſent to Spain, where he had been educated in the Catholic religion, and detained for almoſt thirty years. By ſetting him at liberty on this occaſion, it is not improbable that the court of Spain expected to have created ſome diviſion between the prince, and his brother Maurice, that might have proved prejudicial to the United Provinces. But Maurice readily yielded to him all that he poſſeſſed of their father's fortune; and the States, perceiving that the Archduke, beſides reſtoring to him his lands in Brabant and Burgundy, treated him with much eſteem and confidence, refuſed to grant him permiſſion to fix his reſidence within their territories, or even to viſit his kinſmen there, till the year 1608, a ſhort time before the concluſion of the truce with Spain.

He married Eleanor of Bourbon, a daughter of the prince of Condé; by the intereſt of whoſe friends, he recovered poſſeſſion of the principality of Orange, in the kingdom of France. He lived on amicable terms with his relations in the

THE count de Fuentes, unwilling to act in a ſubordinate ſtation, in a country where he had enjoyed the chief command, reſigned the government to the archduke, and ſet out for Spain.

Siege of La Fere.

ALBERT immediately applied himſelf to make the preparations neceſſary for a new campaign; and conformably to his inſtructions from Philip, he turned his principal attention to the war with France. His firſt object was the relief of La Fere in Picardy, which had remained in the hands of the Spaniſh ever ſince it was delivered by the League to the duke of Parma.

TOWARDS the end of the preceding year, it had been inveſted by the French monarch; but as it was ſtrongly fortified, and the garriſon conſiſted of choſen troops, commanded by Alvaro Oſorio, a Spaniſh officer of diſtinguiſhed reputation, Henry was ſatisfied with blocking it up ſo as to prevent the entrance of ſupplies. This he accompliſhed with little difficulty. The blockade had laſted for ſeveral weeks, and Oſorio had conveyed intelligence to the archduke, that if he was not ſpeedily relieved, the

the Netherlands, but being ſincere in his profeſſion of the Catholic religion, he ſeems not to have entertained any reſentment for the injurious treatment he had received from the king of Spain: nor does he appear to have poſſeſſed any ſhare of that bold and enterpriſing genius, by which his brothers were ſo eminently diſtinguiſhed. He died without iſſue at Bruſſels, in the year 1618. Du Maurier.

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want of proviſions would render it impoſſible for him to hold out for any conſiderable time. The Spaniſh army was aſſembled at Valenciennes, and almoſt ready to begin its march; but the more the governor and his council of war reflected on the difficulties which muſt attend the attempting to raiſe the ſiege, by marching directly to La Fere, the more inſurmountable they appeared. For they could not, it was obſerved, approach to that town, without leaving behind them St. Quintin, Ham, Guiſe, Peronne, and ſeveral other fortified places, the garriſons of which would haraſs them on their march, break up the roads, and intercept their convoys of proviſions. An impaſſable marſh rendered the town inacceſſible on every ſide, except where the French monarch had ſtrongly fortified his intrenchments. Even if they ſhould come in ſight of the town, yet, before they could enter it, they muſt either attack the enemy within their camp, or engage with their whole army in the open field. They could not attack them in their camp, without expoſing themſelves to almoſt certain ruin; Henry would not give them an opportunity of fighting in the field, unleſs his army, which was increaſing daily, were ſuperior to theirs, and the conſequences of a defeat would prove fatal not only to the army, but to all the Spaniſh conqueſts in France, and perhaps too to the King's authority in the Netherlands.

DETER-

DETERMINED by theſe conſiderations, the archduke formed the reſolution of beſieging ſome other frontier town of ſufficient importance to induce Henry either to raiſe the ſiege of La Fere, or compenſate for the loſs of that place, in caſe it ſhould be obliged to capitulate.

Siege of Calais.

HE heſitated for ſome time whether he ſhould lead his army againſt St. Quintin or Peronne; but he ſoon laid aſide the thoughts of attacking either of theſe places, and reſolved to undertake the reduction of Calais, which he believed would be an eaſier, as well as a much more important acquiſition.

The Sieur de Rône.

THIS enterpriſe was ſuggeſted to the governor by the Sieur de Rône, a native of France, and formerly a violent partiſan of the League, who had entered into the ſervice of Spain againſt his King and country. He was a man of a dark intriguing ſpirit, whom no tie could bind but intereſt; but he was bold and active, ſagacious and penetrating, and eminently diſtinguiſhed for his ſkill in the art of war. He had received intelligence that Calais, like many other towns in the kingdom, had been much neglected during the civil war; that although the King had ordered the fortifications of it to be examined, yet his other occupations had not allowed

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1596. lowed him to beſtow that attention on it which its importance deſerved; and that, as ſome of the works were ruinous, ſo the garriſon was too ſmall to defend a place of ſo great extent. For theſe reaſons, the governor approved highly of De Rône's propoſal, and he committed the execution of it to himſelf.

In order to prevent the enemy from ſuſpecting what was intended, it was communicated only to two or three of the principal officers; and the archduke gave out that his deſign was to relieve La Fere. He accordingly began his march towards that place, while De Rône turned ſuddenly to Calais with a body of ſelect troops, and attacked the fort and bridge of Nieulai, which commands the entrance to the town by land. He made himſelf maſter of it with very little difficulty, and then proceeded to attack the fort of Riſbane, which ſtands at the mouth of the harbour, and was of the greateſt importance for the preſervation of the place. The garriſon of this fort made a more vigorous reſiſtance than that of Nieulai; but no ſooner had De Rône opened a battery againſt them, by which only a few were killed, than they were ſeized with a ſudden panic, and offered to capitulate. This rapid progreſs exceeded De Rône's moſt ſanguine expectations, and it gave him the greater joy, as not long after the Riſ-

bane

bane had ſurrendered, ſome ſhips with troops for the reinforcement of the garriſon, which had arrived from Boulogne, finding the entrance to the harbour in his poſſeſſion, were obliged to return. 1596.

THE archduke, who was in the neighbourhood of Valenciennes, when he received intelligence of this fortunate commencement of his enterpriſe, ſet out immediately with his whole army for Calais, and pitched his camp in ſuch a ſituation as he hoped would prevent the approach of the enemy.

HE firſt attacked the ſuburbs, and took them by aſſault; nor did he encounter greater difficulty in making himſelf maſter of the town. His cannon had hardly begun to play upon it, when Vidoſſan, the governor, retired with the garriſon into the caſtle; and quickly deſpairing of being able to defend himſelf in it, any better than he had done in the town, he offered to give it up in ſix days, if he was not relieved before the expiration of that time. The archduke, in order to ſave his troops and the fortifications of the place, readily agreed to this propoſal, never doubting that he was fully able to prevent the entrance of any reinforcement either by ſea or land.

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THE King, in the mean time, heard with much anxiety of the progreſs of the Spaniſh arms. But the blockade of La Fere having continued for ſeveral months, he expected that the garriſon muſt be reduced in a few days to the neceſſity of capitulating; and he thought it probable that, after finiſhing his preſent enterpriſe (which he could not abandon without loſing all the expence and labour which he had beſtowed upon it), he would arrive in time to raiſe the ſiege of Calais. He went himſelf however with a part of his cavalry to Boulogne, that he might be ready to adminiſter ſuch aſſiſtance to the garriſon of Calais, as might enable them to hold out till his whole army ſhould be at liberty to advance to their relief.

Henry attempts in vain to raiſe the ſiege.

UPON his arrival in Boulogne, he was informed of the capitulation above mentioned. He lamented bitterly that he had not brought with him a greater proportion of his troops; but finding it neceſſary to make ſome exertion without delay, he prevailed on Campagnol, the governor of Boulogne, with three hundred choſen men, to attempt to force his way in the night through the Spaniſh lines.

THIS arduous undertaking was executed without the loſs of a ſingle man; and Campagnol had no ſooner arrived in the caſtle, than

than having read the King's orders to the garriſon, he required them all to ſwear that they would defend the fortreſs to the laſt.

In the evening of the ſixth day of the truce, they were ſummoned to fulfil their engagement; when they replied that they had received the reinforcement which they expected. But it ſoon appeared how unequal they were to the defence of ſo weak a place, againſt ſo numerous an enemy.

Early next morning De Rone began to play off his batteries, and in a few hours a great part of the wall was laid in ruins.

Calais taken by ſtorm.

An Italian regiment, through whoſe negligence Campagnol had got into the fort, was ordered to advance to the aſſault, and was followed by the Walloons and Spaniards. The garriſon received them in the breach with undaunted courage, and, after an obſtinate engagement, in which great numbers fell on both ſides, compelled them to retire. But the Italians returned immediately to the charge; and at laſt, through the great ſuperiority of their numbers, they overpowered the garriſon, entered along with them into the fort, and put all of them to the ſword, except Campagnol, and a few others, who took refuge in the church,

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1596. and afterwards ſurrendered at diſcretion. In this manner did Calais fall into the hands of the Spaniards in leſs than three weeks after De Rone had begun the ſiege. The King left Boulogne, after having taken precautions for the preſervation of that place, and returned to La Fere. And the archduke, after ſtaying eight or ten days in Calais to repair the fortifications, led his troops againſt the town of Ardres.

Siege of Ardres.

THE garriſon of Ardres conſiſted of two thouſand five hundred men, commanded by the marquis of Belin, the lieutenant-governor of the province, and by the ſieur de Annebourg, governor of the town, an officer of diſtinguiſhed courage and capacity. By frequent vigorous ſallies, the operations of the beſiegers were greatly retarded. At length, however, they took the ſuburbs by aſſault, and De Rone began to batter the walls of the town. But conſidering the ſtrength of the place, and the number and bravery of the garriſon, he had little reaſon to hope for ſucceſs before the concluſion of the ſiege of La Fere; when there was no room to doubt that the King would advance without loſs of time to the relief of Ardres.

NOTWITHSTANDING this encouraging circumſtance, the marquis de Belin called a coun-

cil

cil of war, and urged with great earneſtneſs the neceſſity of capitulating; alleging that it was impoſſible to hold out till the King's arrival, and that the ſooner they ſubmitted, they would the more eaſily obtain advantageous terms. This propoſal was rejected with great diſdain by the ſieur de Annebourg, and all the officers in the council. But the cowardly Belin, availing himſelf of that ſuperior authority with which he was inveſted as lieutenant-governor of the province, capitulated, notwithſtanding their remonſtrances, on a condition to which the archduke readily agreed, that the garriſon ſhould march out with the honours of war. La Fere having ſurrendered on the day immediately preceding, the King had already ſet out for Ardres, and as his army had of late received a conſiderable augmentation, he entertained the moſt ſanguine hopes of being able to raiſe the ſiege. When a meſſenger informed him of the ſurrender, he was inflamed with indignation, and ordered Belin to be tried for his life. At the importunity of his friends, he afterwards ſtopped the proſecution; but he baniſhed him from court, and deprived him of his office of lieutenant-governor of the province [b],

[b] D'Avila, lib. xv. Bentivoglio, &c. Thuanus, p. 116. lib. viii.

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1596. Albert returns to the Netherlands.

HENRY was now in ſome perplexity with reſpect to his future conduct. He was extremely ſolicitous to recover as ſoon as poſſible the towns which he had loſt; but as his finances were in great diſorder at that time, and Picardy, having been long the ſeat of war, was reduced to the moſt exhauſted condition, he perceived that any enterpriſe ſo tedious as the ſiege of a fortified town, muſt be attended with inſurmountable difficulties. He reſolved therefore, in conformity to the opinion of his nobility, to advance towards the enemy, and to compel them, if poſſible, to give him battle. But the archduke, whoſe army was greatly diminiſhed by putting garriſons into the conquered towns, had penetrated into his deſign; and being no leſs averſe to an engagement than Henry was deſirous of it, he left France without delay, and put his troops into quarters of cantonment in the province of Artois. The King being thus diſappointed in his hopes of a deciſive action, diſmiſſed the greater part of his army, and leaving the marſhal Biron with only five or ſix thouſand men to check the excurſions of the Spaniſh garriſons, he returned to Paris, where a great number of important affairs of ſtate required his attention.

He beſieges Hulſt in Flanders.

WHILE the Spaniſh army was employed in proſecuting the war in France, no memorable event

event had happened in the Netherlands. This was not owing to any want of activity and vigonr on the part of Prince Maurice, but to the extreme weakneſs of his army, which the States, from a deſire of ſaving their ſtrength when they were not expoſed to immediate danger, had reduced ſo low, that when all the garriſons were full, he could not lead into the field more than three thouſand men. With the aſſiſtance of this little army, the garriſons of ſome of the frontier towns had made ſeveral bold incurſions into Flanders and Brabant, and either plundered the country, or laid the inhabitants under contributions. The States of theſe provinces had ardently wiſhed for the return of the archduke; and they now intreated him to employ his arms in reducing ſome of the places in their neighbourhood, from which they received ſo great annoyance. Albert, who did not intend, by returning ſo early to the Netherlands, to paſs the remainder of the ſeaſon without action, readily complied with their requeſt; and, after deliberating with his council of war, undertook the ſiege of Hulſt in Flanders.

Maurice had, ſince his conqueſt of that place about five years before, made great additions to its fortifications. He had likewiſe formed the territory on which it ſtands into an

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iſland, by means of two large canals which were drawn around it; and, by building forts on theſe canals, and laying a part of the adjacent country under water, he had rendered the town almoſt inacceſſible.

THIS at leaſt was the opinion of ſome officers whom Albert had ſent to reconnoitre it; but being ambitious to diſtinguiſh the firſt year of his adminiſtration, by performing ſome important ſervice to the people committed to his care, and being excited at the ſame time by De Rone and other adventurous ſpirits, whom no difficulties could deter from any enterpriſe, he perſiſted in his deſign, and proceeded immediately to put it in execution. In order to conceal it as long as poſſible from the enemy, he made a feint of attacking ſome of the towns in Brabant, and this meaſure was attended with the deſired effect. Of five thouſand men who were in garriſon at Hulſt, prince Maurice ordered two thouſand to reinforce the garriſons of Gertrudenberg and Breda.

ALBERT immediately after turned ſuddenly towards Hulſt, and having prepared a great number of ſmall boats, he ordered two of his principal officers, de la Biche and la Barlotta, to tranſport a part of his forces acroſs the inundation and canals. Theſe men executed their

their commiſſion with great ſecrecy and ſilence in the dead of the night, and encountered difficulties which required the moſt determined reſolution to ſurmount. The tide did not riſe ſo high as they expected, and they were often obliged to leave their boats, and puſh them forwards, while they ſtood up to their knees in mud. When, after much labour and difficulty, they had brought them to the ſide of the canal, they were diſcovered by the garriſons of ſome forts which had been built to obſtruct their approach; but, nothwithſtanding the inceſſant fire of theſe forts, they ſtill continued to advance; and having launched their boats in the canal, they at laſt arrived on the other ſide, with the loſs of only a ſmall number of men. Early next morning count Solmes, the governor of Hulſt, attacked them before they had time to entrench themſelves. A bloody combat enſued, in which one regiment of the aſſailants was routed, and their commander killed. But the reſt reflecting on their deſperate ſituation, from which it was impoſſible to eſcape, advanced with irreſiſtible impetuoſity, and, after much bloodſhed, compelled the garriſon to take ſhelter in the town.

Prince Maurice no ſooner heard of what had happened, than he ſet out with all the forces which he could collect, hoping to be able

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able to drive the Spaniards from the iſland, before their number was increaſed. But the archduke advanced with greater expedition, and prevented his approach. It was ſtill practicable for Maurice to tranſport his forces to Hulſt, by the canal which falls into the Hondt or Weſter Scheld. But before he could reach the iſland in that way, Albert had tranſported his whole army, and begun the operations of the ſiege. The only expedient which Maurice could now employ, was to introduce ſupplies into the town by the canal, the mouth of which was commanded by a ſtrong fort, which he hoped the enemy would find impregnable. For this purpoſe he fixed his reſidence at Cruning in Zealand; and from that place, troops were frequently conveyed to the aſſiſtance of the beſieged, notwithſtanding the moſt ſtrenuous endeavours of the Spaniſh army to intercept them.

THE ſiege and the defence were conducted with equal vigour, and the combatants on both ſides gave innumerable proofs of the moſt heroic courage. The garriſon ſallied out almoſt every day, and made dreadful havoc among the Spaniards. De Rone, to whom the chief conduct of the ſiege had been committed, was killed; and by this irreparable loſs the aſſailants were greatly diſmayed. The archduke, however,

however, perſiſted in this enterpriſe; and although he had loſt a much greater number of his troops than in both the ſieges of Calais and Ardres, he continued his operations with unremitted ardour, till, beſides demoliſhing all the outworks of the place, he had made a breach in the wall ſufficient to admit of an aſſault. 1596.

Hulſt given up to the Spaniards.

THE garriſon had thrown up a deep entrenchment within the breach, and as they were ſtill as numerous as ever, through the ſeaſonable ſupplies which prince Maurice from time to time had ſent them, they had little reaſon for deſpair. But being ſeized with a ſudden panic, they urged count Solmes, the governor, with the moſt earneſt importunity, to capitulate; and the count, dreading that, in the preſent temper of their minds, they would probably deliver the town without his conſent, complied with their requeſt. 18th Aug.

Victory of M. Biron in Artois.

ALBERT ſtaid no longer in Hulſt than was neceſſary to give orders for repairing the fortifications; after which he returned to Bruſſels, amidſt the joyful acclamations of the people; who flattered themſelves with hopes, that, under the government of a prince ſo ſucceſsful in all his enterpriſes, an entire ſtop would ſoon be put to the incurſions of the enemy, and internal ſecurity reſtored. But their joy on this account

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account was of ſhort duration. Marſhal Biron, whom the French monarch had left behind him in Picardy, with a body of ſelect troops, had hitherto been ſatisfied with acting on the defenſive; but ſoon after the ſurrender of Hulſt, he began to make incurſions into the province of Artois, and kept all the ſouthern frontier of the Netherlands under perpetual alarms. The archduke ſent the marquis of Varambon to oppoſe him; and Varambon for ſome time obliged him to act with greater caution and circumſpection than he had hitherto obſerved. But Biron having received intelligence that the marquis was on his march to offer battle, he advanced rapidly to meet him; and, having placed the greater part of his troops in an ambuſh, he proceeded with the reſt till he had reached the enemy. A fierce rencounter enſued; and Biron continued fighting and retreating, till he arrived at the place where his troops were poſted. He then returned to the charge with his whole forces united; and having taken Varambon priſoner, he put many of his troops to the ſword, and compelled the reſt to ſave themſelves by flight [k].

The prince of Chimai, now duke D'Arſchot, was appointed to ſucceed Varambon;

[k] Bentivoglio, lib. iii. Grotius.

and

and his endeavours to repreſs the incurſions of the enemy were attended with no better ſucceſs than thoſe of his predeceſſor. Biron triumphed over him through the ſuperiority of his cavalry, and continued to exerciſe his depredations in the open parts of the country, till the approach of winter obliged him to retire. 1596.

Expedition of the Engliſh againſt Spain.

DURING the courſe of theſe tranſactions in the Netherlands and France, Philip ſuſtained a calamity in Spain, which more than counterbalanced any advantage that could be expected from his late acquiſitions. Almoſt every ſeaſon ſince the diſcomfiture of his Armada in one thouſand five hundred and eighty-eight, the Engliſh had undertaken ſome naval enterpriſe againſt his dominions in Europe or in America. The affairs of the Netherlands and France had not hitherto left him leiſure to take revenge for theſe inſults; nor was his leiſure greater at the preſent period, than it had been for ſome years paſt; but his patience was exhauſted; and his acquiſition of a ſea-port, ſo commodiouſly ſituated as Calais, gave him a facility of annoying his enemy, which he had not poſſeſſed before. He reſolved, notwithſtanding his preſent embarraſſments, to improve the advantage which this circumſtance preſented, and having begun to prepare a naval and military force, he intended to make a de-

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ſcent in Ireland; where he had long fomented the rebellious ſpirit of the Catholic inhabitants, and had reaſon to believe that they would join his troops as ſoon as they ſhould land.

Earl of Eſſex commander in chief.

ELIZABETH was aware of the impending danger, and determined, if poſſible, to diſſipate the ſtorm before it ſhould approach. For this purpoſe ſhe fitted out a fleet of more than a hundred and fifty ſhips, having about eight thouſand ſoldiers and ſeven thouſand mariners on board, and gave the command of the land forces to the earl of Eſſex, and that of the navy to lord Howard of Effingham. To this fleet the Dutch added twenty-four ſhips, with a proportional number of troops, under the command of Wardmont, vice-admiral of Holland, and count Lewis of Naſſau, couſin to prince Maurice.

WITH this powerful armament, Elizabeth intended to make an attack on Cadiz, where Philip's naval preparations were principally carried on. But its deſtination was carefully concealed. Sealed inſtructions were delivered to the ſeveral commanders, not to be opened till they ſhould arrive at Cape St. Vincent's; and they were ordered, in their way thither, to keep at a diſtance from the coaſts of Spain and Portugal,

tugal, in order to prevent a diſcovery of their deſign.

THESE precautions ſerved effectually the purpoſe which was intended. The whole fleet arrived on the twentieth of June within ſight of Cadiz, and found the Spaniards entirely unprepared for their defence. There was in the bay and harbour, beſides thirty-ſix merchant ſhips richly laden, and ready to ſail for America and the Indies, a fleet of about thirty ſhips of war, and a great number of tranſports loaded with naval ſtores, deſigned for the equipment of another fleet, which Philip was then fitting out at Liſbon. But there was no perſon in the place inveſted with the chief command, and no garriſon in it ſufficient for its defence.

Cadiz ſacked and plundered by the Engliſh.

THE Spaniſh men of war, however, were quickly drawn up in the mouth of the bay, and they ſuſtained the attack of an enemy ſo much ſuperior to them, for ſeveral hours, till ſome of their largeſt ſhips were taken, others burnt, and the reſt driven aground on the flats and ſhallows.

IMMEDIATELY after this ſucceſs, the earl of Eſſex landed his troops, and led them towards the town. A body of Spaniſh forces marched out to meet him; but being unable to withſtand

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ſtand the impetuoſity of the Engliſh, they ſoon turned their backs and fled. The Engliſh purſued, and entered the town along with them. The inhabitants, who were thrown into the moſt dreadful conſternation, made a feeble reſiſtance, and the caſtle ſurrendered before the Engliſh artillery had begun to fire. Eſſex diſcovered no leſs humanity after his victory, than bravery in acquiring it. The town indeed was given up to be plundered by the ſoldiers, but no cruelty or outrage, ſuch as occurs ſo often in the hiſtory of the Netherlands, was permitted to be exerciſed. The booty was immenſe, and would have been much greater, if, while the commanders were treating with ſome of the principal merchants about a ranſom for the merchant ſhips, the duke de Medina, who lay with ſome troops near the town, had not given orders for ſetting them on fire. It was computed that, in military and naval ſtores, merchant goods, and ſhips, the loſs which Philip and his ſubjects ſuſtained on this occaſion, could not amount to leſs than twenty millions of ducats. Had the advice of the earl of Eſſex been followed, the Engliſh would have attempted to retain poſſeſſion of the town, but lord Howard and the other commanders regarded his propoſal as chimerical. They believed that they had already fulfilled the queen's intentions: they

dreaded

dreaded the approach of a Spaniſh army, and therefore they made haſte to put their plunder on board their ſhips, and immediately ſet ſail for England. 1596.

Deſtruction of the Spaniſh fleet deſigned for Ireland.

THE affront which Philip received on this occaſion, in having one of his capital towns ſacked and plundered, conſtituted a conſiderable part of his calamity, as it leſſened exceedingly the opinion entertained of his prudence, as well as of his internal ſtrength. This conſideration, joined to an impatient deſire of taking vengeance on Elizabeth, determined him, without regard to the approach of winter, to carry his plan of invading Ireland into immediate execution. By the arrival of his Plate fleet from America, he was enabled to equip, in Liſbon and other places, a hundred and twenty-eight ſhips of war and tranſports, with fourteen thouſand troops on board, beſides a great number of Iriſh Catholics, and a prodigious quantity of military ſtores, and materials and inſtruments for building forts. This fleet, under the command of Don Martin de Padilla, ſet ſail from Ferrol in the month of November; and if it had reached the deſtined port, the Spaniards, with the aſſiſtance of the Popiſh inhabitants, muſt have acquired ſo firm an eſtabliſhment in Ireland, as would have coſt the

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Engliſh many years, and much expence of labour and blood, to diſpoſſeſs them.

ELIZABETH and her ſubjects, fluſhed with their ſucceſs at Cadiz, were as ſecure as if the wound which they had lately inflicted on Philip's naval power had been mortal. They had no ſuſpicion of his deſign, and were entirely ignorant of his preparations; but the good providence of Heaven interpoſed remarkably on this occaſion, as it had done formerly, in their behalf. The Spaniſh fleet was overtaken by a ſtorm off Cape Finiſterre, and about forty ſhips, with their crews and ſtores, were loſt. Padilla got back with difficulty to Ferrol; and henceforth all thoughts of the intended enterpriſe were laid aſide [c].

1597. The battle of Turnhout.

THESE calamities were ſucceeded by another no leſs diſaſtrous event, which happened in the Netherlands in the beginning of the year one thouſand five hundred and ninety-ſeven. The fertile provinces of Brabant ſtill lay expoſed to the incurſions of the confederates; and the inhabitants, in order to ſave the country and villages from being ſacked and plundered, had been obliged to ſubmit to contributions, with which the United States were enabled to main-

[c] Grotius, lib. v. p. 269. Camden, p. 730. Carte, lib. xix.

tain

tain the garriſons of Breda, Gertrudenberg, and other places. The archduke, ſolicitous to deliver the people from theſe oppreſſions, had cantoned between four and five thouſand horſe and foot in the open town of Turnhout, which, on account of its neighbourhood to Breda, he judged to be the fitteſt ſituation for watching the motions of the enemy; and he had given the command of theſe forces to the count de Varas, brother to the marquis of Varambon.

Prince Maurice having received intelligence that Varas had been intruſted with this command more on account of his rank and family[d], than his military ſkill, reſolved to avail himſelf of this imprudence into which the archduke had been betrayed. With great ſecrecy and expedition he drew together an army of five thouſand foot and eight hundred horſe, and ſet out from Gertrudenberg with a deſign to attack the Spaniards in their quarters of cantonment. Varas was informed of his intention only on the evening before, and was determined, in contradiction to the remonſtrances of ſome of his officers, to retire to the town of Herentals. He accordingly ſent off the baggage in the night, and began his march by day-break, without the ſound either of drum

[d] Of the name of De Rie in Franche Compté.

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or trumpet. His troops, almoſt all of whom were experienced veterans, were at firſt indignant at the thoughts of flying from an enemy whom they had often conquered; but the dread with which their general was actuated, ſoon diffuſed itſelf into every breaſt, and begot a conviction, that their preſervation depended on the celerity of their retreat.

MAURICE was only a few miles from Turnhout when his ſcouts informed him of the count's departure. He immediately ſent Sir Francis Vere with a party of horſe to ſcour the woods and hedges, and diſpatched another party under count Hohenloe, to retard the Spaniards on their march till the infantry ſhould arrive. Beſides count Hohenloe and Sir Francis Vere the prince had brought with him count Solmes, Sir Robert Sidney, governor of Fluſhing, and ſeveral others of his braveſt and moſt experienced officers, by whom all his orders were executed with equal prudence and intrepidity. Count Hohenloe, at the head of four hundred horſe began the attack, and quickly routed the Spaniſh cavalry, who being driven back upon the foot, threw them into diſorder. At this criſis, Maurice himſelf and Sir Francis Vere came up, and having broken through the enemy's ranks, completed their confuſion, and made dreadful havoc among them, till the greateſt

greateſt part of them were either put to the ſword or taken priſoners. Varas himſelf was killed, after having given proofs, that his miſconduct had not proceeded from the want of perſonal bravery, but from the conſciouſneſs of his inexperience, and his ſolicitude for the preſervation of his troops. Above two thouſand were ſlain, and five hundred taken priſoners, while the victors loſt only nine or ten.

It was in this engagement that a practice invented by Maurice was firſt introduced, of arming the cavalry with carabines inſtead of lances; and to this invention, which filled the enemy with amazement, Grotius aſcribes the great facility with which they were overpowered; for the victory was gained entirely by the horſe, and the infantry arrived only in time to divide the ſpoil.

The battle of Turnhout, through the great diſparity between the numbers of the ſlain on the oppoſite ſides, contributed more to exalt the *character* of Maurice, than any of his former atchievements. Nor was it military renown only which he acquired; he gave a ſtriking proof likewiſe of his humanity in his treatment of the priſoners, whom he protected from all injury and violence with the utmoſt care, and many of whom recovered through the ten-

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der attention which he bestowed. He sent the body of count Varas to the archduke; and Albert on that occasion assured him, that he would follow his generous example, and take effectual pains to prevent all cruelty and outrage in the further prosecution of the war [c].

The surprise of Amiens.

THE loss which Albert sustained in the battle of Turnhout was soon afterwards compensated by his acquisition of Amiens, the capital of Picardy, and one of the strongest and most important towns in France. The citizens, who had been zealous partisans of the league, had lately submitted to the King, upon condition that all their ancient privileges should be preserved, and in particular, that they should be allowed to guard the town themselves, and not be obliged to admit a garrison of mercenary troops.

THE number of those who were enrolled for bearing arms was between fourteen and fifteen thousand; but neither their discipline nor their vigilance corresponded to the danger to which they were exposed from the neighbourhood of the Spaniards. They gave the same attention to their ordinary occupations as in the time of

[c] Grotius, lib. vi. ab initio. Thuanus, lib. cxviii. c. v. Bentivoglio, part iii. lib. iii.

peace;

peace; only a few were employed as centinels and guards, and even theſe performed their duty in the moſt negligent manner.

Of this negligence, Portocarrero, governor of Dourlens, a brave and enterpriſing officer, had received intelligence from one of the citizens [f], and he founded upon it a plan for taking the city by ſurpriſe. Having communicated this plan to the archduke, and obtained his approbation, he collected from the neighbouring garriſons about three thouſand horſe and foot, which he judged to be ſufficient to carry it into execution [g]. On the eleventh of March, he ſet out from Dourlens in the beginning of the night, and before ſun-riſe arrived at an hermitage about a quarter of a mile from Amiens. As ſoon as he perceived that the gate which lay next him was opened, he ſent forward ten or twelve of the moſt reſolute of his ſoldiers, with three officers, called d'Ognano, La Croix, and Del Acro, diſguiſed like the peaſants of that country with long frocks, under which each of them had a brace of piſtols and a ſword concealed. Three of this

[f] He had been baniſhed on account of ſome crime.

[g] They conſiſted of eleven hundred Spaniards, five hundred Burgundians and Germans, four hundred Iriſh, two hundred Walloons, and nine hundred horſe.

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party carried bags filled with nuts and apples. One of them drove a waggon loaded with large beams, and the reſt followed ſlowly at a little diſtance. When the three firſt had paſſed the palliſades and approached the gate, one of them fell down, as by accident, and ſcattered the nuts and apples; and while the guards, making game of the ſuppoſed peaſant, were ſcrambling for the fruit, the waggon was driven under the gate. There it ſtopped, and Del Acro, by pulling an iron pin, quickly diſengaged the horſes. He then fired a piſtol, which was the ſign agreed upon, and he, and thoſe who were with him, falling with great fury upon the guard, killed moſt of them, and made themſelves maſters of the gate. The centinel upon the top of the gate-way, perceiving what had paſſed, attempted to let down the portcullis; but it was ſuſpended by the beams and the waggon; and Portocarrero in the mean time brought forward his troops, and ruſhed into the town. The citizens, entirely unprepared for this ſudden attack, were overwhelmed with aſtoniſhment and conſternation. Their reſiſtance was feeble and ill-conducted; and, after about a hundred of their number had fallen, they laid down their arms, and ſuffered the enemy to take poſſeſſion of the town.

1597. Henry's diſtreſs on that occaſion.

THE news of this diſaſter affected the French monarch in the moſt ſenſible manner, and greatly allayed the joy which his late triumph over the League was calculated to excite. He conſidered, that the Spaniards were, before this time, in poſſeſſion of Calais, one of the principal ſea-ports in his dominions; and that by their preſent conqueſt they had opened a paſſage from the Netherlands, by which they could make incurſions to the gates of the capital. He was mortified by reflecting on the judgment which foreign nations muſt form of a prince, whoſe glory conſiſted chiefly in victories obtained over his own ſubjects; and he dreaded, that the malcontents in his kingdom might take advantage of the preſent calamity, and rekindle the flames of civil war. He had laboured for ſome time under bad health; notwithſtanding which, he broke off a courſe of medicine which had been preſcribed to him, and ſet out immediately for Corbie on the Somme[h], where, after conſulting with the marſhal Biron and ſome other principal officers, he reſolved to poſtpone every other object of his attention to the recovery of Amiens. He then ordered Biron to inveſt the town with ſuch forces as he could draw from the neighbouring

[h] About three leagues higher than Amiens.

garriſons,

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garriſons, and returned to Paris to haſten the preparations neceſſary to inſure ſucceſs.

The ſiege of Amiens.

HENRY knew that the moſt vigorous exertion of his activity was requiſite on this occaſion, and he laboured with unceaſing ardour, till, beſides raiſing a numerous army, he had collected, from every quarter of his diminions, proviſions and military ſtores proportioned to the difficulty of his intended enterpriſe. He concluded at this time a new alliance with the Queen of England and the States of Holland, in conſequence of which the former ſent him four thouſand troops, and the latter furniſhed him with a conſiderable ſum of money, beſides engaging to make a powerful diverſion of the Spaniſh forces in the Netherlands. Having ſent off his troops to Amiens before him, as faſt as they were raiſed, he found on his return thither in the beginning of June, that the ſiege was already far advanced. Biron, prompted by his natural ardour, and piqued by a ſaying which had dropt from the King, that his affairs almoſt never proſpered where he was not preſent, had exerted the moſt indefatigable vigilance and induſtry. He had rendered the blockade complete, by drawing ſtrong lines of circumvallation round the town, and had begun to make his approaches to the walls. Henry approved highly

highly of every thing that he had done, and in order to pacify his reſentment, ſuffered him ſtill to retain the chief command. 1597.

As the number of the troops was conſiderably augmented by thoſe which the King had brought with him, and by the arrival of the Engliſh forces, the operations of the ſiege were carried on with redoubled ardour and alacrity; but the progreſs of the aſſailants was retarded greatly beyond what had been expected, by the invincible bravery and unremitted vigilance of the governor and garriſon, who diſputed every inch of ground with matchleſs intrepidity, and in the numberleſs ſallies which they made, put ſome thouſands of the beſiegers to the ſword.

By theſe ſallies their own number was conſiderably diminiſhed, and in one of them Portocarrero was killed. The defence however was ſtill conducted with the ſame ſkill and ſpirit as before by the marquis de Montenegro, a Neapolitan of the family of Caraffa, and the King had reaſon to deſpair of being able to finiſh his enterpriſe before the arrival of the Spaniſh army from the Netherlands.

Albert attempts in vain to raiſe the ſiege.

The archduke was ſenſible that it was of great importance to Philip's intereſt to preſerve poſſeſſion

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poſſeſſion of Amiens, whether he ſhould enter into a treaty of peace with the French monarch, or proſecute the war; and he could not have exerted himſelf with greater activity in making the preparations neceſſary to raiſe the ſiege. But his levies, as well as all his other preparations, had been carried on ſlowly, through the extreme difficulty which he found in procuring money. The deſtruction of the fleet and ſtores at Cadiz had contributed not a little to increaſe that diſorder which had ſo long prevailed in the King's finances. For ſeveral years Philip had been in the practice of borrowing large ſums from the Italian and Flemiſh merchants, for which he had agreed to pay them an exorbitant intereſt, and had mortgaged certain branches of his revenue. The inconveniences ariſing from thence had become intolerable, and he was determined to deliver himſelf from them at once, whatever ſhould be the conſequence. He had accordingly publiſhed an edict in the month of November of the preceding year, declaring all the contracts by which he had ſequeſtered his revenue to be null and void; and alleging, as an excuſe for this ſtep, that through the unfair advantages which had been taken of his diſtreſs, he had reaſon to dread, that, unleſs ſome remedy were immediately applied, all his labours in behalf

of Chriſtendom and the true religion would be loſt [i].

PHILIP had as little reaſon to be ſatisfied with the prudence, as with the juſtice, of this expedient. His annual revenue, though now freed from all incumbrances, was inſufficient to defray the enormous expence of the preſent war. It was ſtill neceſſary for him, while the war continued, to borrow money; but no merchants, either in Genoa or Antwerp, where it had been uſually found, could be perſuaded to advance it; and it was this cauſe chiefly which had ſo long retarded the archduke's preparations for the relief of Amiens.

Surrender of Amiens.

THE blockade of that city had been formed in April, and it was the end of Auguſt before he could begin his march. At that time he ſet out with an army of more than five-and-twenty thouſand men, and arrived within ſight of the French camp about the middle of September. As his infantry was greatly ſuperior to that of the enemy, he reſolved to offer battle; and from the well-known temper of the French monarch, he doubted not that his challenge would be accepted. But Henry being diſtruſtful of his infantry, the greateſt part of which

[i] Grotius, lib. v.

conſiſted

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consisted of raw troops, readily complied with the advice of the duke de Mayenne, whom he had brought with him to the siege, and resolved to remain within his lines. The archduke advanced towards him, with his army drawn up in order of battle; but when he perceived that the king's resolution was unalterably fixed, that he was well prepared for his defence, and that his intrenchments were every where strongly fortified, he despaired of being able to effectuate his purpose, and returned to the Netherlands. In a few days after his retreat, the marquis de Montenegro, with the approbation of the archduke, consented to capitulate, and received from Henry the most honourable terms [k].

Progress of the war in the Netherlands.

During the greatest part of the siege of Amiens, nothing memorable was transacted in the Netherlands; but as the archduke had, in order to fill up his army, almost drained the provinces of troops, he had no sooner begun his march, than prince Maurice, having assembled between twelve and thirteen thousand horse and foot, laid siege to Rhinberg, and in a few days obliged it to capitulate, though the garrison amounted to a thousand men. He next reduced the town of Meurs with the same

End of August.

[k] D'Avila, lib. xv. Bentivoglio, part iii. lib. iv.

facility.

1597. 26th September.

facility. After which, having paſſed the Rhine, he made himſelf maſter of Grol, Brevort, and ſeveral other places, and then directed his march towards Lingen, the only fortified town which remained in poſſeſſion of the Spaniards on the north ſide of the Rhine. Both the town and caſtle of Lingen were commanded by count Frederic of Heremberg, with a garriſon of ſix or ſeven hundred men; and the count made, for ſome time, a vigorous and ſpirited defence. But the prince, after his batteries were ready to begin to play, having ſent him a ſummons to ſurrender on honourable terms, with an intimation, that as this was the firſt ſummons, ſo he might be aſſured that it would be the laſt; Heremberg conſidered, that his perſeverance muſt be attended with the deſtruction of the garriſon, and therefore agreed to the terms propoſed.

All theſe conqueſts were atchieved in leſs than three months. In thoſe of Grol and Brevort, places ſituated in a marſhy ſoil, Maurice encountered difficulties which required a vigorous exertion of his ſuperior talents to ſurmount; but as no peculiar or ſtriking circumſtances are recorded by the cotemporary hiſtorians, I have not thought it neceſſary to deſcend to a particular detail. The acquiſition of ſo many frontier towns was of great importance to the

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1597. the United Provinces, as they were thereby delivered from the incurſions of the Spaniſh garriſons, by which the inhabitants of the adjacent country had been kept under perpetual alarms; and the States, deeply ſenſible of this advantage, teſtified their gratitude to prince Maurice, by conferring on him and on his poſterity the rich ſeignory of Lingen and its dependencies.

1598. Negociations for peace. THESE tranſactions happened towards the end of the year one thouſand five hundred and ninety-ſeven; and the following was diſtinguiſhed by a negociation which was ſet on foot for the eſtabliſhment of peace between France and Spain. Neither Philip nor Henry had derived from the war thoſe advantages, by the proſpect of which they had been allured, and both of them had powerful motives for deſiring that it might be ſpeedily brought to a concluſion. Philip's eyes were now opened to the vanity of thoſe flattering dreams of conqueſt by which he had been ſo long deluded. His acquiſitions in France had coſt him more than they were worth; and, beſides the expence of making them, they were much more than counterbalanced by the loſſes which year after year he had ſuffered in the Netherlands. His finances, as has been already mentioned, were in extreme diſorder; his credit was ruined by the late violation of his faith; his troops in many places

places of the Low Countries had mutinied again, on account of their want of pay; and if the war ſhould continue for another campaign, he thought it not improbable that the greater part of them would refuſe to march againſt the enemy. From his advanced age, and broken health, he had reaſon to believe that his death was not far diſtant, and he dreaded the fatal conſequences which might ariſe from leaving his ſon, who was hardly arrived at the age of manhood, involved in war with a prince ſo powerful and enterpriſing as the king of France.

PEACE was no leſs deſirable to Henry than to Philip; thoſe wounds under which his kingdom had bled for ſo many years, were ſtill uncloſed, and numberleſs diſtempers prevailed in almoſt every quarter, to which no effectual remedy could be applied during the continuance of the war.

The pope mediates between the contending monarchs.

WHILE, for theſe reaſons, both princes were alike deſirous of peace, neither of them would yield ſo far to his antagoniſt as to be the firſt to propoſe it. But the ſovereign Pontiff, as the father of all Catholic princes, and the common friend of the two contending monarchs, acted the part of mediator between them; and Clement diſcovered, on this occaſion, a degree of

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zeal and prudence, which juſtly entitled him to that high reſpect in which his character was held by his cotemporaries. At his requeſt, it was agreed by the two Kings, that a congreſs ſhould be held at Vervins, a town in Picardy, near the confines of Hainault. The preſidents de Believere and Sillery, were appointed plenipotentiaries by Henry; and Ricardotto and Baptiſta Taſſis, by Philip. Alexander de Medici, the cardinal legate, likewiſe repaired thither, and in the month of February the conferences were begun.

Oppoſition to peace by Elizabeth and the States.

THESE conferences were matter of great anxiety to the States of Holland, as they could not doubt that a principal motive which had determined Philip to diſengage himſelf from the war with France, was, that he might be at liberty to employ his whole ſtrength againſt the confederated provinces. They were not without ſuſpicions likewiſe, that the queen of England would embrace the preſent opportunity of delivering herſelf from the Spaniſh war, and were therefore much diſquieted at the apprehenſions of being left without an ally to ſupport them. But they were ſoon delivered from their fears with regard to the conduct of Elizabeth, who being entirely convinced that the intereſt and ſafety of their infant republic were inſeparable from her own, gave them freſh

freſh aſſurances of the continuance of her friendſhip.

THE French monarch no ſooner agreed to the Pope's propoſal of a congreſs, than he ſent an intimation of it to his allies, and expreſſed his deſire, that, if poſſible, a general peace might be eſtabliſhed, in which they, as well as himſelf, might be comprehended. But neither Elizabeth nor the States were diſpoſed to liſten to his advice. The latter were well aſſured that no conſideration would perſuade Philip to treat with them as a free State, and they were unalterably determined never to acknowledge him for their ſovereign. Elizabeth, who had on different occaſions experienced the great advantage which ſhe derived from her alliance with them, was no leſs ſolicitous than themſelves that they ſhould maintain their independence; and ſhe believed, that while they maintained it, ſhe ſhould have no great reaſon to dread the power of Philip. She was concerned however at the proſpect of loſing ſo uſeful an ally as the king of France, and ſent ſir Robert Cecil and Mr. Herbert, who were accompanied by Juſtin de Naſſau and the celebrated Barnevelt, from the States, to remonſtrate with Henry againſt the peace.

THESE able negociators left no argument untouched that could diſſuade him from his purpoſe:

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poſe: they reminded him of the alliance into which he had lately entered with the Queen and the States, and of the aſſiſtance which on different occaſions they had afforded him. They repreſented the danger to which he expoſed himſelf by treating with a prince who had given ſo many ſtriking proofs of inſincerity; and they offered to furniſh him with a large ſupply of forces, beſides money, and a numerous fleet, for the recovery of Calais, and the farther proſecution of the war.

HENRY replied, that no alliance which he had formed with the Queen or the States, could be reaſonably interpreted as an obligation on him unneceſſarily to prolong the war, which he was perſuaded would ſoon prove the utter ruin of his kingdom. He expreſſed in ſtrong terms his gratitude for the friendſhip which they had ſhewn him, and aſſured them, that no peace which he ſhould conclude with Spain, would prevent him from making a ſuitable return. From the manner of life to which he had been ſo long inured, joined to the provocations which he had received from Philip, they might believe, that it was not an averſion to the war, but the neceſſity of peace, that had determined him to embrace a meaſure ſo repugnant to the inclination of his friends. The diſorders which prevailed in his dominions were ſuch, that if the

the proper remedies were not applied, they would ſoon become incurable, and theſe remedies could not be applied in the time of war; but peace, he hoped, would quickly reſtore his kingdom to its native ſtrength and vigour; when, inſtead of being a burden upon his allies, as he had hitherto been, he would be able, and they ſhould find him willing, not only to repay with intereſt the obligations which they had laid him under, but to defend and protect them, and the reſt of Europe, againſt the exorbitant ambition of the king of Spain.

THIS apology, delivered with that irreſiſtible force of natural eloquence, by which Henry was eminently diſtinguiſhed, made a ſtrong impreſſion upon the minds of the Engliſh and Dutch ambaſſadors; they could not doubt of the truth of what they had heard; and before their departure, they had the candour to acknowledge, that as the peace which he was about to conclude was neceſſary for France, ſo it might be found in the iſſue highly beneficial to the other European powers. Henry ſent ambaſſadors to England and Holland to enforce what he had ſaid on this occaſion, and ſtill continued as formerly on terms of cordial friendſhip both with Elizabeth and the States.

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1598. Concluſion of peace on the 2d of May.

THE treaty of peace was ſoon after brought to the deſired concluſion[l]. Several difficulties occurred during the courſe of the conferences, which were removed through the diſintereſted zeal and great authority of the Pope and the cardinal legate; and at length, upon Henry's reſigning his claim to Cambray, Philip conſented, though with great reluctance, to give up Calais, Andres, Dourlens, and all the other towns in France, which he had acquired at the expence of ſo much blood and treaſure[m].

Philip transfers the Netherlands to Iſabella and Albert.

PHILIP had been the more ſolicitous to put an end to the war, on account of a ſcheme which he had conceived, after the diſappointment of his views in France, of transferring the ſovereignty of the Netherlands to his eldeſt daughter Iſabella, whom he intended to give in marriage to the archduke. And to embrace this meaſure, he was prompted, partly by his affection for the Infanta, one of the moſt accompliſhed women of the age, and partly by his eſteem for Albert, whom, of all the princes in Europe, he deemed the moſt worthy of ſo illuſtrious an alliance.

[l] At Vervins.

[m] Bentivoglio, part iii. lib. iv. p. 464. Sully, lib. ix. D'Avila, towards the concluſion. Thuanus, lib. cxx. ſect. i. and v.; and Cambden, p. 760, &c. Miniana, lib. x. cap. xii.

BUT

1598. His deliberations on this ſubject.

BUT while his attachment to his daughter and her future huſband made him deſirous of procuring for them ſome ſovereign eſtabliſhment, he could not, without reluctance, reſolve to ſeparate from the body of his empire ſo rich a portion of his hereditary dominions. To the troops and money of the Netherlands, the late Emperor and himſelf had been greatly indebted for moſt of their victories over their enemies in France and Germany; and it had been the Netherlands chiefly, which, by their ſituation in the heart of Europe, had rendered them formidable to the ſeveral European powers, and enabled them ſo long to maintain the tranquillity of their other dominions. The preſervation indeed of theſe provinces had, for many years, proved a perpetual drain for the wealth of the Spaniſh monarchy; but it was doubtful whether, if they were disjointed from it, they would not be found as great a burden as ever, ſince it would ſtill be incumbent on the King to ſupport the archduke in his new ſovereignty, againſt the attempts of his enemies in the revolted provinces.

THESE conſiderations were urged with great warmth by the count de Fuentes, in order to diſſuade Philip from the proſecution of his deſign. But ſome others of his counſellors, and particularly the count de Caſtel-Rodrigo, in

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whom he repoſed the greateſt confidence, were at no leſs pains to confirm him in it, by repreſenting, that the ſeparation propoſed, inſtead of leſſening, would ſerve to augment the ſtrength and vigour of the Spaniſh monarchy.

"THE Netherlands lay ſo remote from the ſeat of government, and the laws of that country, and the language, character, and manners of the people, were ſo extremely different from thoſe of Spain, that it would be for ever found impracticable to preſerve them in obedience. Their averſion to a foreign dominion, and eſpecially that of Spain, was inſurmountable; the abſence and diſtance of the King had been the cauſe of that inveterate rebellion which had furniſhed employment to his armies for almoſt forty years, and no other effectual means could be deviſed either to reconcile the provinces which had already revolted, or to prevent the reſt from imitating their example, but to give them a ſovereign of their own, who, by reſiding among them, might conciliate and ſecure their affections. It was true, that, without the aſſiſtance of the queen of England, the rebels muſt long ere now have laid down their arms; but if with the feeble aid which they had received from a Queen engroſſed with domeſtic cares, and tottering on her throne, they had been able for ſo many years not only to de-

ſend themſelves, but to carry on an offenſive ſucceſsful war, how much reaſon was there to dread the conſequences that muſt follow, if the Britiſh crowns were united, as they would ſoon be, on the head of a prince in the vigour of life, who, being free from the embarraſſments of a diſputed title, would have full leiſure to give attention to foreign affairs? From jealouſy of the King, the neighbouring princes would never ceaſe to ſupport the rebellion, and foment the diſcontents of his Flemiſh ſubjects; but if the Netherlands were diſunited from the Spaniſh monarchy, and erected into a ſeparate and independent ſtate, the cauſe of that jealouſy would be removed; it would become the intereſt of France and Britain, and the other neighbouring powers, to lend their aſſiſtance to extinguiſh the war; and even the revolted ſtates would, in order to ſecure internal tranquillity, chuſe to return to their ancient union with the ſouthern provinces."

His deed of abdication.

By theſe arguments, which coincided with Philip's inclination, he was confirmed in his deſign; and, on the ſixth of May, he ſigned the deed of abdication; in which, after declaring his reſolution to give the infanta in marriage to the archduke, he reſigned the ſovereignty of the Netherlands, and of the county of Burgundy, to that princeſs, to be enjoyed conjunctly by

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by her and her future huſband; and after their deceaſe, by the heirs of the marriage, whether male or female, according to the eſtabliſhed rules of hereditary ſucceſſion.

But it was provided, that in caſe this ſovereignty ſhould devolve to a female, ſhe ſhould marry either the King or the prince of Spain: That neither any prince nor princeſs deſcended from the Infanta, ſhould marry without the conſent of the king of Spain; and that in default of iſſue, the Netherlands ſhould be reunited to the Spaniſh monarchy. By other articles, it was ſtipulated that the new ſovereigns ſhould prevent their ſubjects from trading to the Indies; that they ſhould, before their admiſſion, take an oath to permit the exerciſe of no other religion but the Catholic, within their dominions; and in caſe they ſhould fail in the execution of this, or any other article, it was declared that the ſovereignty transferred ſhould immediately return to the crown of Spain.

How received in the Netherlands.

This deed was immediately tranſmitted to the archduke; and ſoon afterwards the States of the ſouthern provinces agreed to accept of the archduke and the Infanta for their ſovereigns, with the conditions which the deed contained; being well pleaſed to be delivered, as they expected to be, from the yoke of Spain, which

which they had found ſo grievous and intolerable.

But although this event gave great ſatisfaction to the people ſubject to the Spaniſh government, it was not likely to produce any change in the ſentiments or conduct of their neighbours in the United Provinces. The new ſovereigns, ſaid the confederates, whom Philip has appointed, will be ſovereigns in name only and appearance, but not in reality. They will be utterly unable to ſupport themſelves without the aſſiſtance of the Spaniſh arms. They will depend on Spain, as much as any Spaniſh governor or regent; and the Spaniards will ſtill continue to exerciſe, as formerly, an unlimited influence in the government. In the deed of abdication, the Netherlands are treated, not as a free and independent ſtate, but as a fief of the Spaniſh monarchy; and from the advanced age of the Infanta [m], together with the conditions of the deed of abdication, it was evident that the preſent meaſure could be meant only as a temporary expedient, intended to amuſe the people of the ſouthern provinces, and not as a fixed and permanent eſtabliſhment. But whatever was the King's intention in this meaſure, and whether the ſovereignty now tranſ-

[m] Thirty-two.

ferred,

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ferred, ſhould or ſhould not return to the crown of Spain, it was the unalterable reſolution of the United Provinces to maintain their liberty, in oppoſition to whatever attempts might be made to deprive them of it by the king of Spain, or the archduke of Auſtria[n].

ALBERT was in the mean time employed in preparing to ſet out for Madrid; but having been detained in the Low Countries much longer than he expected, by a new mutiny of his troops, he had juſt begun his journey when he received intelligence of the death of the King.

Illneſs and death of Philip.

FOR more than two years this prince had been extremely afflicted with the gout; to which had been lately added, a hectic fever, and a dropſy. Finding his ſtrength ſo much decayed, that he could not expect to live above a few weeks, he ordered his attendants to tranſport him from Madrid to the Eſcurial; and when his phyſicians ſignified to him their apprehenſions, that he would not be able to endure the fatigue: "But I am reſolved," he anſwered, "to accompany my funeral to my tomb." Upon his arrival at the Eſcurial, the gout returned with double violence both in his

[n] Van Meteren, Grotius, &c.

feet

feet and hands; and ſoon afterwards, ſeveral impoſthumes gathered in his knees and breaſt, which occaſioned the moſt excruciating pain. He was in ſome meaſure relieved by laying the impoſthumes open. But another more intolerable diſtreſs ſucceeded. The matter of his ſores was of the moſt purulent and naufeous nature, and ſwarms of lice were engendered in it, from which no application, and no care or pains, could deliver him. In this dreadful condition, he lay in a ſupine poſture, for more than fifty days; during which time he exhibited a ſtriking diſplay of patience, firmneſs of mind, and reſignation to his fate. He gave proof of the ſincerity of his religious profeſſion, by practiſing, with great zeal and aſſiduity, thoſe ſuperſtitious obſervances, which the church of Rome preſcribes, as the means of procuring acceptance with the Deity. He ſeemed inclined likewiſe to make atonement for ſome ſeverities which he had exerciſed, and ordered ſeveral priſoners to be releaſed, and their effects reſtored °.

About two days before his death, having ſent for his ſon, and his daughter Iſabella, he diſcourſed to them of the vanity of human greatneſs, delivered many ſalutary counſels for

° Among theſe was the wife of Antonio Perez.

the

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the adminiſtration of their dominions, and exhorted them with much earneſtneſs, to cultivate and maintain the Catholic faith. When they had left him, he gave directions for his funeral; and ordered his coffin to be brought into his chamber, and placed within his view; ſoon after which his ſpeech failed, and he expired on the thirteenth of September, in the ſeventy-ſecond year of his age, and the forty-third of his reign [p].

His character.

No character was ever drawn by different hiſtorians in more oppoſite colours than that of Philip; and yet, conſidering the length and activity of his reign, there is none which it ſhould ſeem would be more eaſy to aſcertain. From the facts recorded in the preceding hiſtory, we cannot doubt that he poſſeſſed, in an eminent degree, penetration, vigilance, and a capacity for government. His eyes were continually open upon every part of his extenſive dominions. He entered into every branch of adminiſtration; watched over the conduct of his miniſters with unwearied attention; and in his choice both of them and of his generals, diſcovered a conſiderable ſhare of ſagacity. He had at all times a compoſed and ſettled countenance, and never appeared to be either elated

[p] Miniana, lib. x. cap. xiv. Thuanus, lib. cxx. ſect. xiv.

or

or depreſſed. His temper was the moſt imperious, and his looks and demeanour were haughty and ſevere; yet among his Spaniſh ſubjects, he was of eaſy acceſs; liſtened patiently to their repreſentations and complaints; and, where his ambition and bigotry did not interfere, was generally willing to redreſs their grievances. When we have ſaid thus much in his praiſe, we have ſaid all that juſtice requires, or truth permits. It is indeed impoſſible to ſuppoſe that he was inſincere in his zeal for religion. But as his religion was of the moſt corrupt kind, it ſerved to increaſe the natural depravity of his diſpoſition; and not only allowed, but even prompted him to commit the moſt odious and ſhocking crimes. Although a prince in the bigoted age of Philip might be perſuaded that the intereſt of religion would be advanced by falſehood and perſecution; yet it might be expected, that, in a virtuous prince, the ſentiments of honour and humanity would, on ſome occaſions, triumph over the dictates of ſuperſtition: but of this triumph, there occurs not a ſingle inſtance in the reign of Philip; who, without heſitation, violated his moſt ſacred obligations as often as religion afforded him a pretence; and under that pretence exerciſed for many years the moſt unrelenting cruelty, without reluctance or remorſe. His ambition,

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ambition, which was exorbitant; his reſentment, which was inplacable; his arbitrary temper, which would ſubmit to no controul; concurred with his bigoted zeal for the Catholic religion, and carried the ſanguinary ſpirit, which that religion was calculated to inſpire, to a greater height in Philip, than it ever attained in any other prince of that, or of any former or ſucceeding age.

SOME hiſtorians have diſtinguiſhed this prince by the title of Philip the Prudent [q], and have repreſented him as the wiſeſt, as well as the moſt religious prince, that ever filled the Spaniſh throne. But it is queſtionable, whether he be entitled to praiſe on account of his prudence, any more than on account of his religion. In the beginning of his reign, he diſcovered great caution in his military enterpriſes; and, on ſome occaſions, made even greater preparations than were neceſſary to inſure ſucceſs. But his ambition, his reſentment, and his abhorrence of the Proteſtants were too violent to ſuffer him to act conformably to the dictates of ſound policy and prudence. He might have prevented the revolt of his Dutch and Flemiſh ſubjects, if,

[q] Eldiſcreto.

after

after the reformation in the Netherlands was ſuppreſſed by the ducheſs of Parma, he had left the reins of government in the hands of that wiſe princeſs, and had not ſent ſo odious a tyrant as the duke of Alva to enſlave them. He might, after the defeat of the prince of Orange, have rivetted the chains of ſlavery about their necks, and gradually accuſtomed them to the yoke; if, by engaging in too many expenſive enterpriſes, he had not exhauſted his exchequer, and made it in ſome meaſure neceſſary for Alva to impoſe the taxes of the tenth and twentieth pennies, for the maintenance of his troops. He might, through the great abilities of the duke of Parma, have again reduced the revolted provinces to obedience, if he had not conceived the wild ambition of ſubduing England and acquiring the ſovereignty of France. His armies, in the latter part of his reign, were never ſufficiently numerous to execute the various enterpriſes which he undertook; yet they were much more numerous than he was able to ſupport. Few years paſſed in which they did not mutiny for want of pay. And Philip ſuffered greater prejudice from the diſorders and devaſtation which his own troops committed, than he received from the arms of his enemies. Againſt his attempts on England and France, his wiſeſt counſellors remonſtrated in the

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ſtrongeſt terms. And prudence certainly required that, previouſly to any attack upon the dominions of others, he ſhould have ſecured poſſeſſion of his own. Yet ſo great was his illuſion, that rather than delay the execution of thoſe ſchemes which his reſentment and ambition had ſuggeſted, he choſe to run the riſk of loſing the fruits of all the victories which the duke of Parma had obtained; and having left defenceleſs the provinces which had ſubmitted to his authority, he thereby afforded an opportunity to the revolted provinces, of eſtabliſhing their power, on ſo firm a foundation, as could not be ſhaken by the whole ſtrength of the Spaniſh monarchy, exerted againſt it for more than fifty years [s].

[s] By his firſt wife, Mary of Portugal, Philip had no other iſſue but Don Carlos; and by his ſecond, Mary of England, he had none. Iſabella, daughter of Henry II. of France, bore him two daughters, Iſabella Clara-Eugenia, and Catherine; the former of whom was married to the archduke Albert; and the latter to Emanuel Philibert, duke of Savoy. His fourth wife, Anne of Auſtria, daughter of the emperor Ferdinand, and of Philip's own ſiſter Mary, brought him three ſons and one daughter, who all died young, except Philip, who ſucceeded him.

If the reader incline to enter more particularly into the private life and character of Philip, than has been thought proper in the general hiſtory of his reign, he will meet with ſeveral intereſting anecdotes, in the prince of Orange's Apology, of which an abſtract is ſubjoined.

APPENDIX;

CONTAINING

AN ABSTRACT

OF THE

APOLOGY OR VINDICATION

OF THE

PRINCE OF ORANGE,

AGAINST

PHILIP's PROSCRIPTION.

APPENDIX.

THE prince of Orange begins his Apology, which is addreſſed to the confederated States, with obſerving, that being conſcious of having devoted his life and fortune to the ſervice of the Netherlands, it afforded him great joy to reflect upon the teſtimony given to his fidelity and zeal, in that barbarous Proſcription which had been publiſhed againſt him by the king of Spain. "I have reaſon likewiſe," continued he, "to rejoice at the opportunity which is thus preſented to me, to vindicate my conduct from thoſe malignant imputations, which have been caſt upon it by certain ignoble hirelings; and which are repeated and ſet forth in the blackeſt colours in this Proſcription. For I am not accuſed at this time by any of thoſe obſcure libellers, to whom I have ever thought it beneath my dignity to reply; but by a great and powerful prince, who intends, through my ſides, to wound, and if poſſible to deſtroy, the confederacy. I can

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with confidence appeal to you, who are well acquainted with my paſt life, whether it has ever been my practice, either to praiſe myſelf or to cenſure others. And I muſt likewiſe appeal to you and to the world, whether now, when I am accuſed of ingratitude, infidelity, and hypocriſy, compared to a Judas and a Cain, called a rebel, a traitor, a diſturber of the public peace, and an enemy to mankind; and when both pecuniary and honorary rewards are promiſed to thoſe who ſhall ſlay or murder me; whether after this the duty which I owe to myſelf, and to you who have repoſed in me ſuch unlimited confidence, does not call upon me to ſay what I can conſiſtently with truth, to prove the malice and falſehood of my accuſer? If you know his repreſentation of my conduct to be juſt, you will ſhut your ears againſt the defence which I am about to offer; but if you have known me from my youth to be more faithful, and chaſte, and virtuous, than the Author of this infamous Proſcription, I ſhall expect that you will attend favourably to what I ſhall advance, and deliver judgment in vindication of my integrity and innocence.

"THE firſt crime of which I am accuſed in this Proſcription, is ingratitude; and a recital is made of favours beſtowed on me by the king himſelf, and the emperor his father; to the latter

latter of whom, it is ſaid, I owed my ſucceſſion to the late prince of Orange; and to the former my having been admitted into the order of the Golden Fleece, and appointed a counſellor of ſtate, and governor of the provinces of Holland, Zealand, Utrecht, and Burgundy.

"No man reſpects more than I do the memory of the emperor, and I reflect with much ſatisfaction on the many proofs of attachment which I received from him. But the neceſſity which I am laid under to vindicate my character, obliges me to obſerve, that of the ſort of favours which are objected to me, I never received any from the emperor, but on the contrary ſuffered great loſs and prejudice in his ſervice. With reſpect to my ſucceſſion to the inheritance bequeathed to me by my couſin, the late prince of Orange, it is impoſſible to conceive any ground for alleging that I was at all indebted for it to the emperor. My right to that inheritance was indiſputable; nor was there ever any prince or private perſon, who pretended to call in queſtion its validity. Would not the emperor have been juſtly accuſed of tyranny and injuſtice, if he had prevented me from enjoying it? And does my accuſer reckon it an inſtance of goodneſs in a prince, merely not to defraud and oppreſs his faithful ſubjects?

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" ALL Europe knows what important ſervices the emperor received from the prince my kinſman; who commanded his armies, extended his dominions, and died at his feet. Had the emperor employed his power to diſappoint the laſt will of one who had ſerved him with ſo much fidelity and ſucceſs, would he not have involved his name in perpetual infamy? Beſides, that even although he had inclined to act a part ſo unworthy of his character, yet of the moſt valuable part of that inheritance he could not have deprived me, as it lies within the territory of the king of France, on whom alone I depend for the ſecure poſſeſſion of it. But even allowing that what is ſaid of my obligations to the emperor were true, yet the king of Spain is ſurely not entitled to reproach me with it; who, in contempt of all law and juſtice, has, to the utmoſt of his power, endeavoured to deprive me of the inheritance in queſtion, and rendered ineffectual that kindneſs of the emperor, for my unmindfulneſs of which he accuſes me of ingratitude.

" GRATITUDE, in the opinion of this prince, ought not to be confined to the perſon by whom favours have been beſtowed, but ought to extend likewiſe to his deſcendants: and it is becauſe I have oppoſed the ſon, whoſe father was my benefactor, that I am deemed ungrateful.

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Let him apply this golden rule to his own conduct, as he has applied it to mine; and he will then perceive which of us is guilty of ingratitude. Maximilian was the firſt of the family of Auſtria who came into the Netherlands. And no perſon acquainted with hiſtory is ignorant of the important obligations which that emperor received from my kinſman count Egelbert of Naſſau; by whom he was powerfully ſupported againſt Lewis the eleventh of France; by whom the people who had rebelled againſt him were ſubdued; and by whom likewiſe he recovered his liberty, of which the jealouſy of the Flemings had deprived him. Need I mention what every body knows, of the ſervice performed to the late emperor Charles, by count Henry Naſſau my uncle, who was in reality the perſon that prevailed with the electors to confer upon him the Imperial crown? Was it not by the bravery of René, prince of Orange, that the emperor ſubdued the duchy of Guelderland; and by that of Philibert, that he gained poſſeſſion of Lombardy and Naples, and the perſon of the pope, and the city and ſtate of Rome? And will his ſon pretend to reproach the memory of theſe great men, by boaſting of his father's kindneſs, in ſuffering juſtice to be done to their kinſman? Am I not authoriſed, from the few facts which I have mentioned, to aſſert, that had it not been for the houſes of Orange

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Orange and Naſſau, which I have the honour to repreſent, my defamer could not have put ſo many pompous titles, as are inſerted in the beginning of his Proſcription?

"By what I have ſaid, I would not be underſtood to diſclaim every kind of obligation to the emperor. I ſhall for ever retain a grateful remembrance of the honour which he did me, when, after having taken upon himſelf the inſpection of my education, and kept me nine years about his perſon, he gave me the important charge of all his ordnance in the Netherlands: and in my abſence, without any application made in my behalf, in contradiction to the repreſentations of his courtiers, and in preference to many officers of great experience, appointed me commander in chief of his army, at the age of twenty-one. I reflect with gratitude on that teſtimony of regard, with which he honoured me at the time of his reſignation, when having ſent for me from the camp, he gave me a public proof of his affection, by placing me next him, and leaning upon me, to ſupport him under the fatigue of that ſolemnity. I know likewiſe, that he meant to give me a further proof of his regard, when he impoſed upon me the irkſome taſk of carrying the Imperial crown to his brother Ferdinand. But will my enemies pretend to aſſert, either that I ſhewed

I ſhewed myſelf unworthy of theſe honours, or that my intereſt and fortune were promoted by them? Did the troops, when I commanded them, ſuffer any repulſe or damage? On the contrary, although the plague raged among them, and I had two of the ableſt generals of the age, the duke de Nevers and the admiral Coligny, for my opponents; I kept them at bay, and fortified the towns of Charlemont and Philipville, in ſpite of their moſt vigorous endeavours to prevent me. While the ſervices which I performed correſponded to the truſt repoſed in me, I can affirm with truth, that honour was the only acquiſition which I derived from the favour that was ſhewn me. From the chamber of accounts it will appear, that I never received any pecuniary recompence for my ſervices. I am able to prove by the moſt inconteſtible evidence, that my unavoidable expence as general, added to the expence of my embaſſy into Germany, and that which I incurred, when the King required me to receive and entertain the numerous foreign nobility, who crowded to congratulate him on his acceſſion, amounted to no leſs than one million five hundred thouſand florins. And to indemnify me for this expence, what return did I receive from the King, who now accuſes me of ingratitude? Having, with the emperor's conſent, begun to aſſert my claim to the lordſhip

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APPEND. 1580. of Chatel Bellin, before the ſupreme court of juſtice at Mechlin; when the counſellors had regiſtered their opinion, and on the day when they were to have pronounced ſentence in my favour, this King, who had juſt ſworn to govern us according to the laws, did, in violation of theſe laws, interpoſe his arbitrary power, and forbid the judges to proceed; nor ſince that time, have they been ever permitted to do me juſtice.

"When what I have ſaid ſhall be conſidered, the governments which were beſtowed on me will not appear to be more than was due for the ſervices which I have performed; nor more than an adequate compenſation for that extraordinary expence, which theſe ſervices had coſt me. Had the King allowed me to remain in poſſeſſion of theſe governments, he might have had ſome reaſon for reproaching me; although it was not in reality to him I was indebted for them, but to the emperor, by whom it was determined they ſhould be conferred upon me, before his departure from the Netherlands. But ſince my accuſer has laboured to expel me from them; ſince he has, to the utmoſt of his power, deprived me of my poſſeſſions, beſides carrying off my ſon to Spain, in contempt of the privileges of this country, which he had ſworn to preſerve inviolate, becauſe I would not

not lend myſelf a willing inſtrument of his oppreſſion; after this, I ſay, is he entitled to accuſe me of ingratitude?

"NOR is there any better ground for his accuſation, that I have violated the allegiance, which I owed him as my ſovereign. Though I have rejected his authority, yet I have done nothing more than was done by his anceſtor, Albert duke of Auſtria, the founder of his family, againſt my anceſtor, the emperor Adolphus of Naſſau. And beſides this, I ſhould gladly know by what title my accuſer poſſeſſes his Caſtilian dominions? Did not his predeceſſor Henry of Caſtile, a baſtard, riſe in rebellion againſt his brother Pedro, his lawful ſovereign, whom he killed with his own hand? And is not Philip the lineal heir of that uſurper? It may be ſaid, that Pedro was a tyrant, and therefore juſtly dethroned and ſlain. And may not the ſame plea be offered in excuſe for the part which I have acted? May it not be ſaid with truth of Philip, that his conduct has been that of a cruel tyrant; and that the cruelties exerciſed by Pedro, were much leſs ſhocking and horrible, than thoſe which have been perpetrated by the duke of Alva and his aſſociates? I muſt farther obſerve, that as king of Spain, I owe him no ſubmiſſion, but only as duke of Brabant. And as he is duke of that province,

APPEND. province, I, by reaſon of the baronies which I hold there, am one of the principal members of it. But he has forgotten the conditions on which he received this dukedom. He has forgotten the ſolemn oath which he took to preſerve our privileges; and that it is an expreſs article of the compact betwixt us, that if he fail in his engagements, our obligation to obey him as our ſovereign ſhall ceaſe. All Europe has witneſſed his open contempt of theſe engagements. All Europe will bear me witneſs, when I ſay, that not a ſingle privilege only, but every privilege of which we boaſted, and which he had ſworn to maintain, has been violated; and not in a ſingle inſtance only, but in a thouſand inſtances. In my own perſon, as I have already hinted, I have had ample experience of his lawleſs tyranny: my ſon, at an age when he was incapable of offending him, has been torn from me. All my eſtates and goods have been confiſcated; and I myſelf declared a traitor and rebel, without any of thoſe forms of trial which the laws require: and by whom? By men of the loweſt claſs veſted with his authority, by pettifoggers, and others too mean to be employed as pages, by one who holds the rank, which I have long held in the Netherlands. I do not deny, that at his acceſſion I took the cuſtomary oath of allegiance; but the tie on me to yield obedience, and that

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on him to afford protection, were mutual; and it is a dictate of common ſenſe, that in obligations of this ſort, the failure of either party ſets the other free from his engagements.

" But even if I had not received any perſonal injury, I ſhould have thought myſelf indiſpenſably obliged to oppoſe the tyrannical meaſures which were purſued. For it is not the prince only who ſwears to maintain the fundamental laws. The ſame oath is required of the nobles, and of all who are admitted into public employments. By this oath I was ſtrictly bound to do every thing in my power to reſcue my fellow-citizens from the oppreſſions under which they groaned, and, had I not done what my enemy complains of, I ſhould have been juſtly chargeable with the crime, of which all the world knows that he has been guilty, a breach of the moſt ſacred and ſolemn obligation.

" To this imputation, I know that his partiſans are ready to reply, that although he ſwore at his acceſſion to maintain our privileges, yet the pope had granted him a diſpenſation from his oath. I leave it to divines and others, better acquainted than I am with religious controverſies, to determine, whether this arrogance of the pope, in aſſuming power to ſet men free from

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from the obligation of an oath, be not an impious encroachment on the prerogative of Heaven, and I leave it to them to determine, whether this pretenſion is not deſtructive of faith among men, and ſubverſive of ſociety. I ſpeak not therefore of the lawfulneſs of Philip's conduct, after having obtained this boaſted diſpenſation, but of his folly in applying for it. The tie between him and his ſubjects was ſtrictly mutual; and by procuring a diſpenſation for himſelf, he at the ſame time ſet me, and all his other ſubjects, free from the engagements which we came under to yield him obedience. It is childiſh and trifling to ſay, that by means of the diſpenſation he is free, but that we who have not been diſpenſed with, are ſtill as much bound as ever. For from the moment that he conſiders himſelf as diſengaged (by what means ſoever his obligation was diſſolved), the condition on which we promiſed obedience being removed, it muſt be abſurd to reproach us with infidelity.

" I COME now to that part of the Proſcription, in which I am accuſed of having been the author of all the diſturbances that have happened. With ſuch of you as are old enough to remember the riſe of theſe diſturbances, there will be no need to defend myſelf againſt ſo groundleſs an imputation; but for the ſake of

of thoſe who were too young at that time to form a judgment of what they ſaw, it is neceſſary I ſhould give ſome account of thoſe tranſactions, which are ſo groſsly miſrepreſented in this infamous proſcription. APPEND. 1589.

" No perſon acquainted with the conduct of my accuſer in his other dominions, or with the cruelties exerciſed in Granada, Mexico, and Peru, will be at a loſs to account for the calamities with which the people of the Low-Countries have been overwhelmed. In the very beginning of his reign, his deſpotic temper was conſpicuous. The emperor his father ſaw it with deep concern, and when the count de Boſſut, and I, and ſeveral others were preſent, he exhorted him to treat his Flemiſh ſubjects with greater moderation; and foretold, that if the pride and arrogance of his Spaniſh counſellors were not reſtrained, the people of the Netherlands would ere long be excited to revolt. But this wholeſome counſel had not the effect which the Emperor intended. His ſon ſtill conſulted only with Spaniards; he ſtill foſtered as much as ever his paſſion for arbitrary power: and reſolved, in contradiction to his intereſt, if rightly underſtood, as well as to his oath, to overturn our conſtitution. The condition annexed to your grant of the nine years' ſupply, that the money ſhould be diſpoſed

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of by your own commiſſioners, excited in him, and in his counſellors, the moſt inveterate reſentment. I have been preſent when theſe counſellors, who knew well their maſter's ſentiments, adviſed him to the purſuit of meaſures, by which you were all to have been adjudged to death. But it was by accident I came to know that theſe bloody counſels had been adopted. From the French King's own mouth, when I reſided at his court as an hoſtage, I learnt that a plan had been concerted with the duke of Alva, to extirpate from France and the Netherlands all who were ſuſpected of being favourably inclined to the reformed religion. I concealed from the French monarch my ignorance of the deſign; and the indignation which it excited in me. By the interceſſion of the ducheſs of Savoy, I obtained leave to return into the Netherlands, where (I deny it not, on the contrary, I glory in it) I promoted with all my influence that earneſt requeſt, which the States preferred to the King for the removal of the Spaniſh troops.

"I ACKNOWLEDGE, that amidſt the numberleſs falſehoods with which this proſcription is filled, there is truth in another part of the charge which is laid againſt me. I acknowledge, that after having remonſtrated in vain to the ducheſs of Parma, againſt the cruel and arbitrary

arbitrary meaſures that were purſued; being prompted by my dread of a civil war, by my concern for the calamities of the people, and by a ſenſe of duty ariſing from the oath which I had ſworn to maintain their rights, I called together the principal nobility, and attempted to open their eyes to the impending danger.

"I ACKNOWLEDGE likewiſe, that I approved of the ſupplication, which was preſented by the nobility, againſt the placarts and executions. I am far from being either aſhamed, or ſorry, for the counſel which I gave. That ſupplication was not only the moſt moderate meaſure that could have been deviſed, but was ſtrictly conformable to the conſtitution and practice of the Netherlands; and happy had it been for the King, as well as for the people, had he complied with the requeſt which it contained.

"WITH reſpect to that part of the proſcription, in which my accuſer reproaches me, on account of the favours which I have ſhewn to the Proteſtants; I confeſs, that before I embraced the reformed religion, I never hated thoſe who profeſſed it. Nor will this appear ſurpriſing, when it is conſidered that my mind had been early tinctured with its principles, and that my father, who had eſtabliſhed it in his dominions, lived and died in the profeſſion

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of it. I confeſs, that even while, in conſequence of my education at the emperor's court I held the Catholic perſuaſion, I always abhorred the barbarities which were exerciſed by the Popiſh inquiſitors. I confeſs, that at the time of the King's departure from Zealand, when he commanded me to put to death certain perſons attached to the Proteſtant faith, I refuſed to obey, and gave theſe perſons private warning of the danger to which they were expoſed. I confeſs, that in the council of State, I made all the oppoſition in my power to the perſecutions that were propoſed; partly from motives of compaſſion or humanity, partly from my conviction of the abſurdity of puniſhing men for opinions which they could not change, when they did not diſturb the public tranquillity; and partly from a perſuaſion, that the violent remedies employed were calculated to diſappoint the end in view. But while, for theſe reaſons, I was from the beginning averſe to perſecution; you all know that I had no concern, either in the introduction of the reformed religion into the Netherlands, or in the rapid progreſs which it made during the government of the ducheſs of Parma. You know, that at that time I poſſeſſed not the ſmalleſt influence with thoſe, by whom it was introduced and propagated; and you likewiſe know, that with regard to thoſe diſorders, into which

which the Proteſtants ſuffered their zeal to betray them, ſo far from giving them my countenance or approbation, I exerted my authority to reſtrain them; I puniſhed the perpetrators with ſeverity, and have been, on account of the rigour which I exerciſed, by many among the Proteſtants, moſt cruelly calumniated and defamed.

"I HOPE to be excuſed, on this occaſion, for obſerving that there is one circumſtance in the proſcription, that gives me pleaſure. Notwithſtanding the malice and rancour, and contempt of truth which my accuſer has diſcovered, there is one crime, often laid to the charge of the governors of provinces, of which he has not ventured to accuſe me; I mean that of avarice, or the embezzlement of the public money. Of this deſpicable crime, indeed, I have been accuſed by ſome unknown perſons, in certain defamatory writings that have been circulated. But from the ſilence obſerved on this head by my inveterate enemy, theſe libellers may ſee the folly, as well as falſehood, of their inſinuations. To you there can be no occaſion to vindicate my conduct. I give thanks to God, that I learnt, at an early period, of how much conſequence it was for one who governs a free people, not only to preſerve himſelf untainted, but even to keep himſelf free

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from the ſuſpicion of corruption. And you know, that on this account I have conſtantly declined taking any charge of the public money; and from the beginning of my adminiſtration, have transferred both the collection and diſtribution of it to others.

"I AM accuſed in the proſcription, of having practiſed to return into Holland, by undertaking to defend the people from the tax of the tenth penny, which, it is ſaid, was impoſed upon them by the duke of Alva, without the King's conſent; and I am accuſed likewiſe of having perſecuted and expelled the Catholics. If, by practiſing, my accuſer means that I ſolicited for liberty to return, there is as little truth in this, as in his other aſſertions. I myſelf was moſt earneſtly ſolicited; and I am ready to ſhew letters which I received, not only from the governors of towns, but from the citizens, intreating me to come and deliver them from the tyranny of the Spaniards. And, in complying with theſe intreaties, what did I do that my duty did not require from me? I attempted to deliver from ſlavery, the provinces which had been committed to my care; whoſe liberties I had ſworn to maintain; and of the right to govern which the King had no power, without the conſent of the States, to deprive me.

"No

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"No part of this proſcription gives me greater ſurpriſe, than that in which I am accuſed of perſecution. It is impoſſible but even the Romaniſts themſelves muſt bear witneſs to the falſehood of ſo injurious an imputation. No perſon in the Netherlands can be ignorant, that far from employing rigour, I have often argued and remonſtrated againſt it, and have promoted lenity in the treatment of the Catholics to the utmoſt of my power. Of this, even my accuſer himſelf ſeems to make an indirect acknowledgment. I feigned, he ſays, that the perſecution of the Catholics diſpleaſed me. But how does he know that I feigned? Have not my actions been at all times open? Why does he not judge from them of my intention? Never had one perſon leſs ground for accuſing another of any crime, than my accuſer has to caſt on me the imputation of hypocriſy. Did I, either before, or at the time when he conferred theſe obligations upon me, for which he has reproached me with ingratitude; did I ever offer the incenſe of flattery, either to himſelf or to the ducheſs of Parma, or his tools and confidents in the council? On the contrary, did I not openly, and without diſguiſe, condemn the meaſures which he had dictated, and which they purſued? Was it poſſible for me to ſpeak more plainly than I did, or to give a clearer teſtimony of my averſion to his deſigns,

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than by desiring him, as I did frequently, to suffer me to resign my governments, because it was not in my power to yield him the obedience which he required? Such was my conduct before my departure into Germany; and since that time, is there a single step of my conduct that will admit of the interpretation of hypocrisy? Did I not openly solicit aid from the German princes to oppose him? Have I not raised armies against him; taken towns which he possessed; repulsed his forces; and expelled him utterly from at least two of the provinces over which he tyrannized? Is there any thing in this that can be termed hypocrisy.

"But my accuser will not find it so easy to vindicate his own conduct from this odious imputation. Read my defence which I published some years ago; and you will perceive to which of us belongs the appellation of hypocrite and deceiver. In that defence there are copies of letters which I received from him, filled with professions of friendship and regard, at the very time when, as appears from the sequel, he had doomed me to destruction.

"But why should I expect to be dealt with equitably, by one whose conscience allows him to affirm, that his minister the duke of Alva imposed the tax of the tenth penny, and urged

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the levying of it with ſuch inflexible obſtinacy, without his authority or conſent? Is it credible that one who knew this King's temper ſo well as Alva, and who had ever ſhewn the greateſt ſolicitude to pleaſe him, would have preſumed, by a meaſure ſo tyrannical and unprecedented, to run the riſk of kindling a civil war? Or, if this wary Spaniard was in reality ſo raſh and preſumptuous, can it be believed by any perſon who conſiders the important conſequences with which his raſhneſs and preſumption were attended, that the King would not, long ere this time, have diſavowed him, and made him feel the weight of his diſpleaſure? Was not Alva puniſhed for ordering his ſon to marry his couſin, rather than another woman, whom he had debauched under a promiſe of marriage? Was not this old ſervant baniſhed for this venial tranſgreſſion, from his maſter's preſence, and thrown into priſon, from which he would never have been delivered, if one better qualified to tyrannize over the Portugueſe could have been found in Spain? And what opinion muſt we form of a King, who, for this private offence, could puniſh an ancient friend and ſervant with ſo much ſeverity; while, notwithſtanding the crime of treaſon, the moſt public and notorious, and productive of the moſt dreadful calamities to his faithful ſubjects, he not only ſuffered him to paſs unpuniſhed, but received him with

APPEND. 1580. with open arms, and loaded him with honours? After this, will he ſtill employ the language of a good King, and boaſt of his affection for his people?"

In a great part of what remains of this Apology, the prince of Orange enters into a detail of the tranſactions recorded in the preceding hiſtory. I ſhall therefore paſs over this, and ſet before the reader what relates to the reproach, which Philip caſts on William's marriage with the daughter of the duke de Montpenſier, who was the princeſs of Orange at the time of publiſhing the proſcription.

"My accuſer," continues he, "is not ſatisfied with ſaying every thing that can blacken my character, and render it odious to the world, but he has likewiſe attempted to taint the honour of my wife. He ſays, "that I have infamouſly married a religious woman, ſolemnly bleſſed by the hands of the biſhop, in contradiction to the laws of Chriſtianity, and of the Romiſh church, and that I did ſo whilſt my marriage ſubſiſted with another woman." Though this aſſertion were ſtrictly true, it would ill become this inceſtuous and adulterous King to accuſe me. But you know that it is entirely without foundation. My marriage with my former wife, now dead, did not ſubſiſt,

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ſiſt, and the ground of her-divorce was approved even by the doctors of the Roman church; and by thoſe illuſtrious princes to whom ſhe was allied. My preſent wife was not, even by the rules of the popiſh church, a religious woman, in the ſenſe made by my accuſer. The duke of Montpenſier, my father-in-law, who is ſincerely attached to the Catholic communion (not as cardinal Granvelle, and other Spaniſh miniſters, from intereſt, but from principle and conviction), ſpared no pains to put the lawfulneſs of his daughter's marriage beyond doubt or controverſy. He found it the clear opinion, not only of the principal perſons in the Parliament of Paris, but of ſeveral biſhops and doctors whom he conſulted, that even if a promiſe of celibacy had been given by my wife, yet, in conſideration of her youth, it would not have been binding, as it would have been contrary to the rules of the Gallican church, to the decrees of the high court of juſtice in France, and even to the ordinances of the councils of Trent, to which my adverſary pays ſuch unlimited ſubmiſſion. He likewiſe found, that in reality no ſuch promiſe was ever made; that ſundry proteſtations had been taken, to prevent any perſon from imagining that his daughter ever intended to take the vow; and that, even in her abſence, the moſt undeniable evidence of this had been produced.

"I SAID

APPEND. 1580. "I SAID before, that although my marriage were not so unexceptionable as you see it is, even by the principles of the church of Rome, it would ill become my accuser to reproach me on account of it. He seems not to have remembered the common maxim, that whoever ventures to accuse another, ought to be well assured that he himself is innocent. And yet is not this King, who has endeavoured to stigmatise my lawful marriage with infamy, the husband of his own niece? It will be said by his partisans, that he previously obtained a dispensation from the pope. But does not the voice of nature cry aloud against such an incestuous conjunction? And in order to make room for this marriage, is it not true, that he put to death his former wife, the mother of his children, the daughter and sister of the kings of France? I say not this, prompted by my resentment, rashly and at random: I assert, that in France there is evidence of the horrid deed of which I now accuse him.

"IT was not a single murder that was perpetrated for the sake of this extraordinary marriage. His son too, his only son, was sacrificed, in order to furnish the pope with a pretext for so unusual a dispensation; which was granted, in order to prevent the Spanish monarchy from being left without a male-heir.

This

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This was the true cauſe of the death of Don Carlos, againſt whom ſome miſdemeanours were alleged; but not a ſingle crime ſufficient to juſtify his condemnation, much leſs to vindicate a father for imbruing his hands in the blood of his ſon. And if Don Carlos was in reality guilty of crimes deſerving death, ought not an appeal to have been made to us, his future ſubjects? Did the right of judging, and pronouncing ſentence of death againſt the heir of ſuch extenſive dominions, belong to Spaniſh friars and inquiſitors, the obſequious ſlaves of the father's tyranny?

"But perhaps this good King made conſcience of leaving for his heir a prince, whom he knew to be born in unlawful wedlock. For Philip's marriage with the mother of Don Carlos was not leſs contrary to the laws of God and man, than that other of which I have already ſpoken. At the very time when he eſpouſed the princeſs of Portugal, the mother of Carlos, his marriage ſubſiſted with Iſabella Oſorio, by whom he had two ſons, Pedro and Bernardino; a marriage brought about by Ruo Gomez de Silva, prince of Evoli, to which that nobleman was indebted for his power and greatneſs. And beſides, is it not well known that this King lived in habitual adultery with another woman, the lady Euphraſia? Did he not compel

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pel the prince of Aſcoli to take that lady for his wife, when ſhe was big with child by himſelf? And while it has been affirmed with certainty, that that unhappy man was taken off by poiſon; do not even the Spaniſh courtiers aſcribe his death to the grief which he conceived from the affront to which he was obliged to ſubmit, and the cruel neceſſity impoſed on him, of acknowledging for his heir the adulterous baſtard of another? Such, and ſo chaſte has been the conduct of this King, who has the aſſurance to calumniate my lawful marriage as a violation of the ſacred laws of chaſtity.

"But I ſhall haſten to conclude this Apology, after offering ſome remarks concerning the nature of the ſentence that has been pronounced againſt me. It is in this part of the edict of proſcription, that the compiler, whether the King himſelf or ſome ignoble inſtrument of his tyranny, has employed all the thunder and lightning of his eloquence. But I thank God, it intimidates me no more, than the anathemas of Clement VII. intimidated my kinſman prince Philibert, when he beſieged and took the Pontiff priſoner in his caſtle of St. Angelo, after the proofs which I have given, that I fear not all the power which my adverſary is poſſeſſed of; and after contending for ſo many years againſt his beſt generals, with numerous armies

armies under their command, it was weak in him to expect to frighten me with the high-sounding terms of this proscription. I have less reason now, than formerly, to dread the attempts of those abandoned wretches, whom he has endeavoured to instigate against me. For I am not ignorant, that before this time he has bargained with poisoners, and other murderers, to deprive me of my life. He has now given me a public warning of his bloody design. And with the divine assistance, and the vigilance of my friends, I trust, that, notwithstanding his diabolical machinations, my life shall be preserved so long as the prosperity and interest of this people, to whose service I have devoted it, shall require. APPEND. 158c.

"My confidence on this head is greatly augmented by reflecting upon the indignation, which I cannot doubt will be generally excited by that extraordinary method of proceeding against me, which my adversary has adopted. For there is not, I am persuaded, a nation or prince in Europe, by whom it will not be thought dishonourable and barbarous, thus publicly to authorise and encourage murder; except the Spaniards, and their King, who have been long estranged from every sentiment of honour and humanity. In having recourse to private assassinations against a declared and open enemy,

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enemy, does not this mighty monarch confeſs his deſpair of being able to ſubdue me by force of arms? Does he not give a teſtimony in my behalf, and diſcover that he dreads the efforts which I may make againſt him? Is it not weak and mean, to make publicly ſo puſillanimous an acknowledgment? But the weakneſs and meanneſs of his conduct is not greater than the abſurdity of his choice of the rewards, which he holds forth to thoſe who ſhall execute his bloody purpoſe. For it is not money only that he offers them, but nobility and honour; as if a regard to honour could influence a man capable of perpetrating a deed held in univerſal deteſtation. And if any perſon already poſſeſſed of nobility were to pollute himſelf by ſo foul an action, would not his nobility from that moment be annihilated? Would not all ſociety and connection with him be held diſhonourable?

"EVEN my adverſary himſelf ſeems to have been in ſome meaſure ſenſible of the truth of this, and therefore he addreſſes himſelf more particularly to criminals and malefactors, as thoſe who are moſt likely to comply with his requeſt. "And in order," ſays he, "that his deſtruction may be the more effectually and ſpeedily accompliſhed, we, deſirous of puniſhing vice and rewarding virtue, promiſe on the word

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word of a king, and as the miniſter of God, that if any perſon ſhall be found poſſeſſed of courage and public ſpirit ſufficient to animate him to the execution of this decree, and to free us from the aforeſaid peſt of ſociety, we ſhall order to be delivered to him, either in land or money as he ſhall incline, the ſum of twenty-five thouſand crowns; and if he ſhall have committed any crime, however enormous, we promiſe to grant him our royal pardon; and if he be not already noble, we hereby confer nobility upon him, and likewiſe on all thoſe who ſhall aid and aſſiſt him." Is not this, in plain terms, calling on every deſperate wretch, every outcaſt from ſociety, to aſſiſt him in the execution of his deſign? No crime, however enormous, but ſhall be pardoned; no criminal, however deteſtable, but ſhall be crowned with honour. Does this king deſerve the title which he aſſumes, of a miniſter of God, who thus confounds the diſtinction between vice and virtue; and thus publicly avows his willingneſs to beſtow the higheſt rewards and honours upon men defiled with the moſt abominable crimes? Have I not ground to rejoice in being perſecuted by one whoſe conſcience allows him to have recourſe to ſuch unhallowed means? And is not ſuch depravity of ſentiment in my accuſer, a teſtimony in behalf of my integrity?

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"I HAVE now ſaid all that ſeems neceſſary to vindicate my character from thoſe falſe aſperſions which are thrown upon it in this proſcription. Many things which I might have ſaid, I have purpoſely omitted. Had I deſcended to a particular account of the cruelty, accompanied with a contempt of the moſt ſacred obligations, which has been exerciſed by my accuſer over this unhappy people, I ſhould never have come to a concluſion. But with you there can be no occaſion for giving a more particular detail. You have been ſpectators of the horrid ſcene; and have borne your ſhare of thoſe oppreſſions which would fall to be deſcribed.

"BUT before I conclude, I muſt intreat you to reflect ſeriouſly upon the means to which our enemy finds it neceſſary to have recourſe, in order to accompliſh his deſigns. This infamous proſcription, joined to the pains which he and his miniſters continually employ to create diviſions among the provinces, ſhews clearly that he now deſpairs of enſlaving us by force of arms, while we remain united.

"IT is indeed againſt me chiefly, at this time, that his deſigns are directed. "Were I removed," he ſays, "either by death or baniſhment, tranquillity would be reſtored." You will eaſily conceive what tranquillity he means,

means, if you call to mind your condition, before I returned into the Netherlands, when you groaned under the tyranny of the duke of Alva. Would to heaven that by my baniſhment or death you could be delivered from your calamities! My enemy ſhould not, in that caſe, find it neceſſary to employ poiſoners and aſſaſſins to deſtroy me. You all know how often I have expoſed myſelf to danger in your defence. I leave it to you, to whom alone it belongs, to determine, whether my life and preſence be repugnant or conducive to the intereſt of the provinces. To you only, and not to the King of Spain, I am accountable for my conduct. You have full authority (and I pledge myſelf to ſubmit to it) to diſpoſe, as you ſhall incline, either of my perſon, or of my life. Interpoſe that authority with which I acknowledge you to be inveſted, and give orders either for my departure from among you, or for my death; if you judge either the one or the other for the general good. But if, on the contrary, my paſt conduct has convinced you, as I truſt it has, of the ſincerity of my zeal and attachment; or if my long experience gives you confidence in my ability for conducting your affairs, I ſhall ſtill continue to employ, in your ſervice, the talents which I poſſeſs, hoping that you will liſten to the earneſt exhortations which I have given you, to maintain harmony and

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concord in the ſtate; and exert yourſelves ſtrenuouſly for the defence of this people, whom you have undertaken to protect; depending on the favour of the Almighty, that your endeavours for this end ſhall be attended with ſucceſs."

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